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ABSTRACT 
In the eight years of its existence, from 1983 to 1991, the United Democratic Front had a 
major impact on the pace and direction of political struggles in South Africa. The UDF was 
a loose alliance of organizations, whose strength was determined by the nature of the 
organizations affiliated to it. This thesis explores the nature of the problems faced by the 
UDF in the Pietermaritzburg region, and how it sought to respond to them. Chapter one 
-covers the period from 1976 to 1984. This chapter surveys the political context in which
the UDF was formed, beginning with the Soweto uprising of 1976, and continuing with the
growth of extra-parliamentary organizations in the late 1970s and early 1980s, leading up
to the formation of the UDF in 1983. This chapter ends with emergence of organized
extra-parliamentary activities in Pietermaritzburg in 1984. Chapter two assesses the period
between 1984 and mid-1986. This was the time when the UDF activists began to mobilize
in the region, and it was during this period that UDF structures were set up. This period
also witnessed growing tensions between youth and parents, and between UDF and
lnkatha supporters. The chapter ends when the state clamped down on extra­
parliamentary activities by declaring a national state of emergency in June 1986. Chapter
three assesses the period between mid-1986 and the second half of 1989. This was the
period when the South African state and lnkatha came out in full force to suppress the
UDF. Through the use of emergency regulations, the state detained and restricted UDF
activists, and in February 1988 eventually banned organization. During this period, the
UDF and lnkatha supporters were engaged in violent clashes. These struggles took on the
proportion of a civil war in the region, particularly in 1987. However, political events took
another turn in the second half of 1989, when extra-parliamentary organizations resurfaced
and embarked on mass defiance campaigns. Extra-parliamentary organizations, organized
these campaigns under the mantle of the Mass Democratic Movement. Chapter four starts
by assessing the impact of the mass defiance campaigns and ends at the time when the
UDF was officially disbanded in August 1991. These last two years were dramatic for the
UDF, nationally and regionally. In Pietermaritzburg, immediately after a series of
successful mass demonstrations, UDF activists began a programme of restructuring the
Front. The process was short-lived because in February 1990, when the South African 
government unbanned previously banned political organizations, including the UDF, 
African National Congress, Pan Africanist Congress, and others, the UDF had to begin to 
redefine its political role. Most UDF activists crossed over to the ANC, and in- 1991 the 
leaders of the UDF decided to dissolve the organization. In the Pietermaritzburg region 
the UDF disbanded more quickly than in other regions, largely because of the particular 
problems that the Front had experienced in this region. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis explores the role of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the political struggles 
in the Pietermaritzburg region from the time of its formation in 1983 to the time of its 
dissolution in 1991. The thesis starts with the Soweto uprising of 1976-77 to give an 
historical context in which the UDF was formed. The Soweto uprising marked a watershed 
in South African history. In 1976 active political resistance to apartheid, which had been 
suppressed by the state in the early 1960s, began to resurface. The uprising completely 
transformed the political environment. 1 It gave a new-found determination to black people, 
particularly the youth (young people at schools and school-leavers), not to accept South 
African society as unchanging or unchangeable, and it created a psychological readiness 
to act in this cause.2 Althoug� � ��u��-�mQ}ed�mpact in 
Pietermaritzburg, its aftermath was felt in every corner of the country. Events that followed 
,_ 
the Soweto uprising culminated in the resurgence of black trade unions, community 
organizations, student movements, Black Consciousness organization, and the formation 
of the United Democratic Front in 1983. 
The formation of the United Democratic Front specifically to oppose the National Party 
government's proposed constitutional reforms marked the beginning of an important phase 
in the politics of resistance in South Africa. T� UDF was to J2e_�_Fror1t�of.0!9�nizations 
that were, among other things, opposed to apartheid and to the bantustan policy, that 
aspired to be non-racial and democratic in organization, and that believed in mass action 
as a means of carrying political struggles forward. Essentially the UDF was an umbrella 
1 Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 
(Johannesburg, Ravan, 1983), p. 330. 
2 John Brewer, After Soweto: An Unfinished Journey 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1986), p. 413. 
1 
• 
organization, which individuals could not join directly but only through affiliate 
organizations. 3 
The founding of the UDF at a time when the country was experiencing socio-economic 
upheavals led to the rebirth of a number of black organizations, and put hundreds of 
local community issues into a national political context. 4 Although the call for the 
formation of the UDF was first articulated in the Transvaal, its appeal rapidly became 
nation-wide. Former ANC supporters and people from various religious groups, trade 
unions, community groups, including those who were not comfortable with the tight 
ideological parameters of Black Consciousness, rallied to the UDF's banner.5 From the 
time of its launching in August 1983, the UDF moved towards the Congress strand of 
politics. 
The first few months of the UDF's existence-were relatively trouble-free, except in the 
Transvaal region, vvhere a number of UDF activists were detained for a short time and 
several meetings banned.6 Those who were detained belonged to certain civic 
organizations and were involved in organizing either protest marches against the 
passing of the South African Constitutional Act or rent boycotts�s that the 
government was initially cautious in its approach to the UDF. Possibly the government 
wished to avoid. a repetition of the worldwide condemnation that had followed the 
3 Steven McDonald, ... A guide to black politics in South 
Africa', in Helen Kitchen (eds.), South Africa: 
Transition to What? (New York, Praeger, 1988), p. 47. 
4 Steven Mufson, Fighting Years: ,Black Resistance and the
Struggle for a New south Africa (Boston, Beacon, 1990), 
p. 61.
5 McDonald, 'A guide to black politics in South Africa'.
p. 47.
6 Ibid, p . 5 5 . 
2 
banning and detention of Black Consciousness leadership in 1977. 7 On the other hand, 
tolerance of the UDF, and allowing it to function freely, could be viewed as a 
demonstration of the government's new reformist politics. 8 But black aspirations quickly 
outran any possible programmes of government-led reform. The government's 
acceptance of the principle that there was a need to reform itself acted as a spur of 
hope for anti-apartheid activists that the iron grip of apartheid could be broken at last, 
and served to stimulate the resurgence of popular political opposition. 9 
A change in the government's attitude towards the UDF began in 1984-85. This was -------- -
after the leaders of the Front began to take the initiative in leading prot�st campaigns 
and stayaways. Rent increases, bus fare hikes, election boycotts on the part of 
coloureds and Indians, protest against whites-only elections, enactment of the South 
African Constitutional Act in September 1984, black students' protests about lack of 
proper education facilities at their schools, and strikes by various black trade unions 
usually sparked the stayaways. Most of the protests in 1983-4 were concentrated in the 
Transvaal region; by 1985, most other regions had followed suit, including 
Pietermaritzburg. By 1985 state monitoring of the UDF was becoming stricter, as the 
Front was clearly winning support across much of the country, and becoming a 
stumbling block to the government's reform initiatives. 
The 1980s also witnessed growing divisions within black communities. Terms like 
'collaborators' and ·sellouts' were used by anti-apartheid activists to label those who 
in one way or another supported government policy, while the latter labelled anti­
apartheid activists as 'radicals'. An important topic in this thesis is the intensification 
7 Ibid. 
8 Thabo Thule, 'Violence in Pietermaritzburg', in Fatima 
Meer (ea·.), Resistance in the Townships (Durban, 
Madiba, 1989), p. 203. 
9 Ken Owen, 'A fundamental shift in South African 
politics?', in Kitchen (ed.), south Africa :In
Transition to What?, p. 142. 
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of struggles between black communities in the Pietermaritzburg region from the early 
1980s onwards. Pietermaritzburg was the scene of ferocious conflicts between the UDF 
and lnkatha. The thesis gives an analysis of how the struggles began, what intensified 
them, and how they were conducted. The struggles which took place in the 
Pietermaritzburg region in the 1980s can be analyzed from three angles. Firstly, they k_
can be seen as conflicts between 'collaborators' (lnkatha supporters) and 'radicals' \ 
-- -
(UDF supporters). Secondly, they can be analyzed as conflicts between 'radicals' and 
the state, and thir�ly, they can be analyzed in broad social terms as conflicts between 
'progressives' and 'reactionaries'. Unlike the situation in other regions, -where the 
'radicals' were usually superior in strength to the 'collaborators', in Pietermaritzburg 
and in other Natal regions the 'collaborators' often matched the 'radicals' in strength 
on the ground. 
To some extent lnkatha supporters were acting in the cause of serving their (ruling) 
party and its administrative structure, the KwaZulu government. If lnkatha had 
successfully suppressed the UDF in the region, this would have been a source of relief 
for the South African government for two reasons. Firstly, it would have reduced the 
state's expenditure on checking the UDF in Natal. Secondly, the state would have felt 
confident that the 'progressive' organizations in Natal would be permanently checked. 
A central question that the thesis attempts to address is how the UDF managed to 
survived lnkatha and the state onslaughts. In this region the struggles took on the 
proportions of a civil war in 1987. Elsewhere in the country the emergency regulations 
had managed to silence extra-parliamentary activists. 
This study also assesses the strengths and the weaknesses of the UDF in 
Pietermaritzburg's politics. The fact that the UDF was a Front (a loose federation), and 
not a tightly organized political party, led to several complications in its functioning. 
The thesis assesses the manner in which the UDF functioned in the region, the 
relationship between UDF national and regional structures, and between the 
organization and its affiliates. It explores the complications that were caused by the fact 
4 
-- - - · ... --
that the UDF, whether at national or regional level, could not impose its policies on its 
affiliates. The affiliates could take up UDF campaigns in ways they thought suitable for 
their constituencies. 10 Although some UDF national or regional campaigns were 
successful, the word 'united' at times seemed to be reflective of wishful thinking rather 
than of political realities. 11 I will analyze this weakness of the UDF through assessing 
the internal struggles that constantly kept those who were supposed to be in the 
leadership of the Front at loggerheads in the region. 
The Front's organizational structure meant that its functioning was beset with problems. 
For instance, voting powers were not proportional to the size of the affiliates. Each 
affiliate had an equal say, whatever its size. This gave more power and voice to the 
student and youth groups that dominated the UDF. The Front also faced procedural 
difficulties in dealing with urgent situations. Its decisions were supposed to be reached 
by consensus, and as a result major decisions took a long time to be made, while the 
government, by contrast, could act swiftly and decisively. 12 With these difficulties and 
complications in mind, a question that the thesis tries to address is how effective the 
UDF was in handling problems that confronted it (combatting the emergency 
regulations). Was it the ineffectiveness of the Front in handling its problems that led to 
the emergence of the 'cabal'? This was a group of UDF activists who allegedly took 
decisions on behalf of the Front in the region without consulting other members. Was 
the Front a real threat to the state or it was only a psychological threat? To answer · 
these questions, the thesis assesses the manner in which the UDF managed to 
mobilize and organize its supporters in the region. The thesis also tries to analyze the 
extent to which the programmes of the Front were distorted by state agents through 
intimidation, and campaigns that were aimed at discrediting the UDF. 13 
10 Mufson, Fighting Years, p. 58. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Stephen Davis, Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South 
Africa's Hidden war (London, Yale University Press, 1987), p. 93. 
5 
Also important to note is that, although the UDF had a substantial number of supporters 
among Indians in the Pietermaritzburg region, this study will mainly focus on 
developments in the African townships. This is mainly because most of the struggles 
which characterized UDF politics in the region from 1984 to 1991 took place in African 
townships of the Edendale valley, lmbali, Sobantu, and others, and in the Vulindlela 
area. Analysis of the pattern of political struggles in the Pietermaritzburg region reveals 
that lmbali was the focal point. The struggle started in this township and then shifted 
to Sobantu and other townships, and to the peri-urban areas of Vulindlela. 
However, some Indian activists contributed to struggles in the African townships by 
acting as role models in establishing street committees and civic organizations. Some 
Indian 'comrades' even went to the extent of regularly visiting black townships and 
encouraging communities to form organizational structures. Among youth 
organizations, interaction between Indians and Africans was minimal. It was only a few 
Indian youth leaders, mainly at the University of Natal, who fully interacted with African 
youth organizations in the townships. Most of these Indian youth leaders came from the 
Bombay Heights Youth Organization. 14 A few whites interacted with the organizations 
in the townships. Otherwise most whites learned of the struggles in the townships only 
through media reports or when a maid, gardener or black factory worker did not attend 
work, or at times when there was a .protest march in town. 
There are few secondary sources that cover the subject of this study.· As a result, it is 
largely based on interviews. I made efforts to interview key UDF activists in 
Pietermaritzburg region. However, some had left Pietermaritzburg, some I could not 
meet because of their busy schedules, and sadly some have died because of political 
conflict. I have checked my interviews as far as possible. Since the study focuses 
mainly on the UDF, I have not gone into detail about other organizations or groups in 
14 Author's interview with Jorry Mohamed (UNP, 28 May 
1995) 
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the region that were not directly involved in conflicts with the UDF. This thesis therefore 
constitutes a preliminary study. 
Detailed treatment of the thesis topic begins in 1984 because this was when the UDF 
began to organize and mobilize people in the region. Four chapters follow this 
introduction. The first chapter discusses the socio-economic and political context in 
which the UDF was formed; It develops a chronology from the 1976 Soweto uprising 
to 1984. The central issues discussed are the formation of radical student movements, 
the surge in black trade unionism after the report of the Wiehahn Commission of 1979, 
the social reforms after the report of the Riekert Commission in 1979, the Black Local 
Authority Act of 1983 and the Constitutional Reform Act of 1983, the economic 
recession of the early 1980s, the formation of the UDF in 1983, and the impact of these 
changes in the Pietermaritzburg region. The chapter ends when opponents of the 
government in the region were beginning to- become actively involved in the politics of 
resistance in 1984. This was the period when youth organizations that later affiliated 
to the UDF were formed in the region, and high-school students began to participate 
actively in the politics of the Front. The increase in the number of radical youths is an 
important theme because the youth played a prominent role in UDF politics in the 
region. Youth and students (high school and university students nationwide from 1976, 
and in Pietermaritzburg frorn the 1980s) openly spoke out against the passivity of their 
parents, and this sparked generational friction. It was during this period that the UDF 
began to take a lead in organizing and mobilizing people in the region. 
Chapter two begins with the formation of the UDF as a regional organization in the 
Pietermaritzburg area. The chapter explores how the UDF structures in 
Pietermaritzburg related to other UDF structures, particularly national ones. This 
chapter looks at the organizational aspects of the Front, focusing on how the Front 
mobilized people to support its cause. The areas that were exposed to UDF activities 
became far more politicized and militant than before. lmbali township is an example of 
where this · radicalization' occurred. The militancy and radicalism that took root in lmbali 
spilled over to Sobantu, Edendale and Vulindlela. 
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Chapter two also assesses the problems that the UDF faced in the region. It makes a 
critical assessment of the reaction of the state and lnkatha to the emergence of the 
UDF in the region. A detailed assessment of the state's role during the 1986 state of 
emergency is given. The relationship between the UDF and lnkatha is analyzed 
through examination of the education crisis that involved the student movements, and 
through analysin·g the struggle between lnkatha-vigilante groups and the lmbali civic 
association (ICA), a UDF affiliate. The chapter also looks at how lnkatha forged links 
with vigilante groups in the region and why the UDF became an opponent of these 
groups. 
The emergence of COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Union) in 1985, and its 
role in shaping politics in the Natal Midlands, are also discussed in this chapter. 
COSATU's federal structure, like that of the UDF, served to instill among black workers 
a sense of their power as a united body. Labour had for the first time fashioned a 
national administrative structure, focusing workers' attention on apartheid as the 
ultimate source of shopfloor discontent. 15 Nevertheless, the federal, decentralized 
nature of COSATU imposed a political culture of negotiations and compromise that 
made the federation vulnerable in a turbulent situation like the one in Natal. No matter 
how urgent the matter at hand, decisions vvere slow in coming, dependent as they were 
on each major partner finding and representing its own union consensus to the 
executive. 16 
The chapter ends by highlighting how the 1986 national state of emergency managed 
to suppress most extra-parliamentary opposition in the region and in the country as a 
whole. UDF activists were arrested and detained, and some went into hiding. These 
actions taken by the state disorganized the Front. The year saw the imposition of a 
blanket of silence on· extra-parliamentary organizations in the whole country. In the 
15 Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, p. 93. 
16 Ibid. 
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Natal Midlands, however, the paradox is that the new phase was marked by 
intensification of the struggles between the UDF and lnkatha. 
The third chapter assesses the period between 1986 and 1989. The chapter covers the 
period from the state of emergency imposed on 12 June 1986 to the Mass Defiance 
Campaigns in late 1989. Late 1989 witnessed the resurfacing of extra-parliamentary 
activists with new vigour. This chapter also assesses the tactics adopted by the UDF, 
lnkatha and the state during the political struggles of the period in the Pietermaritzburg 
region. The UDF, lnkatha and the state followed several different strategies. On a 
number of occasions the UDF and lnkatha held peace talks. However, the talks failed 
because of differences in the views and interests of these two groups. UDF supporters 
often viewed proposals made by the state and lnkatha with suspicion, while lnkatha and 
state representatives, in the form of the police, viewed UDF proposals as 'radical' 
demands (demands for revolutionary change). 
When there was progress, the state intervened to scuttle the peace talks by arresting 
key UDF activists. The state continuously strove to suppress the UDF through 
deployment of 'kitskonstabels', legislating measures to suppress UDF activity, and 
placing restrictions on some UDF activists, and detaining others. The chapter tries to 
explore how effective these steps were in suppressing resistance. It also looks at the 
ways in which they exacerbated political conflict. The chapter also assesses the role 
of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce in its attempts to achieve a peaceful 
solution among the warring parties. 
Furthermore, the chapter explores UDF activities during this conflict, assessing whether 
the state and lnkatha weakened the Front or whether there were other factors that 
weakened it. Activities of UDF affiliates like the South African Youth Congress 
(SAYCO) and the Release Mandela Committee (RMC) are assessed because they 
formed an important component of the Front's grassroots organization. The chapter 
also looks at t!:le manner in which the Mass Democratic Movement (a loose alliance of 
progressive organization which emerged during the state of emergency years) 
9 
coordinated the mass defiance campaigns of 1989. These campaigns transformed the 
political scene in the region and even nationally. This chapter ends when the mass 
defiance campaigns began. 
The fourth chapter begins at the time when the mass defiance campaigns were taking­
off. The chapter assesses the impact and the aftermath of the mass defiance 
campaigns of 1989. The chapter looks at the release of political prisoners and the 
surge in political activities of extra-parliamentary. Also, the chapter assesses the 
restructuring process attempted in 1989 and 1990 by the UDF and SAYCO in the Natal 
Midlands. Furthermore, the chapter assesses the move by the South African 
government to meet the demands made to it by extra-parliamentary political 
organizations. 
However, the government's unbanning of political organizations in February 1990 
marked a turning-point for the UDF. It had to redefine its role in the new political context 
that came into being. The MOM disappeared without a formal decision being taken. The 
chapter examines in depth the relationship between the UDF and the ANC in the 
region. Also, this chapter analyzes the conflict in 1990 between the UDF-ANC and 
lnkatha supporters in the Edendale Valley, that culminated in what is now called the 
Seven Days War. Finally, the discussion focuses on the disbandment of the United 
Democratic Front after eight years i_n the politics of resistance. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
'SAYING NO TO APARTHEID': FROM SOWETO TO THE FORMATION OF THE UDF 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the historical context in which the United Democratic Front was 
formed on 20 August 1983. The upsurge of youth politics at the end of the 1970s is the 
obvious starting point because it marked the revival of resistance politics in several forms. 
These included the increased articulation of black political thought opposing apartheid, 
the emergence of a strong and politically militant labour movement, and a successful 
quasi-military offensive (on the part of liberation movements) that deprived the government 
., 
of the control of the black ·townships. 1 Tile economic_cegessiQ!.1 of the early 1980s 
-·-- -- . .. -='-'· ·- "':I, 
intensified black political militancy. The recession that began to set in during the first
quarter of 1982 not only undermined real wage levels, but also fuelled protest and
resistance from a large sector of African people. This is because it limited the state's
capacity to subsidize transport and bread prices, to finance housing construction and the
provision of urban services, and to upgrade education and health facilities.2 Furthermore,
�- -1
this black resurgence gathered momentum in the face of determined government efforts 
to squash7ffhrough · repressive measures, and to undermine it through limited reforms, 
like accommodating individuals from the oppressed communities who were prepared to 
work with the authorities. To_e state tried to modernise apartheid through its reform 
programme, called __ '.total strategy\ As Ken Owen argues, these reforms did not have the 
- , __ J
1 R. Hunt Davis, Apartheid Unravels (Gainesville,
University of Florida Press, 1991), p. 2.2 Kumi Naidoo, 'The politics of youth resistance in the 
1980s: The. dilemmas of a differentiated Durban', 
Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 18, no. 1 
(1991), p. 149. 
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envisaged effects, but instead 'they acted as a spur of h<>pe_ for the extra-parliamentary 
---·-· ----- · 
activists that the iron grip of apartheid could at last be broken. '3 
The Soweto uprising marked a watershed in South African history. In 1976 political 
activities similar to those of the 1950s and 1960s, which repressive laws had silenced, 
began to resurface, but now with a more radical approach to protest and defiance. The 
uprising completely transformed the political environment.4 It gave a new-found 
determination to African people, particularly the youth, not to accept South African 
society as unchanging or unchangeable, and it created a psychological readiness to 
act in this cause. 5 The patterns of resurgence varied from region to region. 
The period from 1976 to 1983 witnessed several fundamental social changes. First 
it witnessed the collapse of the widespread belief in the white community that the 
Verwoerdian idea of apartheid Y10uld bring peace and security.6 Secondly, it witnessed 
a much more substantial and sustained black challenge to white political domination. 
Thirdly it saw the first efforts by the ruling class to expand its base, through attempts 
to accommodate a black elite politically.7 
3 Ken Owen, 'A fundamental shift in South African 
politics?', in Helen Kitchen (ed.), South Africa: In 
Transition to What? (New York, Praeger, 1988), p. 142. 
4 Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 
(Johannesburg, Ravan, 1983), p. 330. 
s John Brewer, After Soweto; An Unfinished Journey 
(Oxford, Clarendon, 1986), p. 413. 
6 Hermann Giliomee, The Parting of the Ways; South 
African Politics 1976-82 (Cape Town, David Philip, 
1982), p. 10. 
7 Ibid. 12 
The resurgence of black politics, 1976 - 1983 
The Soweto uprising saw the emergence of new forms of protest. The passive 
resistance of the late 1950s was transformed into physical confrontation. The burning 
of the , dompas' was replaced by the burning of cars, homes, administrative offices, 
shops and beer halls. Sovveto students vvere the engineers of the protest, which spread 
to all the Reef townships within a short time. There were outbreaks too in places far 
from the Reef and from one another, such as Nelspruit in the Eastern Transvaal, 
Jouberton township near Klerksdorp in the south-western Transvaal, Bothaville in the 
Orange Free State, Galeshewe near Kimberley in the northern Cape, Langa and 
Nyanga in Cape Town, and at the Universities of the North (Turfloop) and Zululand.8 
Students tended to be more organized than ever before, as they used their schools for 
assembling and debating political issues. Schools became laboratories and fortresses 
of resistance, providing raw political education to the pupils passing through them, and 
serving as focal points for physical mobilization. 9 
Also important to note is that after the 1976 uprising, two distinct groups of political 
organizations emerged among the youth. There were those who aligned themselves 
with the Congress tradition in the Congress of South African Student�_(COSAS), and 
there were those who belonged to the Black Consciousness camp in the Azanian 
Students Organization (AZASO), y,,hich was a student wing of the Black Consciousness 
political party AZ.APO (Azanian Peoples Organization). 
'Youth' as a word and as a political idea and category has raised some debate, for it 
is very difficult to define the exact ages of the people whom one could confidently call 
'the youth'. Several academics have written about the youth, among them J. Kane­
Berman, K. Naidoo and i Seekings, and their understanding and uses of the word in 
8 John Kane-Berman, Soweto: Black Revolt, White Reaction 
(Johannesburg, Ravan, 1978), p. 2. 
9 Shaun Johnson, South Africa: No Turning Back (London, 
Macmillan, 1988) ,. p. 96. 
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their works vary. 10 What is clear from their work is that in the aftermath of the Soweto 
uprising the youth formed a distinct sector of the population in terms of mobilization and 
organization. From the late 1970s the term 'youth' was reconstructed by South African 
communities and it was imbued with liberatory intentions. The term cohered around 
those of a younger generation who were impatient with their parents' responses to 
apartheid. 
This new generation of school students, who were toddlers at the time of Sharpeville, 
had not directly experienced the political trauma of the post-Sharpeville repression. 11 
They were energetic in organizing and mobilizi�g the�selves, an<!_�olatile when the 
state did not give attention to their dem�nds or when the state tried to enforce 
repressive laws on them. For instance imposing Afrikaans as a compulsory medium 
of instruction, enforcing enrolment by age-group at schools, and preventing pupils from 
organizing protests led to protests at schools. This generation was the product of the 
alienated environment of the sprawling, impoverished townships, a system of education 
that was designed to train them for wage labour, an economy that could no longer 
provide them with sufficient job opportunities, and a culture of political quiescence that 
they had begun to reject. 12 They fought vigorously against anything that was associated 
with the apartheid regime. 
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As the immediate cause of the uprising was the imposition of Afrikaans in Transvaal 
schools, its geographical impact was limited. In Natal, for instance, the imposition of 
Afrikaans was not an issue, and the province as a whole remained calm. The one 
exception was the University of Zululand, where the students participated in protests. 13 
But the general psychological impact of the uprising should not be underestimated, as 
the period witnessed a dramatic increase in the numbers of students at various schools 
across the country who began to participate in the politics of resistance. The effects of 
this spilt over South Africa's borders. Some parents transferred their children to places 
that were politically 'quiet', mainly to Natal and Swaziland. Students who had been in 
Soweto, or in other places that experienced the uprising, continued to preach the 
gospel of the Soweto uprising at their new schools. The exodus of students to schools 
elsewhere led to overcrowded classrooms and a lack of adequate teaching facilities, 
and this provided a stimulus for further protest. 
As people became more politicaUy aware they became even more rebellious, 
particularly the urban dwellers. The government became even more repressive. In 1977 
various students bodies were banned. These included SASM (South African Student 
Movement), SSRC (Soweto Students Representative Council), and SASO (South 
African Students Organization). But the events of 1976 had shown the students how 
imp_ortant it was to have structures which would articulate their particular grievances 
and enable them to mobilize against Bantu education and the injustices of the 
apartheid regime. 
In April 1978, a new black consciousness organization called the Azanian People's 
Organization (Azapo) was formed. 14 In 1979 COSAS (Congress of South African 
Students) was formed to unite students across the country in their demands for free, 
13 Kane-Berman, Soweto: Black Revolt. White Reaction, 
p. 2.
14 Kane-Berman, Soweto: Black Revolt. White Reaction, 
p. 2-6.
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dynamic, compulsory and non-racial education for all. 15 In styling itself a 'congress' it 
was self-consciously identifying itself with the Congress tradition of the ANC, and 
looking for political inspiration not to the recent past but fully a quarter of a century 
back. 16 Its focus on the 'past quarter of the century' could be explained by the fact that 
COSAS was the first mass organization since the crushing of internal resistance in the 
early 1960s to embrace the Freedom Charter of 1955. 17 
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impetus for, the growth of like-minded ccimrriunity-organizations catering for a range of 
interests, including civic associations, religic:>1..1_.s_orgar,Jzations and trade unions. 18 Extra­
parliamentary political organizations increased in strength and in numbers. With the 
legalization of African trade unions in 1979, black workers became influential in the 
politics of change in South Africa. Their vvorkplace struggles were frequently connected 
with community campaigns, and so contributed to the development of community 
organizations outside the workplace. 19 These workplace and community struggles 
steadily consolidated a political culture that articulated the principles of non­
collaboration With government institutions, of non-racialism, of democracy and mass­
based direct action aimed at transforming urban living conditions and challenging white 
minority rule.20 
15 Ann Harries, The Child is Not Dead; Youth Resistance 
in South Africa 1976-86 (London, British Defence and 
Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1986), p. 21. 
16 Johnson, south Africa: No Turning Back, p. 106. 
17 Ibid. 
lB Ibid., p. 109. 
19 M. Swilling, 'The politics of stalemate', in Frankel
et al. (ed.), State Resistance and Change in South
Africa, p. 91.
20 ·Ibid.
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With the upsurge in numbers of militant and independent black trade unions in the late 
1970s, the state intervened. Two commissions were appointed, the Wiehahn 
Commission to investigate industrial relations, and the Riekert Commission to 
investigate the movement of black workers and to revise the influx control laws. The 
findings of the commissions were basically that the apartheid state needed to be 
restructured. The 1979 Industrial Conciliation Act was passed, aimed at trying to che.ck 
the growing powers of black trade unions. The unions were to operate legally, but they 
were required to register officially and to disclose their sources of income. In response 
to the Riekert Commission findings,' · section 1 O' rights were extended, so that Africans 
could stay in 'white' South Africa with their families if they were employed. Families that 
were not covered by ·section 10' rights were not allowed to stay for longer than 72 
hours in 'white' areas without a permit. 
The 1979 Industrial Act was amended in 1981. The new Act led to an increase in the 
numbers of black workers who joined trade unions, and dropped the most overtly racist 
aspects of previous legislation. 21 The effects of these industrial changes were that 
Black trade unions grew rapidly, with a 200% surge in membership between 1980 and 
1983 (from 220 000 to 670 000). 22 These reform programmes led the National Party 
to split into two in 1982, with Dr. Andries Treurnicht leading the break-away,. ultra-right 
wing, Conservative Party (CP). 23 In a· speech during the budget debate in April 1982, 
CP members singled out the Labour Minister, Fanie Botha, for bitter criticism, pointing 
out that Botha and his labour legislation had alienated white workers and betrayed the 
NP's principle of protecting white workers. 24 
21 Martin Plaut and David Ward, Black Trade Unions in 
South Africa (Nottingham, Bertrand Russell Peace 
Foundation, 1982), p. 12. 
22 Ken Owen, 'A fundamental shift in South African 
politics', p. 52. 
23 Martin Plaut and David Ward, Black Trade Unions in 
South Africa, p. 12. 
24 Ibid. 
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From the late 1970s, the state's reform programmes also aimed at co-opting · moderate' 
black individuals into the apartheid system. 'Moderates' were those individuals who 
were prepared to work with the apartheid government. In the early 1980s P.W. Botha's 
National Party government tried to modernize the apartheid system by passing two 
Acts. The first was the Black Local Authorities Act, which came into effect on 1 August 
1983. This act led to the establishment of township councillors in African townships. 
The Republic Constitutional Reform Act of 1983 followed, and came into effect in 
September 1984. This provided for the inclusion of Coloured and Indian 
representatives in a subordinate role in a tricameral parliament. 25 These reforms 
represented an attempt by the state to co-opt sections of the Indian, Coloured and 
urban African middle class.26 The cartoon on the next page illustrates the imbalances 
and contradictions of the Constitutional Act of 1983. 
With heightened extra-parliamentary activities on one hand and worsening socio­
economic conditions on the other, the politics of resistance became very popular 
among Africans. Against this background, the formation of the UDF provided hope and 
a channel for political aspirations for many black people. 
25 Jeremy Seekings, 'Trailing behind the masses: The UDF 
and township politics in the PWV Region 1983-4', 
Journal of Southern African Studies, vol. 18, no. 1 
(1991), p. 45. 
26 Ibid. 
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ANYTI-UNG 
We ask .equal pay for the same job. 
4 whites will say NO. 
What can 1 Indian and 2 Coloureds do. 
2 +- 1 will never s 4. 
We ask for peace and friendship 
among all people in SA 
. They give us a government that 
divides us. 
. They want us to take the blame 
for the bad laws they make for the African 
people. 
How 'tVill there be peace? 
[From Natal Indian Congress Newsletter, October 1983]. 
The formation of the United Democratic Front 
In this tense political situation, on the 28 January 1983, the Natal and the Transvaal 
Indian Congresses called a conference in the Transvaal to oppose the creation of the 
South African Indian Council. The creation of this council was one of the packages 
which Indians \N8re promised in the new Constitution. Rev. Allan Boesak, Assessor of 
the Sendingkerk branch of the Dutch Reformed Church and newly elected president 
of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, called for the formation of a 'united front' 
against the government's plans.27 At the same meeting Boesak said that 'the politics 
of refusal needs a united front, and there was a need to form some umbrella 
organizational structure to resist apartheid repression and reform. '28 At this time 
resistance leaders felt that it was strategic not to form a political party, because 
27 Martin Meredith, In The Name Of Apartheid: South 
Africa in the Post War Era (London, Hamish Hamilton, 
1988) I P• 192. 
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political parties on the left stood a great risk of being banned by the government.29 
What was needed, in their opinion was a broader front, which could mobilize as many 
people as possible. 
Three months after Boesak's call, regional branches of the United Democratic Front 
were launched. The launching of the regional branches was before the national 
launching, because the UDF was to be front of various organizations, as a result 
different organizations were to organize themselves before the launch of the national 
structure. The UDF was to be a Front of organizations and not an organization on its 
own. The organizational initiative was taken by various religious, civic, workers', 
students', and community organizations. When one organization thought of an 
initiative, the procedure was that it would consult other organizations, usually through 
the Local General Council (a regional UDF structure in which all affiliates were 
represented), arid then the respective representatives would inform their members and 
discuss the proposals.30 This was the gen_eral pattern in which the UDF took off.31 The 
organizational role was not a responsibility assigned to any specific organization, but 
each affiliate had a duty to organize its members. 
The first UDF branch was launched in Durban on 8 May 1983. On 24 May 1983 the 
Western Cape,UDF was launched with 21 affiliated organizations, and on 31 May 31 
organizations launched the Transvaal UDF brar,,ch. On 20 August 1983 about 15 000 
people launched the United Democratic Front nationally at Rocklands Civic Centre, 
Mitchell's Plain, Cape Town. 
29 Author's interview with A.S. Chetty (Pietermaritzburg, 
4 October 1994). 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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The UDF was therefore born out of a challenge to the regime at a specific moment on 
specific issues.32 Its main perspective was rooted in the ANC's National Democratic 
Revolution, which emphasised the concept of people's democracy. 33 When comparing 
the Freedom Charter and the UDF Declaration (guideline document) there are some 
obvious similarities. When the UDF drafted its declaration, the Freedom Charter had 
been in existence for 28 years. Among other things, the Freedom Charter categorically 
condemned 'apartheid' divisive rule and an undemocratic government. The Freedom 
Charter stated that 'The People shall govern, All shall enjoy human rights, All national 
groups shall have equal rights'. The UDF declaration had similar demands; it was a 
declaration against the divisive and undemocratic reforms initiated by the government 
(The Koornhof Bills, The Constitutional Act). The declaration stated that the Front stood 
for 'a single, non-racial, unfragmented South Africa and a democratic right, based on 
one man one vote for all South Africans'. 34 
By early 1984 there were just under 600 organizations affiliated to the UDF .35 The 
regional breakdown was as follows: 
Stud Yth Trad Womn Civc Relg Polit Othrs Total 
Tvl 12 16 8 7 30 11 9 16 109 
Natl 8 15 5 3 28 4 11 7 81 
W.Cap 23 271 2 20 27 4 9 4 360 
E.Cape 3 13 3 2 2 6 4 33 
OFS 
Total 
1 1 2 
47 316 18 32 87 25 29 31 585. 36 
32 Mac Maharaj, 'At a UDF farewell rally', South African 
OutlOok (July - August 1991), p. 86. 
33 Author's interview with Blade Nzimande (UNP, 4 
November 1994) . 
34 See Apendix 1 . 
35 Tom Lodge, 'The politics of refusal,' Leadership South 
Africa, vol, 5. no. 1 (1986), p. 19. 
36 Ibid. 21 
The figures for regional affiliation provided a somewhat misleading picture of the 
relative regional strength of UDF support. Events in 1985 and later were to demonstrate 
that the Eastern Cape was the area in which the UDF was strongest, while Natal, 
although being the first region to launch a UDF branch, presented the Front with the 
most problems.37 The weakness of the Natal UDF relative to other regions, and the 
problems which it faced, are key themes to be explored in the following chapters. 
The large number of youth organizations that affiliated to the UDF at its launching 
showed the frustration among young black people. The youngsters became very 
susceptible to the politics of resistance. Young black people, who were experiencing 
social and economic hardships emanating from apartheid rule, joined the UDF in great 
numbers. They saw themselves as having nothing to lose except perpetual bondage 
to the apartheid regime, unfair education with no prospects of jobs, and appalling living 
conditions. The figures above also iUustrate the heightened politicization of urban 
blacks in the early 1980s. 
After the launching of the UDF, protests, which were increasingly marked by 
confrontations between police and protesters, escalated on an unprecedented scale 
in many townships. It is important to note that the protests of 1983-4 were not directly 
organized by the UDF. It had only an indirect impact, in that people carried the banners 
of the UDF, sang songs which were associated with the UDF or the banned liberation 
movements, and shouted the slogans of the UDF. At this time, during the Vaal protests 
of 1983-4, Pope Molefe, the UDF secretary for the Transvaal region, observed that the 
UDF was 'trailing behind the masses. '38 This was probably an accurate reflection of 
the UDF's politics in the early stages of its existence. Initially, the UDF was an 
organization formed to take up national political issues which immediately and primarily 
37 Ibid. 
38 Jeremy Seekings, 'Trailing behind the masses: The UDF 
and Township Politics in the PWV Region 1983-4', p. 93. 
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affected Coloured and Indian communities only.39 From 1984 Indian and Coloured 
voters were to boycott elections that were intended to include them in the tricameral 
parliament. 
The leadership of the UDF comprised people who were associated with the banned 
African National Congress. This brought quick popularity for the Front. Among its top 
officials were veterans from the Congress campaigns of the ·1960s, such as Archie 
Gumede, a Durban lawyer, who served as chairman of the Release Mandela 
Committee; Albertina Sisulu, the wife of Walter Sisulu who had been imprisoned along 
with Nelson Mandela, leader of the ANC; Helen Joseph, a former member of the 
banned Congress of Democrats, who had endured years of banning orders; Oscar 
Mpetha, a Cape Town trade union leader; and Nelson Mandela himself.40 Government 
leaders were on record in claiming that the UDF was a front for the ANC's 'Mission in 
Exile'. The leaders of the Front consistently denied any link with the ANC, mainly 
because they wanted to avoid suppressive measures which the government could have 
imposed on them, but the policies of the UDF were clearly charterist in orientation. 
This call to ·regroup' organizations under the umbrella of the UDF, also led to the 
· regrouping' of the 'leftist' organizations under the umbrella of the National Forum,
comprising various autonomous bodies which were aligned to Black-Consciousness 
ideologies. Its first gathering was at Hammanskraal in June 1983. Eight hundred 
delegates attended .and they voted to adopt the Manifesto of the Azanian People 
Organization. The Forum, as its name suggests, did not constitute itself as an 
organization. It was a mechanism for consultation between existing Black­
Consciousness organizations like AZ.APO, AZASO, GUSA (Council of Unions of South 
Africa) and AZ.ACTU (Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions). AZAPO was its driving 
force, and the intention of the Forum was to broaden AZAPO's base as the political 
vanguard of the 200 organizations affiliated to it, including various student 
39 Ibid. 
40 Meredith, In the Name of Apartheid, p. 193. 23 
organizations, black political organizations, trade unions and pressure groups of 
varying strengths. 41 
The relationship between the UDF and NF was neither cordial nor politically hostile. 
Their 'co-operation' was based on the perceived need to combine their different 
localised struggles and address social and political problems faced by the majority of 
South Africans, and ultimately to bring apartheid to an end.42 AZ.APO, the most powerful 
organization in the NF, attacked the UDF for being 'soft' on issues such as capitalism, 
the role of the working class and the role of white liberals in the political struggles. 43 
The NF rejected, as a bourgeois document, the Freedom Charter which the UDF 
seemed to be using as its guide, and it was critical of what it called 'ethnic' 
organizations, i.e. organizations in the UDF such as the Natal Indian Congress.44
Once or twice the UDF and NF shared platforms in the name of the struggle against 
the evils of apartheid. One of those occasions took place in Johannesburg at a protest 
against the killing of students at the University of Zululand in October 1983. Four 
students had been killed and hundreds injured when members of lnkatha attacked 
students who had tried to stop Buthelezi from delivering a speech. 45 This is one of the 
incidents that marked the beginning of physical confrontation between UDF and lnkatha 
supporters in the Natal region. In short, the incident set a precedent for later physical 
attacks by lnkatha on perceived UDF supporters. 
41 Howard Barrell, �The UDF and NF: Their emergence, 
composition and trends' S'outh African Review, vol. 2 
(Johannesburg, Ravan, 1984), p. 11. 42 Ibid. 
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The relationship between the UDF and lnkatha was always tense. At its inauguration 
the UDF rejected lnkatha's overtures to join it, on the grounds that no _organization 
participating in the bantustans or other apartheid institutions could affiliate. 46 Since 
1975, when lnkatha had been· established, Chief Buthelezi the president of the 
organization, had been trying to secure a popular anti-apartheid base of support. 
However the Soweto uprising marked a turning-point for lnkatha. As Paul Forsyth 
argues, the 1976 uprising clearly damaged Buthelezi's national political aspirations 
and sent him in search of the political security which could be provided by an alliance 
with other homeland leaders, and by the support of a white liberal constituency.47 In 
October 1976, Buthelezi announced the formation of the Black Unity Front (BUF) along 
with fellow bantustan leaders Ntsanwisi (Gazankulu), Phatudi (Lebowa) and a variety 
of black professionals.48 In January 1978 the South African Black Alliance (SABA) was
formed; it comprised the Labour Party, the Indian Reform Party and lnkatha. At this time 
Buthelezi was trying to portray lnkatha as a party with 'national' aspirations. 
But by 1983 three factors had served to undermine lnkatha's popular· appeal. First was 
the ��_t_o_y_pri�ng of 1976, which eroded lnkatha's attempts to portray itself as a 
national liberation movement, as the students mobilized themselves under the banner 
of the banned ANC. The second development was lnkatha's sp,lit .. with the ANC in 
October 1979, after a meeting in London between Buthelezi and ANC delegates. 49 At
this meeting lnkatha was apparently denied the right to act as the representative of the 
liberation movements by the ANC. Third was the impact of the economic recession and 
the growth of mass popular organizations such as COSAS, civic associations and the 
46 K. Gottschalk, 'UDF, 1983-1991, rise, impact and
consequences', in I. Liebenberg (ed.), The Long March,
p. 192.
47 P. Forsyth, 'The past as the present: Chief A. N. M.
G. Buthelezi's use of history as a source of political
legitimation' (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of
Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1989), p. 111.
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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Black Consciousness movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The growth of 
mass-based popular organizations posed a threat to lnkatha's domination of African 
politics in Natal. In the early 1980s Buthelezi gradually moved from attempting to 
portray lnkatha as a 'national' organization to openly portraying it as an 'ethnic' 
organization, with its main base of support among Zulu-speakers in Natal and 
KwaZulu. 50 This shift was accompanied by increasing. belligerence on the part of 
lnkatha towards its opponents, and its increasing use of physical force to silence these 
opponents. 
The formation of the UDF in 1983, therefore, was another opportunity for Buthelezi to 
recapture national stature for lnkatha by seeking to align it with the UDF. At the 
opening of the Nodwengu museum in October 1983, Buthelezi condemned the 
proposed new national constitution as undemocratic. 51 But his attempt to take lnkatha 
into the UDF failed, partly because people had already started to protest directly 
against lnkatha's close links with the KwaZulu bantustan. In addition, as Keith 
Gottschalk argues, in 1983 lnkatha supporters outnumbered UDF supporters in Natal, 
and if they had been allowed to join the UDF they would have dominated it in the 
region. The two organizations had different approaches to emancipation from 
apartheid, both economically and politically. The UDF was a charterist organization 
in its outlook, while lnkatha had parted ways with the main charterist organization, the 
ANC, in 1979. The UDF was committed to opposing the establishment of councils in the 
townships, while lnkatha persisted in allowing its members to join such structures. From 
the UDF's perspective, the problem with the urban councils was that, even if they 
received full 'local authority' status, they could wield such authority only within the 
framework of apartheid.52 They had no power to challenge or change1 laws. For these 
so Ibid. 
51 Ibid., p. 154. 
52 Judy Seidman, Facelift, Apartheid: South Africa after 
Soweto (London, International Defence and Aid Fund for 
Southern Africa, 1980), p. 17. 
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reasons, most Africans labelled them as a 'fraud', and boycotted them.53 Working 
within the apartheid ambit, the counci'llors were required to administer the most 
unpopular laws, like the influx control regulations. Subsequently they became the 
'visible agents of the white government in the township, and a target of discontent as 
a body'. 54 In addition the UDF supported sanctions and revolutionary change, while
lnkatha was against them. Economically and politically the two organizations had 
incompatible agendas, and for them to work together was practically impossible. 
In Natal, the emergence of the UDF threatened lnkatha's claims to leadership, pushing 
its tolerance of opposition beyond its limits, forcing it to resort to physical means as a 
way of restraining opposition.55 Not only did the UDF compete for the same 
membership as lnkatha, but it also aimed to organize support in Natal in lnkatha's 
'reserved Zulu constituency', i.e. in a political space which lnkatha leaders saw as 
belonging to the Zulu 'nation'.56 
Indian organizations played a vital role in organizing UDF affiliates, particularly in 
Natal. The Indian community was. in a much better position to organize themselves than 
were Africans. The Natal Indian Congress was still led by the people who had been 
responsible for reviving it in 1971, Mewa Ramgobin and George Sewpershad being two 
of the best known.57 In the 1970s and 1980s, the state's repressive measures had not
fallen as harshly on Indian organizations as on their African counterparts. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., p. 18. 
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The struggles between lnkatha and · progressive' organizations retarded the growth of 
political organizations in Natal. This enhanced the role played by the relatively 
protected Indian activists who successfully organized affiliates to the Durban Housing 
Action Committee.58 It also helps to explain why the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) played 
such an important role in UDF politics at the regional level in Natal. 59 
In Durban, township residents were mobilised by UDF activists to form the Joint Rent 
Action Committee (JORAC). JORAC was formed in early 1985 by residents of 
Lamontville, Chesterville, Shakavil.le and Hambanathi. Their main objectives were to 
spearhead resistance to rent hikes and, later, incorporation into KwaZulu by the Port 
Natal Administrative Board (PNAB), in defiance of Buthelezi. 60 Township administration 
was changed from Durban 'white city' authorities to KwaZulu authorities, and some 
residents were unhappy about the move. The resistance in these townships to the 
incorporation into KwaZulu led to fighting between lnkatha and UDF supporters, and 
within a short space of time almost the whole Natal region was embroiled in similar 
conflicts. Durban townships were the first to be engaged in political struggles in the 
Natal region. Some of the factors contributing to this were the existence of large black 
townships (KwaMashu and Umlazi), where students organized protests against inferior 
education in the early 1980s. The repressive measures that the KwaZulu government 
used in the early 1980s to clampdown on the protests compelled students to come 
together and organize themselves for resistance. Buthelezi warned KwaMashu students 
who were participating in the 1980 school boycotts that they were · political riff raff' who 
were throwing down a gauntlet to lnkatha and would end by having their skulls 
cracked.61 Although these political struggles in Durban in the early 1980s did not affect 
� M. Swilling, 'The UDF and township revolt', in W. 
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the Pietermaritzburg region, they set a precedent for UDF-lnkatha conflicts in the Natal 
region as a whole. In Pietermaritzburg, these conflicts commenced in 1984. 
Political conflict in the Pietermaritzburg region in the early 1980s 
The upsurge of political struggles in South Africa did not take the same form in every 
region. Pietermaritzburg had its own particular dynamics. ThEUID_pact of the Soweto 
uprising was only_psycholq_gical (there were no demonstrations but people became 
aware of the grievances that had led to students' protests). Furthermore, the civic and 
youth protests of the early 1980s did not immediately come to the fore as compared to 
the other regions, for instance the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) and the 
Eastern Cape. 
When examining the roots of political struggles in the post-Soweto era in the 
Pietermaritzburg region, the formation of the D.C.O. Matiwane Youth League is an 
- - -------- - . - . - ---
obvious starting-point. This body was formed in 1980 at a meeting at the Edendale Lay 
Ecumenical Centre. 62 The Youth League was named in honour of David Cecil Oxford 
Matiwane, who lived at Willowfountain and was known for his dedication to the 
liberation struggte.63 On anniversaries like those of the Sharpeville massacre on March 
21, and the Soweto uprising on June 16, Matiwane used to walk from his home to 
Pietermaritzburg city centre carrying a cross and chains to signify the perpetual 
oppression of black people. 64 
62 Jeremy Seekings, Heroes or Villains? Youth Politics in 
the 1980s (Johannesburg, Ravan, 1993), p. 41. 
63 Author's interview with Khaba Mkhize (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 30 September 1994). 
64 Ibid. 29 --
The main activities of the League were to organize social activities for the youth and 
to provide a forum for political debate.65 Together with Matiwane himself, it organized 
commemoration · services on the days which had importance in the history of the 
struggle for liberation. The League focused more on developing leadership than on 
mobilizing mass support.66 Among future leaders whom it produced were Sipho Shezi, 
Ben Martins Dikobe, Andile Hlenge, Sithabiso Mahlobo and the Gqubule sisters.67 
When Matiwane died in 1984, there was a big funeral service. Prominent UDF 
members came to Pietermaritzburg, among them Victoria Mxenge, a member of the 
UDF executive in Durban, and the wife of the political activist Griffths Mxenge who had 
been assassinated in 1981. 68 
After Matiwane's death the Youth League plunged into chaos. The police raided its 
offices at the Lay Centre, as well as the homes of members. Illegal firearms were found 
at both places, and the entire executive was either detained or prosecuted.69 Some 
members of the league became state witnesses in court, and others fled the country. 70
In 1982 Sobantu._'(outh Organizatiqn .(SOYQ) �as formed by youths from Sobantu 
-
. ' . - . 
•- > -� --- •• • · - - - -- -· ----
township. SOYO was born out of a crisis relating to an increase in rents and bus fares. 
The increases in rents by the Natal Drakensberg Board (the body in charge of the 
township), which was followed by the announcement of bus fare increases, compelled 
a number of Sobantu residents to form an organization which could channel complaints 
65 seekings, Heroes or Villains?, p. 41. 
66 Author's interview with Thamsanqa Mseleku (UNP, 27
October 1995). 
67 Author's interviews with Mduduzi Ndlovu (UNP, 8 June 
1995) and Ahmed Bawa (UNP, 22 June 1995). 
68 Author's interview with Khaba Mkhize (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 30 September 1994). 
69 Author's interview with Mduduzi Ndlovu (UNP, 6 June 
1995) 
70 Ibid. 
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to the relevant authorities. People from Sobantu were receptive to change and easier 
to organize than in other townships in Pietermaritzburg for several reasons. Sobantu 
Village had been founded in 1928 and had gradually increased in size until 1954, 
when the government froze further expansion indefinitely. 71 Sobantu had been a 
predominantly ANC-supporting area in the 1950s and 1960s; in the 1980s a number 
of people who had served long prison terms on Robben Island from the region were 
from Sobantu. These were people like Moses Mabhida, Azalia Ndebele, and Sipho 
'Matshayina' Xulu. This provided the township with a proud history of having residents 
who were fighting in the liberation struggle. 72 Research conducted in 1989 by Napier 
and Mthimkhulu found that most of the residents of Sobantu had been there since the 
1950s and 1960s. 73 The township was also unique in having one high school, one lower 
primary school, and one Anglican Church, and this promoted a sense of solidarity. 
People in the township had the opportunity to know one another from childhood to 
adulthood. With the revival of charterist organizations in the 1980s, residents joined 
without hesitation because of their past association with the mother of the charterist 
organizations, the ANC. 
Between 1982 and 1983 a number of people in the Pietermaritzburg region began to 
question the legitimacy of township councillors. Discontent had started simmering in the 
townships of Ashdown and Sobantu in 1982-3 after rent increases had been approved 
by councillors without prior consultation. 74 The Sobantu township councillors resigned 
71 Heather Peel, 'Sobantu Village: An administrative 
history of a Pietermaritzburg township 1924-1959' 
(unpublished Honours thesis, University of Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg, 1987), p. 120-121. 
72 Author's interviews with Lungisani Kunene (UNP, 20 
April 1995), Jabulani Sithole (UNP, 20 March 1995) and 
Vis Naidoo (UNP, 6 June 1995). 
73 Clive Napier, 'Pietermaritzburg's Sobantu village: A case 
study of control and violence in a Natal township' 
(unpublished paper, Department of Development Administration 
and Politics, University of South Africa, 1989). 
74 Radley Keys, 'Chronology of the Pietermaritzburg 
violence', Work in Progress ( March 1988), pp. 3-4. 
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because they said they were increasingly becoming nothing but rubber stamps. Their 
Ashdown counterparts complained that they were toothless bulldogs, and that they 
were merely called an Advisory -Council, which could not change or challenge any 
bylaws and regulations. 75 The Edendale Advisory Board had a similar complaint, and 
its members also resigned. Edendale was unlike other townships in the 
Pietennaritzburg region in that it was not under the direct control of the government. 76
Tenants in Edendale reported their grievances direct to their landlords. Also, because 
of the absence of government-controlled local structures, protest and defiance 
campaigns which were experienced elsewhere in the early 1980s had minimal impact 
in Edendale. 
In May 1983, at a conference organized by the Anti-South African Indian Council in the 
Newholmes Hotel in Pietermaritzburg, teachers, social workers, students, youth, 
religious and community leaders representing about forty-two organizations 
representing all racial groups came together to discuss social and political problems 
that they were facing. n At this historical meeting a Committee of Concern was formed, 
with R. Harku, a former teacher, being elected acting chairperson. 78 Most of the 
organizations that were represented were from Indian areas, as a number of civic 
organizations had been launched i"n Indian areas by Anti-South African Indian Council 
activists who were mobilizing the Indian communities to boycott the government­
proposed tricameral parliament. 
The Committee of Concern organized two workshops (at the Nizamia Muslim Society 
and at Ubunye House in the Pietermaritzburg city centre) at which community leaders 
and experts who understood the government plans (the Constitutional Bills and the 
75 Author's interview with Khaba Mkhfze (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 30 October 1994). 
76 Nkosinathi Gwala, 'Political violence and the 
struggle for control in Pietermaritzburg', pp. 506-512. 
77 PACSA, UDF folder: Committee of Concern, Newsletter 
(October 1983). 
78 See Appendix 3. 
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Black Authorities Bills) could educate the members on the government intentions. 
After listening to Advocate Zac Yacoob's report on the work of the UDF, the Committee 
of Concern decided to affiliate to the UDF. 79 Members of the Committee of Concern 
were amongst the 15000 people at the UDF rally in Cape Town on 20 August 1983. 
They took with them declarations of support for the UDF from 42 organizations in 
Pietermaritzburg. 80 
When township councillors in Sobantu and Edendale resigned, lmbali became the only 
township which continued operating with an increasingly discredited Township Council 
structure. The Township Council had been established in 1977, under the name 
'African Liaison Committee' to help the City Council to administer the township.81 With 
potentially explosive problems that authorities were failing to address, like rent 
increases, inadequacies of drainage systems, lack of electricity, and shortages of 
telephones, the authoritarian township councillors became a target of complaints and 
protests. Furthermore these problems fuelled political activity among the youth. 
Although two prominent councillors of lnibali resigned in August 1983, new elections 
were held the following month and the Township Council continued to function. 
In October 1983, only three of the six wards were contested, with a total of 248 votes 
being cast.82 The councillors who came to office later played very important roles in 
political strife in the region. They all became lnkatha supporters, and several were 
allegedly involved in a number of killings in the following years. The most important 
figures were Patrick Pakkies from Ward One and Abdul Awetta and Ben Jele from 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Mark Butler, et al. Imbali (Centre for Adult 
Education, University of Natal Pietermaritzburg, 1993), 
p. 12.
82 J. Aitchison, M. Butler and A. Harley, Imbali
(University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, Centre for
Adult Education, 1993), p. 155.33 '\. 
Ward Four. Jele had actually lost the election to Awetta, but he later became 
prominent in lmbali because of the role he played as an lnkatha leader. 
On 30 October 1983, in the same month as the township election in lmbali, about 3500 
people gathered at the Lay Ecumenical Centre in Edendale in one of the biggest 
political gatherings held in the city since the 1960s.82 Its purpose was to mark a 
'people's weekend' called by the national UDF to show opposition to the proposed 
constitution. At this meeting the second office of the UDF in the Natal region was 
opened at the Lay Centre, the first having been opened in Durban. This was just before 
the referendum in vvhich vvhite voters were asked t.o vote 'yes' or 'no' for the proposed · 
new constitution. The message which was given by the UDF at the meeting was that 
'we want to control our own lives and we reject the white referendum, the constitutional 
act and the Koornhof plans. '83 
October 1983 marked a turning point in UDF politics in the Pietermaritzburg region. It 
was the first big gathering of UDF supporters held in Pietermaritzburg. No elected 
officials were put into office nor were UDF structures established at that occasion. 
Activists who \NOrked at the Lay Centre were among other things selling UDF materials 
(like T-shirts), and distributing information from the Durban office and from the UDF 
national executive.84 s·ut the opening of the Lay Centre office was important in that for 
the first time in the region UDF activists had a place where they could meet and obtain 
information pertaining to the Front's activities. On the other hand, the launching of UDF 
offices in the region aroused further tensions between UDF and lnkatha supporters. 
This rift developed into fierce struggles between the supporters of these two 
organizations in the following years. The following chapter will explore how these 
struggles started, and the role of the UDF in the struggles. 
02 Natal Witness, 31 October 1983. 
83 PACSA, UDF folder: UDF Newsletter, vol. 1, no. 3 
(October 1983). 
84 Author's interview with A. S. Chetty (Pietermaritzburg, 
4 October 1994). 34 
CHAPTER TWO 
AT THE CROSSROADS: TRANSFORMATION AND REPRESSION, 1984-1986 
Introduction 
Although some people saw the holding of a 'people's weekend' at the Edendale 
Ecumenical Lay Centre in October 1983 as marking the launching of the Natal Midlands 
UDF branch, there vvere no UDF structures established on that occasion. The Committee 
of Concern, the organization that took the signatures from Pietermaritzburg organizations 
to the UDF launching in Cape Tovvn, continued to represent the Front. This continued until 
March 1985, when the UDF established executive structures in the Natal Midlands region. 
The establishment of these UDF structures was done by transforming the Committee of 
Concern. 
From 1983 to late 1984 the UDF was fighting at a national level to stop the implementation 
of the new constitution and the related Koornhof Bills. When the government wen,t ahead 
in 1984 with enacting the constitution, the strategy of the UDF had to change. 
Organizations identifying themselves with the UDF (or charterist tradition) began to take 
more militant action to oppose the government. From 1983, although the ANC was still 
banned, it became a focus for opposition forces through progressive organizations that 
included the UDF. The demands for Nelson Mandela's release from prison became a 
central unifying call for the exiled ANC, and for both the external and internal anti­
apartheid movements. 1 On the other hand the government had its defined reform policy 
within which it wanted the UDF to operate. From 1985 the state reacted to the Front with 
i William Beinart, Twentieth-Century south Africa (Cape 
Town, Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 234. 
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repressive measures. The political situation was at a crossroads, and the UDF was 
compelled by circumstances to transform its structures so that it could adapt to the 
changed situation. 
In Pietermaritzburg the year_ 198� -�arked the beginning of the 'unofficial war', .as 
Kentridge puts it.2 It saw the beginning of conflicts between pro-UDF campaigners, who 
championed resistance to government institutions, and lnkatha supporters, who felt that�ei j 
bus and school boycotts, as well as stayaways and consumer boycotts, were being__,; 
imposed on people. In return, lnkatha pressurized the same people to obey its 
- -- ·-· --·· -- - - �- - �- . 
organization's policies.3 The Congress movement (consisting mainly of UOF-affiliated 
organizations) and its militant youth met strong political resistance from lnkatha.4 The 
KwaZulu homeland structure and the central state came together to 'normalise' the 
situation.5 This meant expelling, and silencing the so called radicals in the region. The 
years 1985-6 witnessed the intensification of lnkatha supporters' campaigns to remove 
radical youth from the townships of lmbali and Ashdown.6 It was also during this time that 
2 Matthew Kentridge, 'Pietermaritzburg under the knife', 
south African Outlook, no. 1 (1990), p. 233. 
3 Khaba Mkhize, 'Reporting the violence: an insider's 
problem' (unpublished seminar paper, University of 
Natal, Pietermaritzburg, April 1988), pp. 3-4. 
4 The Congress movement consisted of organizations which 
identified or aligned themselves with the banned 
African National Congress. 
5 Ari Sitas, 'Political violence in Southern African: 
Historical, comparative and contemporary perspectives' 
(unpublished seminar paper, St. Antony's College, 
Oxford, 25-27 June 1991), p. 3. 
6 M. Butler, et al., Imbali (Centre for Adult Education,
University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1991), p. 161.36 
Pietermaritzburg witnessed a shift of the focus of UDF politics from Indian areas to the 
black townships of Edendale, lmbali, and Sobantu and to the peri-urban areas. 
Nationally, detention and restriction measures imposed by the state on UDF activists 
during these two years forced the organization to function virtually underground, although 
it was still legal. 7 It had to survive by changing its tactics and strategies. In Natal, having 
to deal with lnkatha on one hand and the state on the other, the UDF faced a formidable 
task. By seeking to mobilize and organize school pupils, the UDF situated.the educational 
struggles within a strategy of challenging apartheid. UDF activists sought t� succeed in 
their plan through mobilizing and politicizing Y:OungJ��ople. lmbali schools were the key --
points of focus. Another important event in the mobilization and organization of UDF 
support in the Pietermaritzburg region was the Sarmcol strike in 1985. This marked the 
--·- -- .. ·--- -- -- - - .•. ·- ---
beginning of the emergence of an organized labour movement in the region. Labour 
movements came to combine their vvorkplace struggles with community struggles, and this 
helped to strengthen the UDF. The formation of Congress of the South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU) in December 1985 marked the increasing involvement of workers' 
organizations in the politics of the UDF. 
This chapter ends with the imposition of a national state of emerg.lW..CY�OJJ--1�J..une_-1-9_86. 
Mushrooming extra-parliamentary activities were confronted by the enormous power of the 
state. Some activists went underground, some were detained and some were restricted. 
The state imposed a blanket of silence on extra-parliamentary organizations. This totally 
changed the functioning of the UDF. 
7 Jo-Anne Collinge, 'The United Democratic Front', South 
African Review (Johannesburg, Ravan Press), vol. 3 
(1986) / P• 248, 
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Towards establishing UDF structures in Pietermaritzburg 
After the Edendale Ecumenical Lay Centre gathering of October 1983, the Committee of 
Concern organized a mass meeting to launch the UDF million-signature campaign in the 
city. The million-signature campaign aimed to mobil_ize people against the implementation 
of the South African Constitutional Act. This meeting took place on 17 March 1984 at the 
Lotus Hall, where local residents signed a petition that rejected the new constitutional 
proposals.8 The meeting marked the take-off of the million-signature campaign in the Natal 
Midlands. Speakers at this gathering were Patrick 'Terror' Lekota (the National UDF 
Publicity Secretary), Jerry Coovadia and Virgil Bonhomme from Durban, and Simon 
Gqubule, John Makhathini and Simon Motala from Pietermaritzburg.9 There was a mixture
of African and Indian speakers, probably to reflect the official non-racialism of the UDF, 
and also because the campaigns were centred around issues that directly affected these 
groups. This interregional exchange of speakers was what Jo-Anne Collinge has called 
the UDF's 'road-show style'.10 The million-signature campaign was not a success
nationally, as the Front failed to attain its set figure. Partly this was because of police 
harassment and confiscation of sheets of signatures. 11 However, the campaigns were
significant in that for the first time they prc;,vided township activists with a focus for door-to-
door organization.12 By mid-1984 approximately 230 000 signatures had been collected
0 Natal Witness, 18 March 1984. 
9 PACSA, UDF folders: UDF Newsletter (March 1983), p. 4. 
10 Collinge, 'The United Democratic Front', pp. 240-250. 
11 Nigel Worden, The Making of Modern south Africa 
(London, Blackwell, 1994), p. 129. 
12 M Swilling, 'The UDF and township revolt', in W. 
Cobbett and R. Cohen (eds.), Popular Struggles in South 
Africa (London, James Currey, 1988), p. 101. 
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nationally. 13 The breakdown was as follows: Western Cape 90 L 10, Transvaal 40 000, 
Natal 40 000, Eastern Cape 20 000, Border 30 000 and other regions 1 O 00014. The figure
for Natal was equal to that for the Transvaal. This could have been because state 
repression was concentrated in the Transvaal. Police harassment of political activists was 
more intense in the Transvaal than in Natal. The state confiscated sheets of signatures, 
and detained and restricted political UDF activists. Also, some civic organizations in 
Soweto refused to participate in the million-signature campaign. 
After the million-signature campaign, the next UDF mobilization campaign in the 
Pietermaritzburg region was when Piet Koornhof, the Minister of Cooperation and 
Development, visited the region. On 21 August 1984 he came to lmbali to install the 
township council, to be led by Patrick Pakkies as mayor. 15 On the eve of the minister's visit, 
the lmbali Youth Organization (IYO), a UDF youth affiliate under the leadership of 
S'khumbuzo Ngwenya, organized a meeting for youths. and students. The purpose of this 
meeting was to prepare for activities that the students had to carry out the following day. 16 
The members of the IYO went to every school in lmbali, organizing students to go and 
protest against the installation of the township councillors. 17 The following day students
went to barricade the roads leading to lmbali Hall, but the police took them by surprise and 
brought Dr. Koornhof to the hall in an ordinary car while the students were expecting a 
luxury car. When the students discovered his presence, they went inside to disrupt his 
13 PACSA, UDF folders: Report of the UDF National 
Executive Meeting held at Cape Town on 1-2 June 1984. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Butler, et. al., Imbali, p. 19. 
16 Author's interviews with Mduduzi Ndlovu {UNP, 8 June 
1995) and Sobhuza Dlamini {UNP, 8 June 1995). 
17 Echo, 30 August 1984. 
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speech, and he was forced to cut it short. The security police responded by firing tear gas, 
which drifted into the hall and assisted in disrupting the meeting. 18 
This incident had important practical results. It marked a success for the lmbali Youth 
Organization in organizing students. For the first time students in Pietermaritzburg had 
challenged the security police with the 'toyi toyi'. From that day many students became 
increasingly involved in UDF politics. The Congress of South African Students (COSAS) 
became active at various schools in Pietermaritzburg. 19 The incident marked the beginning 
of a new phase in mobilizing students to take part in the Front's activities. The students 
provided the base that the UDF was looking for. The core of the UDF leadership in 
Pietermari!ZbUrQ was t9_b_�c9.r:mt <JQ!!linated by stud,�nts and teachers.20 In addition, the 
youth organizations that emerged in 1984-5 around Pietermaritzburg, and in whose 
formation the IYO played an important role, adopted a different approach from the youth 
organizations that had operated in the early 1980s. Where the o.c:o Matiwane Youth 
League had concentrated on leadership development (training activists in leadership 
skills), the new youth organizations embarked on mass mobilization and organization.21 
The Koornhof incident also affected relationships between some parents and youth. Most 
parents who were present at the lmbali Community Centre were embarrassed and 
annoyed by the students' behaviour during the occasion. Students protested near where 
18 Author's interview with Mduduzi Ndlovu (UNP, 8 June 
1995) 
19 Ibid. 
20 Author's interview with Blade Nzimande (UNP, 5 October 
1994) 
21 Author's interview with Thamsanqa Mseleku .,(UNP, 2 7 
October 1994). 
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the parents were waiting for Koornhof, and they upset pots of prepared food. 22 A group 
of parents who felt that they should not let children control them set about reviving a 
vigilante group called 'Oqonda'. The term 'vigilante' before the mid-1980s referred to a 
member of a group trying to prevent crime in the community. These groups existed in 
Ashdown, lmbali and Edendale. From the mid-1980s its meaning gradually changed. UDF 
supporters began to associate the vigilantes with a group of people who were 
conservative politically and aligned to reactionary forces or state agencies. 23 In Natal the 
term became applied to lnkatha supporters. Because of the common interests that lnkatha 
and the vigilante groups shared in Natal, they forged a relationship to work together. 
lnkatha was concerned with maintaining the patriarchal and hierarchical values which it 
presented as traditional aspects of African culture, while the vigilante committees in the 
region were concerned with maintaining Zulu culture and respect for elders. 24 As lnkatha 
supporters and the vigilante groups .found common ground, they began to forge links with 
the aim of disciplining the youth. In the process they became enemies of UDF-affiliated 
youth organizations. Because the youth constituted the largest constituency of the UDF, 
-- -· ·4• �- ... __, ' ·-
the hostility of the vigilantes and of lnkatha ended up being directed at all UDF supporters.
22 Author's interview with Sobhuza · Dlamini (UNP, 7 
October 1994). 
23 Author's interviews with Khaba Mkhize (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 30 August 1994) and Masibu Majola 
(Community Care Centre, Pietermaritzburg, 9 September 
1994) 
24 C. Mccaul, 'The wild card: Inkatha and contemporary
black politics', in P. Frankel, N. Pines and M.
Swilling (eds.), State Resistance and Change in South
Africa (Johannesburg, Southern Books, 1988), pp. 158-9;
Author's interview with Gcina Mkhize (Linley House,
Pietermaritzburg, 15 October 1994).
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In the townships of lmbali and Ashdown, 'Oqonda' had existed previously as a 'community 
policing group', together with another group called 'lmbokodo ebomvu'.25 Previously 
'Oqonda' were known by people to be a community-oriented group that was not linked to 
any political organization.26 Some people saw 'Oqonda' as consisting of elders who were 
trying to inculcate traditional values, particularly respect for elders on. the part of the youth. 
Most parents were becoming worried about the way in which traditional values were 
fading away.27 Unlike the previous 'Oqonda', the groups which emerged in the mid-1980s 
aimed specifically at inculcating 'discipline' among the youth.28 By discipline they meant 
that younger people should continue to be subordinated to elder people. 'Oqonda' 
objected to anything done in the community by the youth without their consent or that of 
other elders. Culturally or traditionally, in many African societies any person who is not yet 
married in the community is perceived to be a child who should obey the elders. The 
relationships between 'Oqonda' and official law enforcement agencies before the mid-
1980s is not clear; it seems as if the police acknowledged the existence of these groups 
but did not act against them. People whom 'Oqonda' disciplined did not lay charges with 
the police. 
25 Author's interview with Masibu Majola (Community Care 
Centre, Pietermaritzburg, 9 September 1994). 'Oqonda' 
was a name take from the word 'ukuqonda' meaning to be 
straight. The vigilantes claimed to discipline those 
who were going astray by bring them into the main 
stream of 'proper values'. 'Imbokodo Ebomvu' literally 
means a 'red grindstone'. Usually this term is used by 
some Zulu speakers to refer to police cars because of 
the red reflecting light that they have on their roofs. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Author's interview with Sobhuza Dlamini (UNP, 8 June 
1995) 
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The politics of resistance and revolution had no home for the 'Yes, father' type of person 
which some parents wanted the youth to be. Those who saw themselves as belonging to 
the anti-apartheid ·youth' movement had to demo�nstrate this through their behaviour; they - - ·- -
had to show that they were at war with the apartheid system. In a war situation there is no
compromise; to win the battle you have to incapacitate your enemy or destroy him if
- - - -----· ·- - ·- . .  -- . ' -- - ·-----
�possible. · Bayinyove', meaning 'they should break down things or destroy them', became 
a very popular term among the youth in the 1980s.29 
Although the main enemy was the apartheid regime, it took time for the struggles in the 
region to fo��� in that direction. Form 1985.to 1_991 the UDF i� the regio� wasp·reoccUpied 1
with struggles against lnkatha. This sapped its ability to become a strong organization in 
terms of opposition to apartheid. By the end of 1984, although the UDF had not yet - . ,., . - ' 
established its formal structures in Pietermaritzburg, two hostile camps had emerged in the
region. On one side were people who supported UDF-affiliated organizations, and who 
openly criticised apartheid structures in which lnkatha members participated. On the other 
were lnkatha members and vigilante groups who came together to try to expel UDF 
activists from the townships. From late 1984 the UDF supporters viewed 'Oqonda' (the 
vigilantes) as lnkatha groups in disguise.30 There were no UDF supporters -i�h· g�o-�;,-�· 
-- --- ===. 
Usually when 'harassing' people� the vigilantes identified themselves as a ·community-
concerned group' and not as lnkatha. 31 lnkatha spokesperson described the vigilantes as 
groups that were merely 'expressing black anger' and wanting to suppress 'udlame' 
(violence).32
29 Author's interview with Tharnsanqa Mseleku (UNP, 30 
October 1994). 
30 Author's interview with Sobhuza Dlarnini (UNP, 7 
October 1994). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Fatima Meer, Resistance in the Townships (Durban, 
Madiba Publications, 1989), p. 209. 
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The UDF in Natal was restructured in March 1985. People involved in the restructuring 
process were from both the national and regional levels of the Front. The national 
leadership proposed divisions of the country into regions, which the regional leadership 
was responsible for setting up organizational structures. Before this the only functioning 
regional office was in Durban. In the Durban region there were two bodies, the Regional 
Executive Committee (REC) and Regional General Council (RGC). The establishment of 
the REC and RGC had occurred in 1983 and 1984 respectively. The REC was elected to 
office on 14 May 1984, while the RGC came to office immediately after the launching of 
the UDF nationally. 33
In terms of the restructuring programme, the Natal region was divided into the subregions 
of Northern Natal, Natal Midlands, North Coast and Durban Central. 34 In the Natal 
Midlands region, the Committee of Concern was dissolved. This meant two things: firstly 
that the members of organizations represented by the Committee of Concern automatically 
became UDF adherents and, secondly, that the leaders of the Committee of Concern were 
absorbed into a new group of leaders under the banner of the UDF. Since the opening of 
the regional office of the Natal UDF branch in Pietermaritzburg in 1983; the UDF 
supporters in the region had remained under the aegis of the Committee of Concern. This 
created confusion among some organizations that were affiliated to the Committee of 
Concern because they were not fully informed about the change-over. Also, because 
everything was centralised in Durban, most of UDF"'."affiliates in the regions were not well 
informed about what was happening. 
When the UDF established its new structures in Pietermaritzburg in March 1985, the 
following people were elected to executive positions for the Natal Midlands region: A. S. 
33 PACSA, UDF folders: Report of National Executive 
Meeting (UDF), held on 1-2 June 1984 at Cape 
Town. 
34 Ibid. 
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Chetty (chairperson), S'khumbuzo Ngwenya (organizing secretary), Martin Wittenberg 
(minutes secretary), Muzi Thusi (rural organizer), and D. V. Chetty (treasurer).35 There 
were other UDF executive members like Simon Gqubule, Simon Motala, and Colin 
Gardner, but the above were the most functionally effective members.36 Below the 
executive there was a Local General Council that had close to twenty members. 37 It 
consisted of members delegated by their organizations to represent them. This council of 
the UDF was responsible for organizing and mobilizing people under the banner of the 
Front. Among the members of the LGC delegated by affiliated organizations were Yunus 
Carrim, representing the Natal Indian Congress (Pietermaritzburg), Hloni Zondi and S. 
Faizal representing COSATU, Kenneth Dladla and Kam Chetty representing the civic 
associations, Sipho Gabela and Sobhuza Dlamini representing students from schools in 
the region, S'thembiso Ngcobo and R. Mkhize representing the youth, and John Jeffery 
representing the Pietermaritzburg Congress of Democrats. 38 Later, because of detention 
and restrictions, additional people, such as Mduduzi Ndlovu, were coopted into both 
structures. 
The following diagram illustrates the way in which members were elected to various 
structures of the UDF during this period. 35 Author's interview with Sobhuza Dlamini (UNP, 6 June 
1995). 36 Ibid. 
37 Author's interview with A. S Chetty (Pietermaritzburg, 
4 June 1995). 
38 Author's interview with Sobhuza Dlamini (University of 
Natal, 6 June 1995). Youth and.students' 
representatives were elected by representatives of 
various UDF youth and students' organizations from the 
region. 
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The structures indicated in the dotted box were the most influential in any region. 39 They 
could adopt and carry out programmes of action without necessarily waiting for directives 
from the NEC. Organizationally, the UDF local executive referred matters to the National 
General Council if they were important, or to the Local General Council if they were more 
local in nature. 40 The main reason for using the General Councils was 
that they were the only bodies to which every affiliate organization sent representatives. 
Through this structure it was easy to disseminate information, and decide upon strategies 
and programmes of action. The restructuring process led to the establishment of UDF 
structures and the election of local UDt activists to those structures. The UDFs Local 
Executive Committee, the Local General Council and the affiliates began to determine the 
functioning of the Front in the region.41 The Executive Committee was to meet once a week 
and the Local General Council once a fortnight.42 
From 1984 to mid-1985, UDF mobilization campaigns shifted from Indian areas to the 
townships. This was partly because when more and more Africans joined the UDF, they 
highlighted the problems that were experienced by Africans. These were worse than those 
affecting other communities. The unequal delivery of basic services (i.e. telephones, 
electricity, maintenance of roads, and recreational facilities) to different communities 
weakened the joint commitment (that is the working. together) between Africans and 
Indians in the region. While it was easy for the UDF to organize in Indian areas through 
door-to-door campaigns, discussion groups, house meetings, and civic organizations, it 
was not so in African areas.43 In the African townships, people wanted schools, houses 
39 Author's interview with A. S. Chetty 
(Pietermaritzburg, 4 June 1995). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Author's interview with A. Bawa (UNP, 22 June 1995). 
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and improvements in infrastructure, among other things. To address these problems a 
political structure was needed, so that the issues would be publicized in national politi�I 
campaigns.44 The UDF therefore became a conveyor belt, taking problems from regional 
level to national level. The problems that were experienced by Africans in various regions 
(including Pietermaritzburg) became national issues. 
Furthermore, there was a problem in Pietermaritzburg, particularly in the African 
townships, in mobilizing older people into UDF structures. Most of the older African people 
in the UDF, like the Rev. Simon Gqubule, were from the Federal Theological Seminary 
(FedSem), and they had little contact with old people in the townships.45 The relative 
absence of African adults in the UDF left open a space for white and Indian adults to be 
highly influential in the politics of the UDF. In addition, the fact that some African people 
perceived the UDF as Indian-dominated created diffi�ulUes in mobilizing in Afri�n areas. 
Opponents of the UDF argued that Indians were outsiders who were creating problems in ,� 
African townships. 46 Also, because they often risked being attacked, or having their 
property destroyed by lnkatha or vigilantes, and because of police harassment, older 
people were very cautious about becoming involved in UDF politics. 
The UDF's shift in focus to the African areas led to a decline in the participation of people 
from the Indian communities in its activities. 47 Most UDF-affiliated organizations in the 
Indian areas were unable to become fully involved in a situation of heightened conflict in 
the African townships. Because the conflicts were outside the Indian residential areas, 
their impact on Indian people was limited, and did not lead to active organization and 
mobilization. Generally, there was little joint action from UDF affiliates in the Indian areas 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Author's interview with Vis Naidoo (UNP, 6 June 1995). 
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and in the African townships. As a result, when the UDF established its structures in 1985, 
the affiliated organizations in the African townships assumed a more prominent role in the 
functioning of the Front. 48 
Most of the organizations that had sent signatures to the launching of the UDF in Cape 
Town were from Indian organizations which were members of the Committee of Concern. 
According to Jorry Mohamed, who served in the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and 
Pietermaritzburg Central Residents and Ratepayers Association (PCRRPA), most of the 
forty organizations that had registered under the Committee of Concern had virtually no 
active support. 49 A number of them had only a token existence. Some organizations were
registered because it happened that there �ere individuals who belonged, or had once 
belonged, to the organizations which they wanted to register, though some had not had 
general meetings for years.50 The Committee of Concern, like the UDF, tried to portray 
itself as having strong support. This was to be achieved by trying to bring as many 
organizations together as possible. However, there were also active, functional 
organizations in the Committee, especially youth and church organizations. 51 Students also 
played a prominent role in the UDF struggles in the region. The following section will 
assess the impact of their early involvement in the politics of the UDF. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Author's interview with Jorry Mohamed (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 17 June 1995). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
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Students' involvement in the politics of the UDF 
The UDF launched its Natal Midlands branch at a time when students at schools in the 
region were embarking on mass protests. The students' demonstrations that had begun 
with Koornhof s visit in August 1984 resumed in January 1985. In the first five months of 
that year there were many protest marches and sit-ins at various schools around 
Pietermaritzburg. 52 The issues taken up in the school protests were the shortage of free 
books for students, the imposition of age restrictions by the Department of Educatfon and 
Training (DET) on the admission and progression of African pupils, and the appointment 
of under-qualified teachers in African schools.53 There were also protests against the 
arrest of students who were involved in organizing marches. For instance, a week-long sit­
in was organized in May 1985 by four lmbali and Edendale high schools to demand the 
release of six students held in police detention. 54 At Siqongweni High School in lmbali 
there was an additional issue, the imposition of a R25 deposit for all students who 
enrolled.55 Some of these issues affected not only students but also parents, who had 
difficulty in finding the money, and who viewed education as a right, not a privilege, for 
their children. On 6 August 1985 students from black schools embarked on a massive 
stayaway. The protest was against the continuation of the partial state of emergency 
imposed by the government in 18 Districts to suppress political protests (although Natal 
was not affected), the detention of Themba Ngubane in May 1985, a student from 
Siqongweni high school, and the murder of Victoria Mxenge in August 1985, a UDF 
treasurer in the Durban region. 56 
52 Natal Witness, 23 January; 7 May; 14 May 1985. 
53 Author's interview with Sobhuza Dlamini (UNP, 9 
October 1994). 
54 M. Butler et al., Imbali, p. 159.
55 Natal Witness, 23 January 1985. 
56 Natal Witness, 7 August 1985. 
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After the establishment of UDF structures in the Pietermaritzburg region in March 1985, 
UDF activists began to build up affiliated organizations. It became relatively easy for the 
UDF to organize students because they already had concrete problems round which to 
mobilize. UDF activists took advantage of this opportunity to try to situate educational 
struggles within the general strategy of challenging apartheid, thereby winning students' 
support.57 In this context, students in Pietermaritzburg came to the forefront of UDF 
activities, demanding various ·changes in the system of education. 58 The educational crisis 
continued to attract students to the organizations that were challenging the Bantu 
education system. Sobhuza Dlamini, who was a member of the Congress of South African 
Students, observed that during this time COSAS became very active in attracting students 
to support the Front. Using phrases from the Freedom Charter like, 'Education shall be 
free, Compulsory, Universal and Equal for all children' as slogans, COSAS managed to 
win over the support of most of the student� in Pietermaritzburg. 
Another development that facilitated the mobilization and organization of students by UDF 
activists was the trial in Pietermaritzburg of sixteen national UDF leaders on charges of 
treason. It is possible that state officials chose Pietermaritzburg as the site of the trial 
because they felt that UDF was weak in the region, and that it would not be able to 
organize mass demonstrations. From May to December 1985, Pietermaritzburg became 
a centre of attention for South African and overseas newspapers. The sixteen UDF 
members were released on bail of R170 000 on 4 May 1985.59 Nevertheless, attention and 
criticism (from both internal and external anti-apartheid activists) continued, focusing on 
the restrictions experienced by the 16 UDF members under security laws. In the USA forty 
senators of both parties petitioned the Botha government, 125 British MP's registered their 
57 Author's interview with Blade Nzirnande (UNP, 5 October 
1994). 
58 Ibid. 
59 Natal Witness, 5 May 1985. 
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protest, and the United Nations debated the issue.60 The UDF established a Treason Trial 
subcommittee to organize accommodation and food for the people on trial, their relatives, 
and other visitors to the trial61 • The UDF Local General Council organized fund-raising 
projects to raise money to help in paying for these expenses. The funds were also used 
for organizing campaigns, encouraging people to attend the trial proceedings, and 
informing people who were not attending of the latest developments. 62 These campaigns 
in Pietermaritzburg that started in May continued up to 9 December 1985 when the court 
dropped the charges against the 16 activists. 63
The first project for raising money that the UDF Natal Midlands subregion embarked upon 
was to organize a screening of the movie, 'A Passage to India' at the Grand Prix cinema 
in May 1985. 64 It was chosen because it exposed how imperial or colonial governments 
manipulated and exploited indigenous people.65 According to lrshaad Kaseeram, who was 
a Natal Indian Congress (NIC) activist and part of the UDF fund-raising committee, the 
committee aimed at winning strong support from the Indian communities. Also, Indian 
communities were seen t;>y the·committee as ideal targets for fund-raising because most 
of them were financially better off than Africans. 
In Pietermaritzburg the treason trial increased the level of awareness of students and 
youth. Student bodies such as COSAS and AZASO (Azanian Students Organization) 
6° Collinge, 'The United Democratic Front', p. 265. 
61 PACSA, UDF folder: Letter from Martin Wittenberg 
to the UDF affiliates in Natal Midlands (May 1985). 
62 Ibid. 
63 Natal Witness, 10 December 1985. 
64 PACSA, UDF folder: Letter from Martin Wittenberg to 
the UDF affiliates in Natal Midlands (May 1985). 
65 Author's interview with Irshaad Kaseeram (UNP, 17 
September 1995). 
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became very popular among the students. COSAS became the more popular of the two 
because of its use of the Freedom Charter guidelines, as it had adopted the Charter at its 
launching. To COSAS, proper education for African students was not achievable, since 
African leaders were in prison. 66 Students from surrounding schools frequently organized 
attendance at the trial proceedings. They chanted the 1960s Rivonia trial slogans such as 
'We stand by our leaders' and 'An injury to one is an injury to all', thus reviving charterist 
memories of the 1960s. 67 Students who were unfamiliar with the slogans were taught by
UDF organizers. Furthermore, since COSAS functioned within the paradigm of the 
charterist organizations, its supporters relied on the using the history of the ANC, as a 
point of reference. 
When Natal's UDF leaders appealed to UDF affiliates to show solidarity with the members 
on trial, the lmbali Taxi Association responded by providing free transport to people who 
wanted to attend the trial proceedings. 68 Most of those who took up this offer were students 
from various high schools in the region.69 Some taxi-owners, like Gibson Msomi, were 
university students. 70 Some lmbali parents, particularly those who were not sympathetic 
to the UDF, were strongly against the assistance provided to the UDF by the 'Taxi 
Association. They accused the association, IYO and COSAS of disrupting schooling in the 
township by encouraging students not to attend school but to attend the trial proceeding. 71 
This further widened the gap between many parents and their children. 
66 Author-' s interview with Sobhuza Dlamini {UNP, 7 
October 1994). 
67 Ibid. 
68 Author's interview with Mduduzi Ndlovu {UNP, 8 June 
1995). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Author's interview with Khaba Mkhize {Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 30 August 1994). 
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From the state's perspective, the various acts of student protest were insurrections which 
needed to be suppressed. Security forces, in responding to students' protest marches held 
regionally and nationally, used teargas and rubber bullets in certain instances to disperse 
crowds. 72 By the end of 1985 police harassment was becoming a major obstacle to UDF 
activists. The situation became worse in June 1986, when the government imposed a state 
of emergency. Policemen like Major D. Terreblanche, who could speak Zulu fluently, 
sought to influence parents by telling them that the 'youth' were defying them and that, as 
adults, they were supposed to discipline the youth.73 Terreblanche and other chief 
security-force members insisted that the authorities would seek to restore law and order 
in Pietermaritzburg by returning control to the parents and the traditional chiefs. 74 This 
approach helped to exacerbate further the divisions that were emerging between parents 
and youths. 
Another development that led to heightened conflicts and confrontations in the second half 
of 1985 was the assassination in Umlazi of the Natal UDF regional treasurer, Victoria 
Mxenge. 75 On 3 August students and pupils belonging to COSAS (Congress of South 
African Students), AZASO (Azanian Students Organization) and AZASM (Azanian 
Students Movement), organized a week of mourning by boycotting classes. 76 Students 
marched through the streets of lnanda, KwaMashu and Umlazi (townships around Durban). 
Incidents of looting in shops and clashes between demonstrating students and those who 
72 Natal Witness, 24 January, 1 May and 14 May 1985. 
73 Author's interviews with Masibu Majola 
(Pietermaritzburg, 9 November 1984), Jabulani Sithole 
(Pietermaritzburg, 20 March 1995) and Sobhuza Dlamini 
(UNP, 6 June 1995). 
74 Ibid. 
75 Natal Witness, 7 August 1985. 
76 Cooper, et al .. Race Relations Survey 1985 (Johannesburg, 
South African Institute of Race Relations, 1986), p. 538. 
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were not participating were reported. On 7 August UDF supporters who were attending the 
funeral service of Mxenge were allegedly attacked by lnkatha supporters from Lindelani; 
at least 12 people were killed and 100 injured. 77 Violent clashes between Africans and 
Indians took place in lnanda settlement, with Indian shops looted or burnt down. Groups 
of vigilantes, some of them up to 1000 strong, were organized by lnkatha branches to 
restore 'law and order'. 78 They conducted house-to-house searches for looted goods and 
UDF activists. Hundreds of UDF youth fled the township in fear of clashes with the 
vigilantes. 79 The affair marked the state's tolerance of lnkatha's attacks on UDF activists
in the Natal region. From lnanda, violent clashes between the UDF and lnkatha spread to 
the whole of the Natal region. 
In addition, in August 1985 there occurred the national banning of COSAS and the brutal 
murder in the Eastern Cape of the 'Cradock Four' (Sparrow Mkhonto, Matthew Goniwe, 
Fort Calata and Fidela Mhlawuli). COSAS was banned because of the continuation of 
intense students' protest against the imposition of partial state of emergency and the brutal 
killings of anti-apartheid activists. All these incidents led to heightened animosity between 
lnkatha and the UDF, and to confrontations between the police and UDF supporters. In the 
Pietermaritzburg region, UDF activists held several rallies in the city to mark these 
events.80 lnkatha and the state opposed these UDF rallies or mass actions because they 
regarded them as UDF recruitment drives. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Natal Witness, 7 August 1985. 
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The conflict intensifies: UDF, lnkatha and the state 
Nationally, the period 1983-5 could be referred to as the heyday of the UDF. There was 
swelling support for the Front from youths, workers, students, and community 
organizations. At its annual national conference on 5-7 April 1985, in Krugersdorp, the 
UDF adopted the theme 'From Protest to Change, From Mobilization to Organization'. This 
was the product of an attempt to find ways of transforming , mass mobilization' into 
coherent organization. The UDF aimed to organize and mobilize community, student, 
worker and church organizations at local levels. 
From 1985, church organizations affiliated to the UDF began to organize peace marches 
and commemoration services on days that were symbolically important in the liberation 
struggle, like Sharpeville Day on 21 March, and Soweto Day on 16 June. In 
Pietermaritzburg, on 16 June 1985, churches held a mass prayer service at St. Marks 
Anglican Church in lmbali to commemorate Soweto Day. The ceremony was attended 
mostly by young people. 81 The Rev. Wesley Mabuza, with the Rev. Mazwi Tisani, 
conducted the service.82 In his sermon, Mabuza linked evil and unjust powers to the devil,
and he said that 'one does not pray that the devil be converted but that he is overcome'. 83
After the church service, the police followed a group of about 300 youth who were singing 
as they went off towards their homes, and fired teargas to disperse them. 84 
81 PACSA Newsletter, 17 June 1985. 
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
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At times when the UDF was not directly involved in organizing marches, it was represented 
by its church affiliates.85 The churches became instrumental in organizing marches. Even 
after the imposition of emergency regulations in June 1986, churches carried on managing 
to bring people together. 86 
The UDF's growth and strength became a threat to the authority exercised over African 
people in Natal and KwaZulu by lnkatha and the state. The state was confronted by 
enormous problems in the 1980s. Socio-economic conditions in the country were \
undermining the government's ability to deliver what large numbers of people demanded 
(like subsidies for rents, houses, and bus fares, and the creation of employment). The 
heightened political conflicts which were emerging between the state and the UDF scared 
off prospective investors. In 1986 some investors pulled out of the country in accordance 
with the sanctions that were endorsed by the United Nations in protest against apartheid 
rule. 
The U D F took advantage of this situation and staged activities aimed at encouraging 
people not to participate in government-led institutions. This led to the collapse of civil 
government in many townships throughout the country. The aim was that they should be 
replaced by alternative, unofficial organizations calling for 'people's power'. 87 Governmt3nt 
officials were evicted from many townships by UDF activists, and government buildings 
were burnt down. The UDF gave civic associations a responsibility to make the townships 
ungovernable. 88 This led to the emergence of 'people's structures' (set up by UDF 
supporters) in a number of townships throughout the country. The civic organizations 
85 Author's interview with Peter Kerchhoff (PACSA, 
Pietermaritzburg, 29 September 1995). 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Jabulani Sithole, UDF file: National Working Committee 
paper (29-30· May 1987), p. 8. 
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struggled for access to state funds which were monopolized by whites, fought for
participation in a decision making-process that could bring them from the periphery to the
centre of urban government, and vigorously demanded the upgrading of facilities and
infrastructures in the townships. This was a direct challenge to the state by the UDF, and
marked the beginning of a new phase in South African popular resistance. 89 
The growing strength of the UDF also posed a direct challenge to lnkatha. The launching0J r.:.... .  \
o[ the UDF in 1983 was a threat to lnkath� in terms of follo��r�,J?�.rticularlt in Natal wher6q-'
lnkatha claimed to have the mass_s�UPROct ol the 'Zulus'. When the UDF established its_,... ' _ ... _ � . .  . .  --
structures in Pietermaritzburg in 1985, this threat became real to lnkatha supporters in the
region. UDF supporters began to mobilize in the same constituencies that lnkatha claimed
to be controlling. UDF supporters criticized the KwaZulu administrative structures
controlled by lnkatha, arid they openly criticized lnkatha members for participating in
apartheid structures like the township councils. 90 
From 1§.��_onwg3rds, lnkatha supporters began to forge alliances with vigilante groups in
an attempt to expel from the region the so-called 'troublesome elements' or 'radicals'.
Their campaigns were characterized by intimidation and harassment. As a result, numbers
of people �ho w�re political!� und�cided were pushed into siding with the UDF. From
1985, lnkatha began treating people who wished to remain neutral and unaligned in the
same way as those who were UDF members. People had either to move from their homes
or fight. For instance, if a member of a family had joined a UDF-affiliated organization,
89 Worden, Making of Modern South Africa, p. 130. 
90 Author's interviews with Lakela Kaunda 
(Piet�rmaritzburg, 14 October 1994); Khaba Mkhize 
(Linley House, Pietermaritzburg, 30 August 1994); Thami 
Mseleku (UNP, 27 October 1994) and Mduduzi Ndlovu (UNP, 
8 July 1995) . 
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lnkatha harassed the whole family.91 As a result the rest of the family had to side with the
UDF for 'protection'.92 According to Dumisani Phungula, a member of the Edendale Youth
Organization (EDEYO), joining lnkatha was not a solution because after joining one had 
to participate in attacking non�lnkatha members. 93 Therefore, many people chose to 
oppose lnkatha rather than let it control them. 94 What can be concluded is that from the 
early stages of the UDF's activities in the Pietermaritzburg region in 1985, the Front 
consolidated itself through defence of its supporters in the townships rather than through 
attempts to mobilise around national or regional anti-apartheid campaigns. Political 
struggles in the region became clearly defined as struggles between lnkatha and the UDF. 
In the townships, the UDF camp comprised mainly civic, church and youth organizations, 
while lnkatha supporters forged an alliance with the vigilante committees. Nigel Worden 
argues that in the 1980s the South African state was involved in encouraging reactionary 
vigilante groups to protect township councillors, police, and traders, and also to take action 
against anti-apartheid township activists.95 Clearly the vigilante groups received support 
from the police for whom they provided a convenient ally in countering protest. This can 
be better understood through an analysis of the problems the that lmbali Civic Association 
(ICA) faced in the region. 
91 Author's interviews with Lakela Kaunda (Natal Witness, 
Pietermaritzburg, 14 October 1994) and Jabulani Sithole 
(Pietermaritzburg, 20 March 1995). 
92 Ibid. 
93 Author's interview with Dumisani Phungula (UNP, 30 
October 1995). 
94 Ibid. 
95 Nigel Worden, The Making of Modern South Africa 
(Oxford, Blackwell, 1994), p. 132. 
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With rent boycotts becoming more frequent and more widely supported nationally in .1983-
4, civic organizations became important in coordinating these boycotts. In April 1985, 
lmbali residents formed the lmbali Civic Association at a meeting held at a Baptist church 
in lmbali Stage One.96 The founders dubbed it 'the movement of the future' and 'the 
people's body. '97 Student organizations, the IYO and the lmbali Taxi Association played
a crucial role in its formation. 98 At its launching an interim committee of eight was elected, 
consisting of A. Hlengwa, M. Gumede, Kenneth Dladla, Mnqe Mvuyane, D. Ngwenya, A. 
Khuma, D. Dladla and Robert Duma. Duma, a worker at the South Africa Breweries and 
a member of the Food and Allied Workers Union, was chairperson. 99 The association had
two priorities: to fight evictions offamilies who could not afford to pay rent for their homes, 
and to deal with students' problems, particularly to try to bridge the gap between youth and 
parents (that is to bring the youth and parents to work together). 100 Members of the 
association told people who were not working and who were in arrears with their rents that 
their arrears would be scrapped. 101 The ICA also strongly criticized the township
councillors, accusing them of working within the system and participating in the structures 
that were perpetuating apartheid. 102 
96 Natal Witness, 20 April 1985; Author's interview with 
Khaba Mkhize (Linley House, Pietermaritzburg, 30 
September 1994). 
97 Author's interview with Khaba Mkhize (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 30 September 1994). 
98 M. Butler, Imbali, p. 20. 
99 Natal Witness, 20 April 1985; Author's interview with 
Sobhuza Dlamini (UNP, 4 November 1994). 
100 Natal Witness, 20 April 1985. 
101 Author's interview with Khaba Mkhize (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 30 September 1994). 
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After its launching the ICA decided to affiliate to the UDF as a means of gaining wider 
support. The step was taken because of the influence of students within the association. 103 
The move was inevitable because the agenda of the ICA clearly matched that of UDF 
affiliates. The UDF was to make the townships ungovernable by encouraging the residents 
not to pay rents, to force councillors out of townships, and to demand from the state that 
more amenities should be constructed in the townships. 104 
The formation of the ICA was bound to provoke strong reaction from lnkatha supporters, 
as had happened at the beginning of 1985 with the formation of the Joint Rents Action 
Committee (JORAC) in the townships of Durban. 105 The formation of JORAC was followed 
by physical confrontation between UDF and lnkatha supporters. The two factions burnt 
homes and killed opponents. 106 The position of the ICA after its launching in April 1985 
became similar to that of JORAC, with UDF and lnkatha supporters fighting each other. 
lnkatha supporters who wanted to retain lmbali's council structures strongly resented the 
ICA. lnkatha supporters were prepared not only to participate in town councils but to 
defend them. 
By August 1985 the political situation in lmbali had became tense as efforts by lnkatha 
members to eradicate the so-called · radical' elements continued. 107. A group of heavily 
armed men began roaming the township, demanding to see UDF, AZ.APO and ICA 
members, and threatening them with death. On 18 August, four months after the launching 
of the ICA, unknown people attacked R. Duma and burnt his home. He fled to the Federal 
103 Ibid. 
104 Jabulani Si thole, UDF File: National Working 
Committee paper (29-30 May 1987), p. 8. 
105 Meer, Resistance in the Townships , p. 133. 
106 Ibid. 
107 M. Butler, et al., Imbali, p. 161. 
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Theological Seminary for refuge. 108 Two days later a mob burnt taxis in Mlahlankosi 
Road, an lnkatha-supporting area in lmbali. 109 These were clearly retaliatory attacks 
between lnkatha and UDF supporters. Because of death threats, ICA members were not 
able to keep the association functioning. For the next five years the UDF did not attempt 
to launch any civic organizations in the African townships of Pietermaritzburg. Other ICA 
members had seen what happened to their chairman, and they were afraid of risking their 
lives and property. UDF supporters had learnt a lesson in lmbali and elsewhere in Natal 
about the way lnkatha dealt with those who initiated such structures. However, the need 
for the UDF to have the support of civic organizations was a pressing one because the 
civics could be a powerful force in highlighting community problems. Furthermore, civic 
associations in African townships had the potential to transform the image of the UDF from 
being an organization dominated by youth and students to one which included adults in 
its township structures. Although adults from COSATU unions lived in the townships, they 
were not organized according to townships or areas but only at their workplace. This lack 
of adult structures in black townships proved to be a weakness for the UDF in the Natal 
Midlands.110
On Sunday 25 August 1985 about 200 stick-carrying lmbali residents marched on the 
Federal Theological Seminary and informed the senior staff members, including the 
president of the seminary, Dr. Khoza Mgojo, that the seminary was a cause of unrest in 
lmbali. 111 Among the crowd were Patrick Pakkies, the mayor of lmbali, Ben Jele, 
chairperson of the lnkatha branch in lmbali, and V. B. Ndlovu, a member of the KwaZulu 
Legislative Assembly. 112 The leaders of the crowd were lnkatha members. They gave the 
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members of the seminary an ultimatum to vacate the premises. The seminary took the 
issue to court and obtained an interdict restraining lnkatha members from harassing 
members of the institution. In mid-September, a few weeks after the issuing of the court 
interdict, some residents of lmbali alleged that members of lnkatha had intimidated them 
into paying a donation of R1 each towards the costs of defending the court application 
against P. C. Pakkies and V. B. Ndlovu. 113 
In September 1985 in lmbali, unknown people attacked S'khumbuzo Ngwenya, the UDF 
Natal Midlands co-secretary, and stabbed his mother.114 A month later, Gibson Msomi, 
who was a co-founder of the ICA, a taxi-owner and a student at the University of Zululand, 
was shot dead, as was Mandia Madlala, an lnkatha member.115 The conflict between the 
UDF and lnkatha was beginning to develop into one of 'elimination', not merely 'expulsion' 
or 'discipline'. In November 1985, tl!1e Supreme Court in Pietermaritzburg heard allegations 
of lnkatha's bid to 'cleanse' lmbali of 'troublemakers' when seven lmbali residents 
submitted affidavits. These affidavits cited an lmbali town councillor, Abdul Awetta, as 
having told residents that he would take such a step.116 Henry Mabida, a UDF member in 
the region, was one of the seven residents who gave the affidavits. By the end of 1985 and 
early 1986 these conflicts were spilling over into qther areas. 
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Sobantu, Edendale and Vulindlela in the mid-1980s 
From 1985, political events in lmbali had important repercussions in Sobantu, the 
Edendale townships and the Vulindlela peri-urban areas. In the case of Sobantu, it is 
important to take the analysis back to the early 1980s. At that time the township had been 
relatively calm, compared to lmbali, because of political solidarity within the village. The 
sense of unity that had developed in Sobantu was due largely to the small size of the 
township, which had not expanded since the late 1950s. It had one church, one primary 
school, one secondary school, and no workers' hostels, so people who grew up in Sobantu 
knew one another and developed a sense of community. 117 In the wake of abortive 
government attempts to set up a community council in 1979, and then later a town 
committee, leadership of Sobantu passed to an unofficial Committee of Twelve'.118 This 
committee, which was elected by the residents of Sobantu at a public meeting on 26 
January 1984, comprised Thami Mthalane (chairman), Elias Ntshangase, Arthur Mathonsi, 
D. Majola, Theo Mkhize, M. Hlengwa, Jackie Ntshangase, Piu·s Mbuyisa, Nhlanhla
Makhathini, Tolbert Ngcobo, Ben Tshona and Gugu Mdlalose.119 
The aim of the Committee of Twelve was to lobby for the inclusion of Sobantu into the 
white municipality, and for obtaining funds for the development of the township. The 
committee dealt with two boards that administered the township, the Drakensberg 
Administration Board and then, from 1985, the Natalia Development Board. The committee 
received widespread support from the people of the village, which kept it intact and 
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respected as a body. It had clearly defined issues to deal with, and its members saw their 
task as fighting for blacks against 'reactionary whites'. 
Political solidarity in Sobantu began to break down in 1985, as political refugees from 
lmbali came to seek safety in the village. With the coming of these refugees, the 
committee had to deal with problems that were no longer related only to civic or township 
development but to political struggles among the residents.120 Two major political 
complications developed. Firstly, those who supported AZ.APO started organizing their 
own youth organization in opposition to the UDF-aligned Sobantu Youth Organization 
(SOYO). Broadly speaking, tensions developed between supporters of the 'charterist' 
UDF, and the National Forum (NF), a federation of black-consciousness organizations. 
Secondly, lnkatha members from lmbali were trying to track down refugees from that 
township; as a result, the refugees in Sobantu were suspicious of visitors to the township, 
and sometimes harassed them. 
The first testing incident for the Committee of Twelve came on 15 July 1985. Armed 
Sobantu adults raided homes in the township and ordered Pastor Kwela to leave .the 
township.121 This was because of the activities of his son, Gcwelumusa, a COSAS member 
who was organizing students at Sobantu high school.122 The UDF youth saw Kwela as a 
'progressive' adult who was prepared to help the younger generation politically and 
socially.123 Kwela used to allow SOYO to hold political meetings at his church, and 
occasionally hired educational videos for the local youth to watch. In the event Kwela left 
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Sobantu, but the incident tarnished the political image and the reputation of the Committee 
of Twelve. 124 The engineers of this action were well-known residents, and included 
members of the Committee. 125 These latter might have participated in the actions because 
they felt that if the radicalization of students was tolerated, they might become 
uncontrollable. Because of the indecisiveness of the committee in taking sides in the on­
going community struggles, most of its members came to be seen by SOYO as enemies. 
In the eyes of UDF-affiliated organizations in the region, the · Dozen' became a discredited 
body. 126 'Progressive' youth organizations like SOYO began to view the committee as part 
of the vigilante group that was operating at lmbali. 127
For the first time, rival organizations to SOYO emerged in 1985. They were led by 
·outsiders' and their emergence helped to divide Sobantu into two sections, ·proper'
Sobantu and · Dark City'. · Proper' Sobantu was where SOYO had its support. Its members 
were commonly called 'Amavarara' (the term that was later used to refer all UDF youth 
organizations). 'Dark City' became predominantly a refugee settlement, and the youth 
activists who formed AZAPO and Forward Youth were collectively known as 
· Amazimuzimu. '128 124 Ibid. 125 For personal reasons, my source preferred to remain 
anonymous (Pietermaritzburg, 20 March 1995). 126 Author's interview with Lungisani Kunene (UNP, 20 
April 1995). 127 Ibid. 128 'The names Amazimuzimu and Amavarara do not have 
their origins at Sobantu, but they were brought into 
Sobantu and both gro�p used them without attaching 
any specific meaning to them, besides being a name of 
a group identity. The names were used all o�er the 
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The first youth organization to challenge SOYO in Sobantu was the Forward Youth 
Movement, launched on 17-18 December 1985. 129 Nationally, Forward Youth was seen as 
the youth wing of the Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM), which had its origins in the 
Western Cape in the 1940s. The movement had resurfaced in Cape Town in April 1985, 
with R. 0. Dudley as president. 130 They believed in the ideology of the Trotskyist socialist 
workers' tendency. But according to Lyov Hassim, its general secretary, the 
Pietermaritzburg FY perceived itself as an independent socialist · organization. In 
Pietermaritzburg the Forward Youth was functional for only six months and then 
collapsed. 131 Like the UDF, the FY sought to mobilize a black constituency, although its 
leadership was predominantly Indian. As part of its mobilization tactics, the FY used 
slogans like: 'If you are not forward you are backward, forward for ever, backward 
never.'132 
The movement relied on charismatic youth leaders, Masibu Majola and Jabulani 
Makhathini for its mobilization campaigns. They had both been expelled from lmbali by the 
vigilantes, and belonged to AZAPO's youth wing. They were temporarily living at Dark 
City in Sobantu. When they joined Forward Youth, they carried on with dual membership 
of these organizations. 133 As a result they always combined the activities of Forward Youth 
and AZAPO. 
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The collapse of Forward Youth in Pietermaritzburg was due to the problem of having the 
leadership belonging to two different organizations. The misunderstanding between 
Sobantu's Forward Youth leaders, Hassim the general secretary, Adam Habib the vice­
secretary, and Masibu Majola the president, led to the collapse of the FY six months after 
its launching in the region. 134 The issue ·was whether the FY should attend the launching 
of the National Forum in Durban, which was being organized at the initiative of AZAPO and 
CAL (Cape Action League). 135 After failing to come to an agreement, Masibu and other 
members proceeded to attend the launching of the National Forum on their own. 136 
Because the FY relied on Majola and Makhathini for mobilization in Sobantu, when the two 
left the organization, it collapsed. 
At the end·ot 1985 there were tensions between UDF youth and AZAPO youth in Sobantu, 
although -not on a large scale. 137 The existence of two hostile camps, which were gearing 
themselves to organize the same members but using different political ideologies 
(Charterist and Black Consciousness), resulted in conflict. The confrontations between 
these two camps first emerged in lmbali in mid-1985. This served as a prelude to the 
fighting that broke out between these two youth organizations again in Sobantu in 1987 . 138 
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On 8 March 1986, lnkatha supporters held a meeting in Sobantu. 139 lnkatha supporters
allegedly came from lmbali. Three days after the meeting there were clashes between UDF 
and lnkatha supporters in Sobantu. This followed an incident in which lnkatha supporters 
had attacked students at Sobantu High School, who allegedly had assaulted two 
schoolgirls who were lnkatha members. 140 Sobantu High School closed for several days
because of these clashes. 
By 1986 the repercussions of the flight of refugees from lmbali was being felt in many 
parts of the region. Sobantu was the first township to experience the political impact of 
their arrival. Vulindlela and Edendale residents felt it from mid-1986, but more particularly 
from early 1987 onwards. In Edendale and Vulindlela the struggles were more prolonged 
than in Sobantu. There are several hypotheses which one can postulate to try to explain 
this. Firstly, Sobantu had been built to a clear design, and was also smaller than these 
other two residential areas. Residents of Sobantu could easily notice strangers or visitors 
in the township. However, Vulindlela and some parts of Edendale were not planned 
settlements. Households were more scattered, and it was not always easy to know of 
events happening immediately. 141 
Moreover, unlike lmbali, which had a substantial number of both UDF and lnkatha 
supporters, other areas were dom_inated by a single party. Sobantu and some parts of 
Edendale were predominantly UDF townships, while lnkatha dominated Vulindlela. In this 
region the conflict between the UDF and lnkatha reached its peak in 1987, a theme which 
I will discuss in the following chapter. 
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lnkatha had an advantage over the UDF in Vulindlela because the area fell directly under 
the KwaZulu government. And because of detentions, restrictions and bannings imposed 
on UDF activists, the Front was organizationally handicapped. It was through workers' and 
church organizations that UDF activities in the Pietermaritzburg region were sustained. 
Workers' organizations in Pietermaritzburg in the mid-1980s 
By mobilizing workers, the UDF secured strong support in challenging t�e state 
economically and politically. The labour movement, which in the early 1980s was more 
organizationally mature than black political organizations, strongly influenced the 
awakening of resistance politics in Pietermaritzburg. 142 In the Hulett's Aluminium strike 
(1981), organized by the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU), the Simba Chips strike 
in 1985 organized by the South African Workers' Union, which later was called the Food 
and Allied Workers' Union (SAWU-FAWU}, and the BTR Sarmcol strike in Howick in 1985, 
organized by MAWU, workers managed to link their workplace struggles with problems 
that were being experienced by people politically and socially in the townships. They 
managed to gain substantial support from people in Pietermaritzburg. 143 
The 1985 Sarmcol strike marked a turning-point in the history of popular resistance and 
mobilization in Pietermaritzburg. The dispute between BTR Sarmcol qnd its workers was 
over management's prolonged delays in recognizing the Metal and Allied Workers Union, 
and in granting wage increments demanded by workers. A preliminary agreement on 
these issues between workers and management at BTR Sarmcol had been made in 
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August 1983. 144 Sarmcol's management had, however, continually delayed implementation 
of the recognition agreement. 145 The strike started on 30 April 1985 after management had 
failed to sign an agreement recognizing MAWU as the union representative of the 
workers. 146 On 1 May workers in unions affiliated to the Federation of South African Trade 
Unions (FOSATU) flocked to a workers' rally at Edendale Lay Ecumenical Centre. Striking 
Sarmcol workers also participated in this rally, which was called by FOSATU, the 
Commercial Catering and Allied Workers' Union of South Africa, the General Workers 
Union and the Food and Canning Workers' Union. 147 By 3 May the company had dismissed 
all 950 workers. 148 
When Sarmcol began to employ 'scab' workers, backed by lnkatha because of its 
opposition to UDF stayaways and boycotts, the dispute took on a political dimension that 
fuelled confrontation and conflict in the Pietermaritzburg region. The UDF and its affiliates 
condemned the policy of using · scab' workers. The dismissal of the striking Sarmcol 
workers came as a test for the two-month-old UDF structures in the region. 
On 8 July 1985 the dispute between Sarmcol workers and management turned into an 
open confrontation between UDF and lnkatha supporters. Most of Sarmcol's striking 
workers came from Mpophomeni township near Howick, while 'scab' workers came from 
lnkatha-supporting areas like lmbali. This is one of the reasons why most of the public 
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rallies related to the dispute took place in Pietermaritzburg. Furthermore, MAWU wanted 
to put pressure on the Chamber of Industries, whose offices were situated in 
Pietermaritzt:?urg. 
In July 1985, the Metal Workers' Union, representing the striking workers, organized 
protest marches and support rallies for the workers in Edendale, lmbali and in other parts 
of the Pietermaritzburg region. They explained to the residents the dispute between the 
workers and Sarmcol management. 149 
Tension rose as hundreds of workers and school children in Pietermaritzburg heeded a 
call to stay at home on 18 July in support of Sarmcol's striking workers. 150 The call followed 
a last-minute failure of negotiations between the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Industry 
and MAWU to solve the dispute. In organizing the stayaway, MAWU workers played a 
leading role, and UDF youth organizations helped it. 151 The stayaway was the largest in 
the city's history. It brought the city to a virtual standstill. 152 Demonstrators set two 
beerhalls on fire in lmbali, and others in Machibisa, Edendale, and Ashdown. In lmbali the 
home of Abdul Awetta was petrol-bombed as well as a clinic under the KwaZulu 
administration. In Machibisa the homestead of Chief Mini was attacked. 153 In all, the 
protests were not successful in terms of helping the striking workers to win their battle to 
be reinstated, nor to stop the company employing 'scab' labour but they certainly 
succeeded in mobilizing UDF supporters in the region. The dispute became a UDF rallying 
point for its mass mobilization in the region, and ultimately led to protracted struggles that 
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affected everyone in the region. Furthermore, the Sarmcol dispute marked the beginning 
of the development of strong a relationship between trade unions and community 
organizations in the region. 
On 15 August 1985 UDF affiliates began the second phase of a concerted effort to put 
pressure on Sarmcol. 154 This time the campaign took the form not of a stayaway but of a
mass consumer boycott of white shops and businesses in the Pietermaritzburg and Howick 
area. 155 These boycotts and stayaways were successful in the sense that the Front and its 
affiliates managed to mobilize large numbers of people to show solidarity with the striking 
workers. But the stayaways and the boycotts were not successful in pressuring the 
Sarmcol management to heed the· workers' demands. But nevertheless the stayaway 
symbolized a new phase of the workers' struggles in the region: the city of 
Pietermaritzburg came to a halt, and organizationally, the stayaway marked a great 
achievement on the part of trade unions and community organizations. To quote the Daily 
News: 
· If there were any remaining doubt about the de9ree of organization among black
workers, they have now been dispelled. Those few employers who had still believed
that the old order continued - that workers making unreasonable demands could
simply be dismissed and replaced by others off the streets will now be revising their
ideas'. 156 
In December 1985, FOSATU (Federation of South African Trade Unions) was replaced by 
a politically oriented trade union federation, COSATU, which was launched at a meeting 
of 1 0 000 workers in Durban. With 33 unions representing 449 679 paid-up members, 
COSATU was the largest-ever trade union federation in South Africa's history. 157 Its 
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formation coincided with a general movement of the emerging unions into an alliance with 
other anti-apartheid organizations. 158 
In Pietermaritzburg COSATU took over the struggles of its affiliate MAWU (Metal and 
Allied Workers Union) at BTR Sarmcol. As a result the Sarmcol dispute turned into a 
political confrontation between UDF and lnkatha supporters. In December 1985 three 
leading Sarmcol workers and a youth were murdered, allegedly by lnkatha supporters. 159 
There were attacks on UDF and COSATU members, allegedly by lnkatha supporters after 
this. 
On 1 May 1986 COSATU organized its first national campaigns. In Pietermaritzburg 
COSATU and the UDF jointly organized a workers' gathering at Wadley stadium on 1 May 
1986. About 10 000 people attended. 160 Speakers drew attention to the plight of the
striking Sarmcol workers, and asked other workers to unite in the fight against apartheid. 161 
From this time on, number of workers began to observe 1 May as a people's holiday. 
The formation of COSATU, with its politically militant strategy, impelled lnkatha to form 
its own ethnically based trade union. 162 On 1 · May 1986 lnkatha launched its own union, 
the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA), again at a meeting held in Durban. 
There was strong, politically motivated competition for control of workers in Natal between 
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lnkatha and the UDF. The UDF perceived lnkatha as a threat in Natal because of its ethnic 
mobilization. On the other hand, lnkatha was trying to keep Natal as its stronghold. 
UWUSA's formation, in particular, should not be interpreted as addressing a separate or 
� spontaneous need among workers, but rather as a concerted attempt by the lnkatha 
leadership to combat the new onslaught. 163 UWUSA became a rival union whose prime 
aim was to undermine COSATU in the region. Furthermore, being an ethnically based 
trade union, UWUSA aimed to enhance lnkatha's ideology of 'Zuluness'. 164 
The formation of these two trade union organizations in Natal exacerbated existing 
tensions between the UDF and lnkatha. Although to lnkatha the formation of C'OSATU was 
a threat, to the UDF it proved to be a source of strength. In Natal, COSATU worked hard 
to keep the politics of the UDF alive through organizing protest campaigns and boycotts, 
particularly in Pietermaritzburg. · COSATU brought several unions into the Front. Because 
COSATU was well organized in the Pietermaritzburg region, with a functioning council that 
held meetings twice a week, it greatly assisted in strengthening the UDF presence in the 
regio11. 165 This enabled certain UDF affiliates to. discuss and propose programmes of 
action even when the Front itself was not functioning. When the state and lnkatha 
harassed UDF activists, COSATU assumed an important role in UDF politics in the region. 
Struggles waged by the UDF in the region against the state and lnkatha would have had 
much less impact without the support of COSATU. During the state of emergency, the 
strength of COSATU was important in enabling the Front to survive. 
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Extra-parliamentary activities thwarted 
The surge in support for the UDF and other extra-parliamentary organizations in the mid-
1980s became a threat to the state. Most protest activities in the early 1980s were centred 
in the PWV region. The protests in the Transvaal were against payment of rents, fare 
hikes, and the passing of the South African Constitutional Bill that led to the creation of the 
tricameral.parliament in September 1984, accommodating whites, Indians and Coloureds. 
By June 1985 the political situation in the country had reached such a state that the 
government declared a partial state of emergency, extended the power of arbitrary 
detention without trial, and indemnified the security forces against charges of 
misconduct. 166 The partial state of emergency was declared on 25 June 1985, to last for 
three months in eighteen magisterial districts. The UDF and 28 other organizations were 
restricted from holding outdoor meetings and from campaigning without police permission. 
In August the partial state of emergency was renewed for six months. This second partial 
state of emergency was not renewed, and for two months (April and May 1986) the country 
was not under any emergency regulations. The state probably intended to test the reaction 
of anti-apartheid activists, and to display an image of reform to people who were critical 
of its repressive measures. 
It is important to note is that none of the districts affected by the partial state of emergency 
in 1985 were in Natal.167 The reason that the emergency was not extended to Natal may 
have been that here, unlike in other regions (i.e Transvaal), the UDF-led mass protest 
campaigns were still at an early stage of development. Because some areas in Natal were 
directly under the KwaZulu government, protests in those areas were not directed at the 
South African state but at the KwaZulu government. As a. result the South African 
government could have felt that the UDF was being effectively checked by lnkatha. 
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To sum up, the state responded in two ways to curb the growing strength of the UDF and 
other extra-parliamentary activities from the mid-1980s. Internally it embarked on a policy 
designated to curtail the strength of the UDF, and externally the South African government 
embarked on programmes of disrupting the economies of the neighbouring states, where 
South African political exiles lived. 
By August 1985 the state had detained about 45 out of 80 UDF national leaders; others 
were on trial or had been murdered. The number of detained UDF activists rose 
dramatically in 1986. 168 The government used detention to silence political opposition. The 
state usually used 'Section 29' of the Internal Stability Act to detain UDF activist for long 
periods, so as to prevent them from participating in anti-apartheid activities. Refusing bail 
for UDF activists was a camouflaged form of detention without trial. The detention of 16 
UDF members on treason charges was a means of harassing the UDF and of cracking 
down on extra-parliamentary opposition in South Africa. 
On 2 November 1985 the state president, P. W. Botha, signed an indemnity regulation that 
protected the security forces and the government from prosecution for actions taken while 
carrying out their duties. 169 The Natal Witness published the following report: 
'In terms of the regulations: No civic or criminal proceedings would be brought in 
any court of law anywhere in South Africa against the State. If any action is taken 
in which the good faith of the State, a member of the government or a member of 
the forces is in question, it would be presumed, until the contrary is proven, that 
such act was advised, commanded, ordered, directed or done in good faith. 
Re.gulation 2 prevent the courts from granting interdicts to stay or set aside orders 
and rules issued in terms of the emergency regulations'. 170
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On the same day the government banned newspaper, radio and television reporters from 
entering areas where security forces were deployed. By these actions the government 
effectively set the police and security forces above the law. The restrictions placed a wall 
of silence around the townships, and gave pro-apartheid forces free rein with minimum 
public exposure of their activities. 171 
On Christmas Eve, 1985, the UDF, COSATU, National Education Coordinating Committee 
and the South African Council of Churches called on their followers to express their 
protest against the partial state of emergency by turning off the lights in their homes. 172 
The campaign was highly important for the Front, because it was the first national 
campaign organized by these organizations in concert. In Pietermaritzburg most township­
dwellers turned off their lights as a symbolic protest. However, there was generally poor 
participation in non-African areas. 173 
Through the first half of 1986, political mobilization was building up in Pietermaritzburg, 
with church, youth and students' organizations becoming more active in the political 
struggles in the region. By mid-1986 protests were spilling over to other regions. On 12 
June 1986, four days before the commemoration of Soweto day, the government declared 
a national state of emergency. The broad purpose of the emergency was to break the 
spiralling cycle of violence in the country, to protect the regime's black supporters, and to 
reassure whites that Pretoria was determined to restore order.174 The state of emergency 
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disorganized most extra-parliamentary activities nationally_ Activists were restricted, 
banned or detained. 
With the imposition of the national state of emergency, a large number of anti-apartheid 
activists were arrested. Within a month, some 3867 people had been arrested 
nationwide. 175 In Pietermaritzburg, 57 or so UDF activists were detained during the first 
two weeks of the state of emergency. 176 The repressive security measures taken against 
the UDF forced it to function virtually underground, although it was still legal. 177 However,
statistics of the organizations that compiled records are not completely accurate. The 
detainees' support committees which were established during the state of emergency did 
not record the first batches of detention in detail. It was difficult for them to compile 
information because of security legislation and because of the remoteness of 
Pietermaritzburg's peri-urban areas. Also, it was dangerous for violence monitoring 
organizations to enter some areas because of the turbulent political situation. 
In conclusion, UDF structures in the Pietermaritzburg region were set up mainly as a 
defence against lnkatha rather than as a challenge to the apartheid state. Problems that 
UDF supporters faced in the region included the conflict between youth and parents, and 
conflicts between UDF and lnkatha supporters. Opponents of the UDF criticised the 
Front's youth constituency, and argued that it was an organization dominated by unruly, 
riotous and radical youth. This widened the rift between parents and youth in the region. 
The UDF had to struggle to change this image. 
The last part of the chapter surveyed the state's change of policy towards the UDF. After 
the formation of the UDF, the state had at first allowed it to function freely, probably with 
17
5 Ibid.
176 Christopher Merrett, UNP, Personal Report and 
Research file: The Detainees Aid Committee. 
177 Collinge, 'The United Democratic Front', p. 248.
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the hope that UDF activists were going to work within its reform parameters. But when the 
UDF and other extra-parliamentary organizations began to grow in strength and militancy, 
the state changed its policy. This began in June 1985 when the government declared a 
partial state of emergency. 
With the imposition of the national state of emergency in June 1986, the government 
tightened repressive measures against the UDF. In Pietermaritzburg, as in many other 
parts of the country, the UDF became disorganized. Some activists went into hiding, while 
others started to dissociate themselves from political activities because they were afraid 
of detention. Because the UDF's political meetings could not be held in public places, its 
political activity was drastically curtailed. 178 This opened the way for a more violent assault 
on UDF supporters by lnkatha. This issue will be examined in the next chapter. 
17
8 Christopher Merrett, UNP, Personal Report and Research
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CHAPTER THREE 
BENEATH THE LID OF OPPRESSION TENSION BOILS, 1986-1989 
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to analyze the functioning of the UDF in the Natal Midlands during the 
state of emergency years. It begins by assessing the impact of the state of emergency 
declared in June 1986. It ends towards the end of 1989, at a time when the MDM's 
defiance campaigns were taking place over the whole country. The year 1986 saw the 
intensification of efforts by the state and lnkatha to silence the UDF and other extra­
parliamentary organizations, while 1989 marked the resurgence of the organizations that 
the state and lnkatha had aimed to destroy. This chapter attempts to assess how the Front 
survived during these years. 
The 1985-6 State of Emergency severely curtailed the activities of extra-parliamentary 
political organizations in the country. The UDF and its affiliates became a special target 
of the emergency regulations. The legal space in which the Front could operate became 
very narrow. 1 In Pietermaritzburg, as in other parts of the country, the emergency 
regulations weakened the UDF structurally and organizationally. The state incapacitated 
most of the key UDF political activists through detention and restrictions. The functioning 
of the Front became very difficult. The state of emergency led to the development of 
'invisible' leaders of certain UDF affiliate organizations, leaders who were not known by 
some members of the organization and who could not let themselves become known for 
1 Jabulani Sithole, Pietermaritzburg, UDF file: Report of 
the United Democratic Front National Working Committee 
conference held on 29-30 May 1987, p. 23. 
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security reasons. 2 Later the strategy became a source of weakness, as lines of 
communication were cut between leaders and supporters, and it took some time to 
regroup.3 
However, the state of emergency failed to suppress tensions between the UDF and 
lnkatha supporters in the region. If anything, it allowed lnkatha to use more and more 
violent means to try to crush the UDF in Natal. The conflict between them intensified, with 
the areas around Pietermaritzburg being the most affected. By late 1987 the conflict that 
had began in lmbali in 1985 had turned into a regional issue, with fighting engulfing all the 
Pietermaritzburg townships and its peri-urban areas. 
Resistance to government polices also increased in the townships. Although the UDF as 
a structure was disorganized by restrictions and bannings, its supporters continued using 
UDF slogans and symbols. UDF supporters in Edendale began to develop their own 
alternative 'democratic' structures in 1987. In the UDF-controlled areas a network of street 
committees emerged, based on 'mass participation'. For the first time 'democracy' was 
practised at a street and township level, for people were electing structures that were 
accountable to them. The areas dominated by the UDF accepted street committees as 
their true representatives. However, the street committees in other areas in the country 
ended up running 'peoples' courts', a system of justice criticised by many people. The 
street committees in Pietermaritzburg were later turned into defence committees, and 
these structures played a significant role in defending UDF supporters during the conflict 
with lnkatha. 
In the search for peace and stability in the region, UDF, lnkatha, church organization, the 
Pietermaritzburg City Council, and business organizations tried to establish peace 
2 Author's interview with Dumisani Phungula (UNP, 30 
October 1995). 
3 Ibid. 
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forums. Among these were the Greater Pietermaritzburg conferences, Pietermaritzburg 
2000, the Standing for the Truth Campaign, and several peace talks facilitated by the 
Chamber of Commerce. However, the conflict proved to be complicated, and it was 
particularly difficult for organizations to get agreements through consensus. UDF and 
lnkatha representatives pushed forward their respective organizational interests, and tried 
to avoid being seen as losers by their supporters. 
After the launching of COSATU in 1985, the UDF found an affiliate that brought with it an 
organized work force to the Front. This alliance played an important role when the state 
imposed emergency regulations in 1986, and when the UDF was restricted and banned 
in 1988. During this period, a loose alliance of organizations came to the forefront in 
resistance politics. 4 This alliance of organizations was called the Mass Democratic 
Movement (MOM). According to Cassius Lubisi, who served in a number of UDF-affiliated 
organizations, the MOM came into being between 1985 and 1986 as a result of the 
imposition of the emergency regulations. 5 The UDF and COSATU became the core of the 
Mass Democratic Movement. 
However, the UDF and COSATU had difficulties in counteractlng the actions of the state 
and lnkatha. It took a long time for either the UDF or COSATU to reach decisions, as all 
affiliates had to be consulted, while the state and lnkatha could easily agree to a plan or 
strategy and execute it immediately. On the other hand it became an advantage for the 
UDF and COSATU to operate as loose federal structures because it became difficult for 
the government to suppress all the affiliates at the same time. Furthermore, it promoted 
development of leadership from different organizations. 
4 Business Day, 30 August 1989. 
5 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 23 October 
1995) . 
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In 1987 as a strategy to strengthen itself, the UDF gave high priority nationally to the 
slogan 'isolate the regime and broaden the alliance'.6 The UDF permitted two bantustan 
parties to affiliate to it, i.e. the Seoposongwe Party from Bophutatswana and the governing 
lnyandza National Movement of KwaNgwane, but not lnkatha. 7
At the national level, in March 1987.UDF-affiliated youth organizations launched a national 
youth body called the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO). This marked a come-back 
for UDF youth activists after their organizations had been suppressed by the state of 
emergency in 1985-6. A month later another organization, the Release Mandela Campaign 
(RMC), was launched by UDF activists, to demand, first, the release of Nelson Mandela, 
the leader of the African National Congress leader who had been sentenced to life 
imprisonment in 1964, and, se·cond, the unbanning of the ANC. Nationally, the two 
organizations came to the assistance of COSATU in trying to help in building strong UDF­
affiliated organizations.8 In the Pietermaritzburg region, the functioning of these two 
organizations, the RMC and SAYCO, reflected the weaknesses of the UDF affiliates. 
Although the national launching of the RMC took place in 1987, the Natal Midlands branch 
was only established three years lat�r (1990). The first interim committee for SAYCO in 
the region was elected to office on 1 O April 1988. 9 
6 Keith Gottschalk, 'UDF, 1983-1991: rise, impact and 
consequences', in Ian Liebenberg (ed.), The Long March: 
The Story of the Struggle for Liberation in South 
Africa (Cape Town, Philip, 1994), pp. 192-193. 
7 Ibid. 
See Chapter 1, under the section 'The formation of the 
United Democratic Front' for possible reasons why the 
UDF isolated Inkatha. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See Footnote 144. 
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In 1989, as the political situation in the country changed, the government allowed extra­
parliamentary organizations to embark on political activities without restrictions. Between · 
August and September, extra-parliamentary organizations embarked on mass defiance 
campaigns to protest against the state of emergency and the policies of the apartheid 
government. The chapter ends at the time when these mass defiance campaigns were 
taking off. 
On the run: Activists and the state of emergency 
The imposition of the national state of emergency on 12 June 1986 led to the detention 
and restriction of many extra-parliamentary political leaders in Pietermaritzburg and in the 
country as a whole. For the UDF, this removal of experienced leaders created a vacuum 
in organizational skills and abilities.10 The state's suppression of UDF politics through 
emergency regulations also affected many UDF affiliates. Most of the affiliates that had 
been politically active in the mid-1980s became very weak after 1986. Setting up links 
between the UDF and its affiliates, and between the affiliates, became more difficult. In 
Pietermaritzburg and elsewhere, repression led to the virtual collapse of many functioning 
organizations.11 
In Pietermaritzburg the detention during the state of emergency of key regional officials 
like the general secretaries, S'khumbuzo Ngwenya and Martin Wittenberg, and the scarcity 
or absence of General Council meetings due to the emergency regulations led to the 
collapse of the UDF. Without organizers, mobilization work came to a halt; without General 
Council meetings, UDF affiliates lacked a forum or an organ that could coordinate the 
activities of the various affiliates. The closure of the regional offices after June in 1986 due 
to repressive measures led to the disorganization of the UDF because there was no 
10 Author's interview with Thamsanqa Mseleku (UNP, 27 
October 1994). 
11 Author's interview with Vis Naidoo (UNP, 6 June 1995) . 
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central place in which the Front could perform its daily duties. Meetings that were held took 
place in secret places, with only few people being informed of them. 12 The rationale for this
was that it was not safe to be a known UDF activist, particularly in the townships. UDF 
activists were harassed and intimidated by lnkatha, vigilantes and by the police. 13 
Furthermore, some of these external problems that the UDF in the region had to deal with 
ended up brewing internal conflicts within the Front. For instance, having meetings in 
secret places, with only a 'selected' few in attendance, was seen by other UDF activists 
as leading to the emergence of a 'cabal' of leaders and the development of· clique 
politics. 14 It was particularly the collapse of youth organizations in the townships which 
weakened the Front, for in the Pietermaritzburg region the youth constituted the largest 
constituency of UDF supporters. 
When local activists were put out of action the national UDF leadership was unable to 
provide assistance. This was due to the fact that most of the UDF structures in the region 
were not functioning; as a result, it was difficult to establish strong regional and national 
ties. Moreover, it was regional structures that had to play a crucial role in facilitating and 
coordinating democratic interaction between local affiliates and the Front at ·a national 
level. 15 
12 Author's interviews with A. s. Chetty (Pietermaritzburg, 
4 October 1994), Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 6 September 1994), 
Thamsanqa Mseleku (UNP, 27 October 1994) and Mduduzi 
Ndlovu (UNP, 8 June 1995). 
13 Author's interview with Mduduzi Ndlovu (UNP, 8 June
1995). 
14 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 6 September 
1994) . 15 Report of the UDF National Working Committee conference 
held on 29-30 May 1987 in Johannesburg, p. 13. 
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With the disintegration of the UDF structures and its affiliate organizations at local level, 
people continued responding to calls for stayaways and boycotts because issues like 
rents, bus-fare hikes, and police harassments affected them daily. Although people were 
not mobilized into formal organizations they heeded UDF calls to display their opposition 
to apartheid. 16 From mid-1986, the recruitment of new members into existing UDF 
organizations subsided because of state repression as well as intimidation from lnkatha 
supporters. 17 Nonetheless · township social life provided some channels for the 
dissemination of information to unorganized groups of people. Activists knew whom to tell 
and where to go (places like bus terminuses, soccer grounds, shops), and eventually 
messages could get to most UDF supporters. 
In the short-term, the effects of the state of emergency on the UDF and its affiliates largely 
crippled it as an effective organization. However, in the long-term the state of emergency 
had some positive effects on the Front. UDF youth activists, particularly those who left 
lmbali because of harassment, were always on the run from the security forces who 
wanted to detain them, and from lnkatha vigilantes who claimed that they should be 
'disciplined'. 18 They moved from one place to another, from Mpophomeni to Empolweni, 
from Sobantu to Songonzima. Wherever they remained for a day or so, they aimed to 
leave a contact person to start mobilizing people into joining UDF-affiliated 
organizations. 19 For the first time places that had previously been politically quiet became 
zones that bred antf-apartheid activists. 20 
16 Author's interview with Mduduzi Ndlovu (UNP, 8 June 
1995). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Author's interview with Sobhuza Dlarnini (UNP, 8 June 
1995) 
19 Author's interviews with Mduduzi Ndlovu and Sobhuza 
Dlarnini (6 June 1995; UNP, 8 June 1995). 
20 Author's interview with Vis Naidoo (UNP, 6 June 1995). 
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In the long run, the detention of UDF activists and the expulsion of UDF and AZAPO 
youths from lmbali, a process that had began in 1985, had precisely the opposite effects 
from those hoped for by the state and the vigilantes. Detention brought together many 
people behind bars, which gave activists an opportunity to discuss political issues. Some 
people who had little political understanding left the prisons politically matured. 21 Detention 
and harassment of UDF activists led to the emergence of a new and young leadership. For 
example, lmbali witnessed the coming to the forefront of Sipho Gabela, Bheki Zulu and 
Sobhuza Dlamini, and at Mpophomeni there was Boy Ndlela. 22
One should be careful not to romanticize detention, which often had adverse psychological 
effects on detainees. Conditions of detention differed; some people were in solitary 
confinement, while others were interrogated day and night. 23 The Kenyan author and 
activists Ngugi wa Thiong'o argues that · detention is torture and the cruelty of it is 
ignorance of when one would be released, and this torture is not only for those inside but 
even those outside'24. 
After realising that restrictions and detentions were not effectively destroying extra­
parliamentary organizations, in February 1988 the state banned the UDF and sixteen other 
organizations. It prohibited all the banned organizations from engaging in any political 
activity. 25 The state also severely restricted the activities of COSATU. The UDF was 
21 Author's interview with Thamsanqa Mseleku (UNP, 27 
October 1994). 
22 Author's interviews with Sobhuza Dlamini, Vis Naidoo and 
Mduduzi Ndlovu (UNP, 6 June 1995). 23 Author's interview with Ahmed Bawa (UNP, 19 May 1995). 24 Ngugi wa Thiong'o A Writers Prison Diary (Nairobi, 
Heinemann, 1981), p. 146. 25 Natal Witness, 25 February 1988. See Appendix 3 for a 
list of the organizations that were affected. 
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permitted to retain its assets and keep its books up to date. 26 But because of detentions, 
banning and restrictions, it was difficult to run the offices. Nationally, the UDF continued 
its activities under the mantle of the MDM.27 Eighteen leading UDF political figures were 
served with restriction orders.28 In Pietermaritzburg, some of the UDF leaders who 
appeared in the Natal Witness newspaper under the column of those who were restricted 
were A. S. Chatty, Simon Gqubule and Jabu Ngwenya.29 In place of restricted activists, 
certain individuals took over the functioning of the Front. This led to in-fighting within the 
UDF, with some activists being accused by others of forming a ·cabal'. 
The emergence of clique politics 
By 1986 it had become risky to be a known UDF activist in the Pietermaritzburg region. 
When political protests took place in the region, police often arrested and detained UDF 
activists whom they knew. In addition to police harassment in Natal, UDF supporters were 
always at loggerheads with lnkatha supporters.30 The hostile political environment for UDF 
supporters in black areas led to the concentration of the Front's leadership in the hands 
of few individuals. Most of those who took over leadership were Indian activists in 
functioning organizations like the Natal Indian Congress (NIC). Such dynamics led to the 
emergence of a controlling core group within the UDF, later called a ·cabal' by other UDF 
activists who were not part of this group. However, cabal politics could be more easily 
understood as group politics rather than race politics. Indian ·comrades' who were 
26 Hennie Kotze and Anneke Greyling, Political 
Organizations in South Africa, (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 
1994), p. 209. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See Apendix 5. 
3 Natal Witness, 22 February 1988. 
30 Author's interview with Mduduzi Ndlovu (UNP, 8 June 
1995) . 
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perceived as forming the core of the group were not alone, for individuals of other race 
groups were involved. 31 
Among UDF activists, there were different opinions about what constituted · cabal' politics. 
According to a report drafted by some UDF supporters from the Natal Midlands region, the 
·cabal' was undemocratically oriented practices that had emerged within �he UDF
structures from 1986 onwards. Such practices were carried out by a clique of activists who 
were caucusing, and taking decisions for the Front and bypassing democratic 
mechanisms laid down for the Front. 32 These individuals controlled the · democratic' 
practices of the UDF and access to resources, among other things. 33 They abused their 
positions through undemocratic practices. Their practices did not allow for evaluation, 
debates, and discussions of the Front affairs. That led to an end of the UDF as a 
democratic structure. From 1986 onwards, some activists claimed that the Front in Natal 
was dominated by a coterie which gave instructions to the activists and expected them 
to obey. 34 
Different UDF activists held different views on the impact of the cabal in the 
Pietermaritzburg region. Some perceived the cabal's activities as highly destructive, while 
others argued that there was no alternative, as conditions were not conducive for the UDF 
to operate democratically. Some former UDF activists argued that all effective political 
31 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 23 October 
1995) 
32 Jabulani Sithole, Pietermaritzburg, UDF file: Report on 
identifying undemocratic practices (no page numbers 
indicated). 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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organizations are run by small groups of individuals, and that the so-called 'cabal' needed 
to be viewed in this light. 35
Although there were a number of reasons for the emergence of the cabal, the state of 
emergency was the main reason. The argument from UDF activists who failed to see 
reasons for the · cabal' accusation is that the state of emergency led to detention and 
restrictions, and limited the opportunities for political activity, as a result only a few 
individuals could meet and keep the organization going. Of those who were labelled by 
other supporters as forming the ·cabal', some were activists who were trying to keep the 
Front functioning. 
Between 1987 and 1989 the UDF executive and the Natal and Transvaal Indian 
Congresses held several meetings and workshops in an attempt to defuse accusations 
of 'cabalism'. (Although the UDF was officially banned in 1988, activists continued calling 
themselves UDF supporters collectively or individually). In March 1988, November 1988, 
December 1988, and February 1989, the UDF Regional Executive Council held meetings 
(on one occasion at the University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg) to discuss the issue.36 The 
outcomes of these meetings were all much the same. They all condemned the practices 
of individuals who were seen as trying to control the Front, and acknowledged that they 
perpetuated and reinforced schisms within the Front's structures and among its affiliates. 
At the March 1988 meeting, six main problems were identified.37 To quote a UDF 
document: 
'There is a lack of political leadership in the organization (UDF); 
35 Author's interviews with A. s. Chetty (Pietermaritzburg, 
4 October 1994) and Thamsanqa Mseleku (UNP, 27 October 
1994) 
36 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 6 September 
1994) . 
nJabulani Sithole, Pietermaritzburg, UDF file: Report on 
identifying undemocratic practices. 
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There is a break down in communication; 
The problems emerged over the amount and distribution of resources; 
The UDF have severe difficulties in remaining accountable and democratic during 
the state of emergency; 
The structures on the ground are weak or not coordinated; 
There is generally a low level of political education'. 38 
Having identified the problems, the executive's next undertaking was to try to address 
them. UDF activists envisaged the restructuring of the Front in the region as the best 
means of solving the problem. The process of restructuring was delayed until 1989, and 
in the event it was never completed, for in that year extra-parliamentary organizations 
again embarked on defiance campaigns, political activists began to organize openly, and 
secret meetings faded away. 
Politics and territorial control: The UDF and lnkatha 
The struggles between the UDF and lnkatha, besides being characterized by ideological 
differences, were in essence about domination of one group over the other. Each 
organization aimed at gaining control of particular territories. lnkatha and the vigilante 
committees had managed to evict the 'radical' youth from lmbali in 1985-6. After the 
declaration of a state of emergency in June 1986, seeing an opportunity to further cripple 
an opponent reeling from the impact of the emergency measures, lnkatha began to 
escalate violent attacks on UDF supporters. 39 
As the only political party in KwaZulu, lnkatha controlled the KwaZulu government, and it 
had the means to control schools, hospitals, transport and police. 40 The KwaZulu 
administration controlled Edendale Hospital, and clinics and schools in lmbali and 
38 Ibid. 
39 Stephen Davis, Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's 
Hidden War (London, Yale University Press, 1987), p. 95. 
� Fatima Meer, Resistance in the Townships, p. 202. 
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Vulindlela. It also had the right to allocate housing and land in areas that fell under the 
KwaZulu government, jurisdiction. lnkatha used all these powers to entrench its party 
position. 41 In the mid-1980s Chief Buthelezi, the leader of lnkatha and Chief Minister of the 
KwaZulu government, constantly warned civil servants working for the KwaZulu 
Government that he would dismiss them if they supported the UDF.42
By early 1987 lnkatha was intensifying its efforts to expel UDF supporters completely from 
·the townships in the Edendale valley. In January 1987, there was a full-scale clash
between members of the lnkatha Youth Brigade and the supporters and players of the
Young Buccaneers soccer team in Ashdown. lnkatha and vigilantes attacked the star
player of the Young Buccaneers side, who had been associated with the UDF in the past.43 
When other players and supporters came to his defence, they all became targets of attack
by lnkatha.44 These attempts by lnkatha to 'discipline' its opponents in Ashdown stimulated
political organization and mobilization of anti-lnkatha groups in Edendale townships.
People who were opposed to lnkatha galvanized the youth to defend their communities
against further lnkatha attacks. 45 
To some people in Edendale, memories of being told by Chief Buthelezi that they were the 
offspring of people who assisted the British to destroy the Zulu kingdom in 1879 served 
to enhance their fears and concerns against lnkatha.46 Non-lnkatha members in Edendale 
41 Ibid. 
42 Natal Witness, 20 December 1987. 
43 Fatima Meer, Resistance in the Townships, p. 200. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Author's interviews with Khaba Mkhize (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 30 August 1994) and Dumisani Phungula 
(UNP, 30 October 1995). 
46 Author's interview with Khaba Mkhize (Linley House, 30 
August 1994). 93 
feared that lnkatha might use this opportunity to settle this old grudge. 47 Furthermore, the 
Edendale community, with its independent landlords, was prepared to resist incorporation 
into the KwaZulu bantustan. It was in Edendale in 1987 that the UDF formed its first street 
committees in the region. This led to the formation of coordinated Self-Defence Units 
(SDUs). These became the first cells of defence structures that the UDF-affiliated 
organizations established in the Pietermaritzburg region.48 Later, UDF-affiliated 
organizations formed SOUs in most of the Pietermaritzburg area. The members of the 
SOUs commonly called themselves comrades or amaqabane, while they called the 
lnkatha faction otheleweni or oklova.49 
Because of the powers that lnkatha wielded in rural areas through chiefs and lzinduna and 
in lmbali through the township council, its supporters were able to use force to recruit 
people to the organization. The indiscriminate forced recruitment by lnkatha supporters 
antagonized large numbers of people, even some police officers who were usually seen 
as lnkatha's natural an.d traditional allies. 50 Beside lnkatha's forced recruitment, there were 
other factors that sparked conflicts between UOF and lnkatha supporters. For instance, 
on 2 June 1987 ten youths coming from a funeral of UDF member Mbongeni Majola were 
47 Ibid. 
4s Ibid. 
49 The name otheleweni has its origins in the 
warnings which were supposedly given to UDF supporters by 
Chief Buthelezi. It is said that Buthelezi constantly 
warned UDF supporters that Inkatha would drive (thela) 
them over the cliffs (eweni). I did not find out the 
origins of the word Oklova. Arnaqabane is Xhosa word 
meaning a close friend or a colleague. 
Author's interviews with Boni Khuzwayo; Zola Mthembu; 
Sibongiseni Mkhize; Mzwandile Magaqa (UNP, August­
September, 1995). 
5° Fatima Meer, Resistance in the Townships, p. 201. 
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killed in lmbali. An lnkatha spokesperson claimed responsibility for the attack. He said that 
members of lnkatha had heard that the youths had stoned the home of Z. B. Mncwabe 
after the funeral, and they had been singing and chanting that they were going to kill and 
burn lnkatha members. 51 The extension of conflict could also be understood as a product 
of retaliation between UDF and lnkatha supporters. 
In September 1987 violent clashes between lnkatha and the UDF suddenly spread like 
wildfire in the Edendale valley townships. Fighting was reported in Ashdown, Edendale 
proper, Machibisa, Caluza and right up to ngaphezulu areas of Gezubuso. 52 Most of these 
clashes, UDF supporters alleged, were due to reaction against forced recruitment drives 
orchestrated by lnkatha. lnkatha supporters on the other hand claimed that clashes were 
due to UDF recruitment drives. Recriminations and retaliation followed. In its 'recruitment 
drives' .lnkatha had various advantages over the UDF.53 lnkatha had the backing of the 
KwaZulu bantustan and of the South African state. Logistically and financially, lnkatha was 
far better organized than the UDF. 
Heavy floods at the end of September 1987 gave the UDF an opportunity to establish civic 
organizations and working committees in the most affected areas.54 lnkatha also tried to 
use the opportunity for its campaigns. Some flood victims alleged that lnkatha officials 
forced them to join the organization before they were given relief aid. 55 A worker fo"r a state 
relief distribution agency confirmed that 'eight out of ten flood victims said they were 51 Natal Witness, 3 June 1987. 
52 Natal Witness, 28 September 1987. Ngaphezulu literally 
means 'upper'. It refers to the areas in the upper 
Msunduzi valley. 
53 Author's interview with Thamsanqa Mseleku (UNP, 27 
October 1994). 
54 Author's interview with Vis Naidoo (UNP, 6 June 1995). 
55 Fatima Meer, Resistance in the Townships, p. 201. 95 
forced to join lnkatha before they could get help from the organization. 56 Both 
organizations' mobilizations campaigns were not successful, in that the humanitarian aid 
offered by several other organizations had nothing to do with political orientation.57 People 
understood the problem as a natural disaster, and they ignored the political solutions 
Ooining political organizations so as to attain support) which the UDF and lnkatha hoped 
to offer. 
In September 1987, some prison warders, security police and other ordinary members of 
the force told international journalists that they were fighting alongside UDF activists not 
because of political affiliation, but because of the indiscriminate attacks of lnkatha.58 In 
September 1987, three police officers were suspended for allegedly taking part in the 
killing of 13 lnkatha Youth Brigade members, in what the local residents described as a 
preemptive strike.59 This incident took place at Taylor's Halt, where lnkatha Youth Brigade 
members had held a meeting. When an lnkatha official V. Mvelase, made a public 
accusation that the police supported the UDF, Brigadier J. Kotze replied by saying that 
'they' in the police force have made investigations into these police officers whom Mvelase 
claimed were UDF members, but they have found that those who were being accused were 
police who refused to join lnkatha'.60 In spite of the common view that the police colluded 
with lnkatha in attacking UDF supporters, there were some policemen who were opposed 
to lnkatha. 
In October 1987 the police arrested number of UDF supporters in the Pietermaritzburg 
region. This followed the call made by the Deputy Minister of Law and Order, Roelf Meyer, 
56 Ibid. 
57 Author's interview with Vis Naidoo (UNP, 6 June 1995). 
58 Fatima Meer, Resistance in the Townships, p. 201. 
59 Ibid. 
00 Echo, 1 October 1987. 
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to step up operations in the townships as a means of curbing unrest. 61 The state protection 
that lnkatha enjoyed became obvious during these police operations, as most of those who 
were arrested were UDF supporters. For instance in December 1987, about 115 UDF 
youth activists, nearly all from Songonzima or eMbumbane areas, were arrested. 62 When 
they were released, they were summoned by Chief Ngcobo, from whose territory most of 
them came, to appear before him with their parents and apologise for joining the UDF.63 
At the beginning of 1988 the conflict between the UDF and lnkatha intensified. On 1 
February 1988, the valley was in turmoil again, when about 1 500 lnkatha vigilantes held 
a meeting in the upper reaches of Edendale at KwaMkhulu and then attacked the residents 
of Ashdown, a stronghold of the UDF. 64 The group returned to the township the following 
day, but the UDF local defence committees repulsed them.65 lnkatha's attack followed 
widespread allegations that the organization was planning to execute a mission called 
'Operation Doom', which sought to destroy all the 'alternative structures' created by the 
UDF and to restore the authority of parents and the traditional chiefs.66 
After UDF supporters had successfully defended the Edendale townships against lnkatha 
attacks, lnkatha shifted its focus to the peri-urban areas of Vulindlela, carrying out severe 
repressive measures against UDF supporters. Most of its 'warlords' who came to 
prominence were from these areas, and chiefs in Vulindlela exercised their authority to 
61 Natal Witness, 20 October 1987. 
m Tim Smith, They have Killed my Children: One Community in 
Conflict 1983-90 (Pietermaritzburg, PACSA, 1990), p. 7. 
63 Ibid. 
� Natal Witness, 2 February 1988. 
65 Ibid. 
�Karl Von Holdt, 'Vigilantes versus defence 
committees', South African Labour Bulletin, vol. 13. 2 
(1988), pp. 16-25. 
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suppress UDF activists. Individuals and households were forced to buy lnkatha cards and 
to become members and attend meetings. 67 These actions fuelled further opposition and 
confrontation. The UDF youth activists from these regions became the most militant and 
aggressive, overshadowing the 'radical' youth from lmbali.68 They became caught up in 
the politics of war, as was reflected in the songs and slogans which they composed. For 
instance they sang a song like: '/zinyo ngezinyo; Babetshilo eMgungundlovu bethi lnkatha 
sizoyitshisa' (tooth for a tooth; they have said at Pietermaritzburg that we will burn 
lnkatha). They also called themselves 'izikhafulagazi' (those who spill blood).69 
At the beginning of 1988, political conflict spread to KwaZulu schools in the townships and 
around the city. The Natal Witness cited widespread reports that pupils were being told 
to produce lnkatha cards before being admitted into some KwaZulu schools, particularly 
in the Sweetwate.rs areas and at Siqongweni high school in lmbali.70 In most schools in 
the peri-urban areas of Pietermaritzburg, the conflicts between lnkatha and UDF­
supporting students were intense. Students who supported lnkatha identified those who 
sympathized with the UDF, pointing them out to school committee members. In these areas 
most school committee members were lnkatha supporters, and they told students who 
supported the UDF to leave the schools, or harassed them there. 71 Some schools went as 
far as closing. lnkatha supporters called the students who supported the UDF amaphekula 
(those who cause disorder). n Some students who were in UDF-affiliated organizations had 
�Author's interview with Thamsanqa Mseleku (UNP, 27 
October 1994). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
m Natal Witness, 30 January 1988. 
71 Author's interview with Nkosinathi Gabela and Weekend 
Ngubane (Linley House, Pietermaritzburg, 3 July 1995). 
72 Ibid. 
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to carry not only books and pens when going to school but ogwatsha (home-made guns) 
as well. 73 
These fierce struggles between UDF and lnkatha supporters ultimately resulted in many 
parts of Edendale, lmbali and the peri-urban areas of Pietermaritzburg being· declared ·no­
go' areas by the inhabitants. At night UDF and lnkatha supporters alike_ physically 
guarded the areas which they dominated. Unauthorized entry usually resulted in death or 
at least a severe beating. 74 In these areas, places were renamed by dominant political 
groups with names of countries or cities associated with a history of war or, in the case of 
UDF supporters, of places which they knew were training ANG exiles. In the Edendale and 
Vulindlela area there were places called Ulundi, Angola, Maputo and Moscow, and lmbali 
had its own Vietnam and Beirut. 
Most people who had their homes on the fringes or in the border zones of the townships 
were forced to leave because of constant attacks. Also drastically affected were the people 
who supported a side that was not dominant in a particular township. Some UDF families 
who left their homes for safer areas, fearing attacks from lnkatha supporters or feeling 
insecure and unsafe, left their homes with young males from the family, or from related 
families, to guard their houses and property. 75 Some of these homes were later used by 
young ·comrades' as camping sites, commonly known as ingoja (hidden place). 76 Usually 
it was at these homes that war rituals took place. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Natal Witness, 19 September 1987. 
75 Author's interview with Isaac Selepe (Linley House, 
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UDF and lnkatha fighters alike took popular Zulu traditional beliefs and superstitions very 
seriously during the 'war' period. Before people could go into battle, an inyanqa (medicine 
man) was called to treat the participants with intelezi medicine so that they would be bold 
when facing the enemy. 77 Some people became famous through using stronger medicine, 
which was believed to offer protection from bullets. This was ukughiha. In the use of 
intelezi and ukughiha, people believed that lnkatha was stronger and more organized than 
the UDF.78 This was probably because lnkatha was dominated by elders who believed in, 
and had some knowledge of, African 'traditional' medicines, unlike the UDF which was a
predominantly youthful side with little attachment to, or knowledge of, 'African tradition'. 
Weapons that were used by UDF activists during this conflict were spears, knives, 
ogwatsha and stones. The UDF defence committees developed the slogan, lsikhali 
seqabane yitshe (the weapon of a comrade is a stone). 79 As the war intensified, the UDF 
self-defence units, through their street committees, began to order residents in the areas 
which they dominated to donate money towards the purchasing of 'community defence 
weapons' (izikhali zokuvikela umphakathi).80 These guns were never numerous enough 
to be give to everyone. Those who were allocated guns were most commonly those who 
had had. military training (eg. ex-soldiers or ex-policemen) or those who showed -
aggression when speaking about lnkatha and the state. 81
77 Ibid. 
78 Author's interview with J. Ndlovu (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 14 March 1995). 
79 Author's interview with Isaac Selepe (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 17 March 1995). 
80 Author's interview with Zi thulele Ngubane (Linley 
House, Pietermaritzburg, 3 May 1995). 
81 Ibid. 
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During these political struggles lrikatha appeared more organized because of the 
privileges that it enjoyed from the KwaZulu government and from the South African state. 
Its youth structures were fully functional, and in the tribal areas the chiefs and izinduna 
kept their subjects in check to see that they maintained loyalty to the KwaZulu 
government. 82 lnkatha supporters did not experience constraints in funding, in 
transportation, and in supply of weapons to the same extent as UDF supporters. The 
reality of this imbalance was that the conflicts posed a threat for many young black people, 
from both lnkatha and UDF organizations, who saw war as the only solution for their future. 
Participants in these fights between the UDF and lnkatha were not only local supporters 
of these two organizations. Both lnkatha and UDF-affiliated organizations organized 
outsiders to come and help, 'Comrades' from the Durban region helped the UDF, while 
lnkatha drew in supporters from the rural areas, especially from the Amanyavu people 
at Table Mountain.83 These people had a history of supporting lnkatha, for their chief, 
Bangubukhosi Mdluli, had successfully driven out followers of the UDF, forcing them to 
seek refuge with Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo. Bangubukhosi and his Amanyavu were 
at the time engaged in bitter struggles with Chief Maphuniulo and his people. 
Bangubukhosi accused Mhlabunzima of accommodating his dissident subjects. 84 
The analysis above focuses on the conflicts between the UDF, lnkatha and the KwaZulu 
government. The following assessment focuses on the role of the South African state in 
the UDF and lnkatha conflicts. UDF activists always viewed the state's interventions with 
suspicion. They perceived the government's strategies, usually implemented by police, as 
82 Author's interview with Thamsanqa Mseleku (UNP, 27 
October 1994). 
83 Author's interview with Khaba Mkhize (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 30 August 1994) and Sibongiseni 
Mkhize (UNP, 28 July 1995). 
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aimed at ensuring the repression of the UDF and the victory of lnkatha. The common 
strategy of the state was to detain UDF activists. Detentions became more frequent after 
the imposition of the state of emergency in 1986. The state effectively banned all 
gatherings, including weddings and parties. It became shameful for a UDF youth to die of 
disease, for' It was death with a bullet that UDF supporters hailed, the death with a funeral 
that would attract the masses'. 85 The more coffins there were, the greater the occasion 
was, and attending funerals was like going to witness the spirit of freedom. 86 The crowds 
sang songs praising uMkhonto weSizwe and acted out the firing of AK47 ri_fles; banners 
acclaiming the ANC, Nelson Mandela, and the Communist Party dotted the crowds, while 
the same parties' colours covered the coffins. 87 During· such gatherings some people 
would start spreading reports that the police who were present were harassing members 
of the crowd, so that people would react immediately and challenge them. 88 For lnkatha, 
a funeral for a victim of a clash with UDF supporters was confirmation of the evils of the 
UDF, which aimed at exterminating lnkatha supporters (seen as collaborators) in 
conjunction with the ANC mission-in-exile. lnkatha supporters saw UDF supporters as 
being incited by 'radicals' and the propaganda of 'Radio Freedom' (on the ANC radio 
station in Lusaka), to kill them. The solution was to expel these 'radicals' from the region.89 
85 Author's interview with Khaba Mkhize (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 30 August 1994). 
86 Author's interviews with Khaba Mkhize (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 30 August 1994), Makhosi Khoza (Linley 
House, Pietermaritzburg, 4 April 1995) and J. Ndlovu 
(Linley House, Pietermaritzburg, 22 June 1995). Debbie 
Bonnin and Ari Sitas, 'Lesson from the Sarmcol strike', in 
William Cobbett and Robin Cohen (eds.), Popular Struggles 
in South Africa, (London, 1988), p. 169. 
87 Davis, Apartheid's Rebels, p. 90. 
88 Author's interview with M. Makhanya (Linley House, 
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89 Author's interview with Khaba Mkhize (Linley House, 
Pietermaritzburg, 30 August 1994). 
102 
During the period 1986-9 the state intensified its strategy of trying to silence the UDF in 
Pietermaritzburg region. After imposing emergency regulation�. detaining, and restricting 
UDF activists, the state finally banned the UDF and other sixteen extra-parliamentary 
organizations in February 1988. Sixteen hours after the announcement of the bannings, 
the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly called for all African people in Natal to be placed under 
its jurisdiction and to come under the authority of the KwaZulu police force. 90 The KwaZulu 
government was clearly trying to take the opportunity of enforcing its rule over Natal as a 
whole, and not just the territories in KwaZulu. 
When the Minister of Law and Order, A Vlok, visited Pietermaritzburg on 26 February 
1988, he categorically warned the residents that the South African Police (SAP) would face 
the future in alliance with 'moderates' (those who accepted the state's reforms), and would 
fight against 'radical groups' (those who did not accepting state reforms).91 The minister 
was seeking to justify the recent bann1ngs. 92 Under new legislation the banned 
organizations were not supposed to be involved in any activities unless they had 
permission from the Minister of Law and Order. The minister's visit to the region was 
ostensibly to present a trophy to the Town Hill police station, after it had been judged the 
neatest police station in South Africa for the year 1987. Of the nine police stations in the 
Greater Pietermaritzburg region, only two were situated in the black areas. (A second one 
at lmbali was opened in the 1990s. )93 
�Natal Witness, 27 February 1988. 
91 Ibid., 27 February 1988. 
92 
Ibid., 25 February 1988. 
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93 Police stations in the Greater Pietermaritzburg we�e Imbali, 
Loop Street, Alexandra Road, Hilton, Prestbury, Town: Hill, 
Bishopstowe, Mountain Rise and Plessislaer. 
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For its part, the state became more and more openly partisan towards lnkatha and the 
vigilantes in the Pietermaritzburg region. Its aim was to destroy the ability of the UDF and 
other progressive organization to operate effectively. 94 lnkatha activists were protected by 
the state, even when there was reason to institute criminal proceedings against them. 95 In 
the national state of emergency, nearly all the people detained in the Pietermaritzburg 
region were UDF supporters. 96 The collusion of the state with lnkatha was also noted in 
police actions, particularly in their failure to respond to urgent calls from UDF supporters 
for the police to ward off lnkatha attackers. On the other hand, the police intervened 
quickly and vigorously to disarm UDF youth going to defend the borders of areas under 
attack from lnkatha.97 In addition to these perceived acts of commission were acts of 
omission. It seemed as if police were instructed that if they saw UDF supporters being 
· attacked they should look aside, but if they saw an lnkatha supporter being attacked they
should intervene. 98 
On 2 March 1988 the state deployed 300 · kitskonstabels' C instant constables') in the 
Greater Edendale area. The state's intentions were to increase the presence of armed 
personnel in the region. 99 This force consisted mainly of lnkatha supporters from the 
region. The rationale for recruiting them locally was probably that they knew the situation 
far better than outsiders and they knew who the enemy was, that is, the young ·radicals'. 
It soon became clear that this new force operated in effect as an armed wing for lnkatha. 
�Christopher Merrett, UNP, Personal Research and Report 
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Some members of the force were from the lnkatha youth brigade, and had charges 
involving violence pending against them in court.
10
° For instance, Weseni Awetta, an 
lnkatha Youth Brigade member and the son of the lmbali councillor and senior lnkatha 
member, Abdul Awetta, was among the members of the force.
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After being subjected to 
public criticism for recruiting people who were subjects of a Supreme Court interdict, the 
police department discharged them on 1 0 March 1988. Nonetheless, the controversy 
surrounding the force did not disappear. 
During the years 1987-8, UDF activists used court interdicts to seek protection from courts 
against assaults from lnkatha supporters, and also to publicize the activities of the Front. 
Although the number of interdicts obtained increased during these years, their impact was 
minimal as fighting continued between UDF and lnkatha supporters. Some of the court 
cases between the UDF and lnkatha supporters were the following, with all the respondent 
being lnkatha members: 
Mkhize and others versus D. Ntombela and others, case No 2887/87, 2 November 
1987. Hebron Mkhize and others versus Sichizo Zuma, case No 2894/87, 2 
November 1987. Zulu and others versus Awetta and others, case No 3029/87, 16 
November 1987. Sililo and others versus Jerome Mncwabe, case No 3199/87, 2 
November 1987. J. Mthembu and others versus Sichizo Zuma, case No 202/88, 8 
January 1988. 
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An overview of struggles between UDF and lnkatha supporters in the late 1980s indicates 
that the political rivalry between the two movements was a crucial factor in causing the 
violence that engulfed the Pietermaritzburg region. Socioeconomic problems among 
African people formed part of the background to the struggles. However, to view 
socioeconomic hardships as the sole cause of the conflict is to overlook reality. Natal was 
100 
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not the only region in South Africa drastically affected by the apartheid laws. 
Socioeconomic conditions sustained the conflicts, but the immediate source was political 
antagonism. Through its apartheid apparatuses, and through the police force, the state 
manipulated that disunity. 
From the mid-1980s, the UDF in the Pietermaritzburg region was compelled to struggle on 
two fronts. In the townships, its supporters became increasingly involved in physical 
confrontations with lnkatha supporters and the police. In the city, UDF leaders were 
involved in diplomatic manoeuvres to re-establish peace between the warring factions. 
This involvement in multiple struggles posed great difficulties for the UDF in the region, 
for there was no clear functioning mechanism to relate different strategies. Decisions taken 
by the executive in meetings were not efficiently and properly explained to supporters on 
the ground. This does not mean that messages were failing to get to the people, but that 
the content often got distorted. The next section assess the techniques that UDF used 
when it was confronted by these problems. 
Beyond political issues: The UDF's search for alliances 
After its launching in December 1985, COSATU became a strong UDF ally nationally. The 
UDF-COSATU mobilization campaigns tended to focus on problems facing the urban 
population. The UDF's broad, populist appeal directly opposed the narrow ethnic appeal 
of lnkatha. 103 UDF-COSATU campaigns were directed at problems which the workers 
faced in the work place and at widespread community grievances. 
Struggles involving bus drivers in Pietermaritzburg illustrate this. Due to geographic 
location of factories far from the black residential areas in Pietermaritzburg, as in many 
other cities in South Africa, transport issues are important in deciding the outcome of 
w Kentridge, 'Pieter�aritzburg under the knife', 
p. 235.
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industrial action. Pietermaritzburg remained the only major city in South Africa that did not 
utilize a rail link from its townships to its places of work. 104 Without bus transport, even 
those who wished to defy strikes or stayaway actions were not able to do so. 
In the Pietermaritzburg region during the 1980s there were two major black bus services, 
Sizanani MaZulu Transport, which serviced the area beyond Edendale (Taylor's Halt, 
Mafakathini, Elandskop, Tafeleni, Gezubuso and Swartkop), and the transport department 
of the Pietermaritzburg Muhicipality, which serviced most other townships. 105 The total 
workforce of the two companies combined was about 800. 106 The Trade and General 
Workers Union (TGWU) a COSATU affiliate, had a very high percentage of members in 
both companies, while the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA), the lnkatha­
linked trade union, had a small presence. 107 
The year 1987 witnessed an escalation of attacks on bus drivers in the region. The TGWU 
gave the following account about what precipitated attacks on drivers by lnkatha and the 
vigilante groups: 
'The drivers' members of the TGWU believe that there are several reasons for their 
attacks. First lnkatha blamed them for the success of the stayaway on 5-6 May 
1987, when residents heeded the COSATU-UDF calls for a stayaway to protest an 
only whites' Parliamentary election. Since without buses even those opposed to the 
stayaway could not get to work. Secondly the bus drivers were a powerful force in 
the GOSA TU local, they have been organized since the early 1980s and have 
1
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helped to organize many other workplace since then. Therefore, an attack on the 
bus drivers was an attack on GOSA TU in Pietermaritzburg 108 '. 
The two-day stayaway called by the Mass Democratic Movement (an alliance of anti­
apartheid organizations, that had COSATU and UDF as the main organizations) in protest 
against the whites-only election on 5-6 May 1987 achieved an almost total stayaway in the 
commercial sector of the city.109 Less than a week after the stayaway, the police raided 
the COSATU offices in the city and seized about 5000 documents.110
The decisions about stayaways and other actions taken by COSATU and its affiliates also 
affected people who supported lnkatha. Even drivers who belonged to UWUSA, the 
lnkatha-backed union, heeded the calls for stayaways. The reasons why they were unable 
to defy the calls can be understood by analysing the disadvantages they faced in relation 
to the routes which they used. It was difficult. for lnkatha supporters to travel to work in the 
city because the main route from most lnkatha-supporting areas in Vulindlela passed 
through Edendale, an area that was predominantly UDF. Therefore, it was risky to travel 
to town on stayaway days for lnkatha supporters. It was equally risky for any driver to take 
chances and work on days that COSATU:-UDF declared as stayaways. 
lnkatha supporters were bitter with COSATU because of this reality, and this led to a fight 
among the bus drivers themselves. The Gezubuso depot for Sizanani MaZulu buses 
witnessed the first. public shootings between UWUSA and COSATU-TGWU union 
members in the first week of October 1987.111 From the October shooting incidents
between the two union members, killings of bus drivers in union-related fighting increased. 
108 Ibid. 
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The government and the company officials failed to control the situation within the 
company, even when it spilled over to the community at large. 
In another domain of struggle, the UDF tried to broaden its approaches by pressuring 
organizations that had access to, and influence with, the government. The UDF asked 
these organizations to use th�ir influence in pressing for an end to conflict. This led to the 
development of peace forums. These initiatives came mostly from church organizations 
and from the Pietermaritzburg City Council. One of the instances where the UDF tried to 
put pressure on a certain group was on 11 February 1987, when its representatives pulled 
out from participating in the Greater Pietermaritzburg Conference ( organized by the 
Pietermaritzburg City Council.to discuss possible means and ways that could bring to an 
end the conflicts in the region), setting out the following conditions for their return: 
'The conference must be fully democratic and fully representative of the people of 
Pietermaritzburg. 
The city of Pietermaritzburg binds itself to fully implement all decisions of the 
conference. 
All UDF affiliates and members must be able to participate fully in the process. 
All detainees must be released. 
All restricUons on the UDF's ability to operate openly must be lifted and all attacks 
by other forces on its members must cease' .112 
The Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce played an important role as a mediator 
between lnkatha-UWUSA on the one hand and UDF-COSATU on the other. The Chamber 
was brought into the scene because the struggles led to the disruption of business and 
industry in the region. At times workers were unable to come to work due to stayaways and 
boycotts, or because they had to defend their homes from imminent attacks. To discuss 
problems generated by this conflict and to try to get solutions, the Chamber of Commerce 
was invited by both organizations to act as a mediator. From 24 November 1987 to 16 
March 1988, the delegation sent by the Chamber of Commerce to be mediators in between 
COSATU-UDF and lnkatha-UWUSA peace talks was led by Paul Van Uytrecht (general 
iu Natal Witness, 12 February 1987. 
109 
manager of-Chamber of Commerce). He was forced to resign following pressure from 
Buthelezi and the Association of Commerce (ASSOCOM), after a report which quoted him 
as accusing lnkatha of responsibility for the conflicts in the region was published in the 
New York Times.113 After Paul Van Uytrecht, Kay Makan became the chairperson of the 
Chamber of Commerce (up to 1991 ), and led the team of mediators. 
Official peace talks under the auspices of the Chamber of Commerce began on 24 
November 1987.114 The organizations represented were the UDF, lnkatha, COSATU, 
UWUSA, and the churches. The UDF and lnkatha delegations wanted to win the support 
of the Chamber for their respective sides.115 lnkatha saw the Chamber as an employer 
organization and therefore as having clout with the unions. The UDF-COSATU alliance 
viewed the Chamber as a group that had economic ideas that matched those of lnkatha, 
and therefore the Chamber had to use its influence to pressure lnkatha into stopping its 
aggression.116 The Chamber found itself trapped in between: they wanted their business 
to operate, while on the other hand it was difficult to find solutions to the conflicts. 
The first phase of the peace talks ended in a dramatic deadlock in a meeting held in 
December 1987 in Durban. lnkatha and UWUSA introduced a document purportedly 
written by the Marxist Workers Tendency of the ANC called 'lnqaba Yabasebenzi', dated 
October 1987. 117 The document criticized UWUSA and lnkatha, and called for the 
destruction of both organizations. Furthermore, the document outlined ways in which the 
113 Ibid., 16 March 1988. 
114 Ibid., 25 November 1987. 
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UDF and COSATU should use peace talks to their advantage against lnkatha and 
UWUSA. lnkatha and UWUSA demanded that the UDF and COSATU repudiate the 
document before any talks could resume. They did so on 15 December 1987. 118 
On 22 January 1988, further peace talks were held by UDF, lnkatha, UWUSA, COSATU, 
and a number of clergy.119 On the same day, the Natal Midlands UDF and COSATU issued 
a joint statement indicating what they viewed as causes of the conflict in the region: 
'The suppression of information by the National Party 
The curtailment of the freedom of expression by the National Party government 
A largely unaccountable and politically motivated police force 
The desperate protection of lnkatha by powerful political interests 
The role played by the SABC in constructing a picture of · black on black' violence, 
to shift focus attention away from the state's responsibility'. 120 
However, most of these peace talks made very little progress in curbing the escalating 
violence. To a certain extent the state was involved in scuttling peace talks. For instance 
in November 1987, the police arrested ten UDF activists at a peace meeting in the city.121 
The banning of the UDF in February 1988 meant that most of the UDF executive members 
in the Pietermaritzburg region could not directly participate in peace talks. For instance 
people like the UDF chairperson of the region, A. S. Chetty, and the Rev. S. Gqubule were 
placed under restriction orders during this time. Others like S. Ngwenya, M. Wittenberg, 
and K. Chetty were on conditional release at one stage or another, and were forbidden to 
attend any public meetings. At the beginning of 1988, the Pietermaritzburg Agency for 
Social Awareness (PACSA) reported that between June 1987 and February 1988, 800 
people from the city were in police detention. This figure included some UDF executive 
members. 122 The discontinuity in UDF representation at the peace talks had serious 
118 Ibid., 16 December 1987. 
119 Ibid., 22 January 198 8. 
120 Ibid. 
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repercussions in that the whole process had to start afresh with new members. It became 
difficult to achieve any progress under such circumstances. 
In June 1988 the trade union federations, COSATU and the National Council of Trade 
Unions (NACTU), in protest against the government actions of trying to silence extra­
parliamentary opposition, organized a three-day national protest. It was directed primarily 
against the Labour Relations Amendment Bill and the banning of the 17 organizations in 
February. 123 The Labour Relations Amendment Bill prohibited political strikes, outlawed 
solidarity strikes, disallowed workers from striking for the same reason within 15 months, 
and empowered employers to sue unions for the loss of income incurred during work 
stoppages. 124 The protests therefore aimed, firstly, to demonstrate their condemnation of 
the Bill by organizing large numbers of workers to participate in demonstrations, secondly, 
to demonstrate that the Bill would not guarantee weaker unions and industrial peace, but 
on the contrary, militant action and a collapse of collective bargaining. 125 Nationally, the 
June campaigns therefore succeeded in showing the South African government that the 
Bill was unworkable. 
In September 1988, lnkatha and COSATU signed a peace agreement in terms of which 
each organization agreed to take action against any of its members found to be violating 
the agreement. This was followed by the establishment of a Complaints Adjudication Board 
by the two organizations. 126 The UDF was not present at the signing of the document 
because of restrictions which had been imposed on it at the beginning of the year. Chief 
w Ibid., 3 June 1988. 
124 Ibid., 8 June 1988. 
u5 Karl•Von Holdt, 'Mass action against the Bill', South 
African Labour Bulletin, vol. 13, no. 3 (1988), pp. 1-14. 
126 Jabulani Si thole, Pietermari tzburg, UDF file: Report 
on the position of the UDF and COSATU in regard to the 
peace talks in Natal. 
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Minister Buthelezi constantly referred to the UDF's non-participation although he knew fully 
well why it was not able to sign the agreement and that the UDF fully endorsed the 
agreement. 127 Accused lnkatha members effectively sabotaged the Board because of their 
non-appearance before it on the grounds that this would prejudice their cases in criminal 
actions. 128 Where the Board did make a finding against lnkatha members, the lnkatha 
disciplinary committee decided to take no action of any significance. The board failed to 
serve its purpose, and it collapsed. 
To sum up: the history of the struggles in the Natal Midlands was littered with failed peace 
agreements. 129 Some events turned out to be ·circuses', with organizations emphasizing 
and arguing on trivial matters. Issues causing the breakdown of peace talks varied from 
police restrictions imposed on the UDF members to stalemate on venues. For instance on 
2 May 1988, Buthelezi refused to accept Pietermaritzburg as a venue for peace talks, while 
COSATU-UDF rejected Ulundi. On 26 September 1989 neither organization could agree 
on the number of representatives from each side. When the executive officials of the UDF, 
lnkatha, and COSATU convened, they hailed each initiative as a ·major' 'breakthrough' 
but none proved to be either ·major' or a 'breakthrough'. 130 Seemingly, peace in the region 
was going to leave either lnkatha or the state on the losing side. If peace was achieved, 
it would give room to extra-parliamentary organizations to start mobilizing and organizing 
people at a large, to protest against apartheid rule. Peace was also a threat to lnkatha, as 
it would have given the UDF a chance to mobilize freely in the region, particularly in 
lnkatha supporting areas. Also to the UDF peace at its cost (with terms that would not 
satisfy its supporters, and its national goals) was unacceptable. The UDF and 
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
u9 Kentridge, 'Pietermaritzburg under the knife', 
p. 236.
130 Ibid. 
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lnkatha both attempted to use peace calls for public relations purposes. With all these 
complications, it is clear that peace talks were not genuinely aimed at securing peace; no 
organization was prepared to compromise its stance. Failure of political organizations to 
achieve amicable solutions in Pietermaritzburg entrenched divisions in the surrounding 
communities, for instance in Sobantu. 
Changing times: Sobantu Village's solidarity collapses 
The political stability that Sobantu enjoyed in the early 1980s began to crumble in 1985 
and eventually collapsed in 1987.131 From 1985 the Sobantu community gradually became 
divided, as a the rift between the Sobantu Youth Organization (SOYO) and the Committee 
of Twelve widened. The impact of the refugees, discussed in chapter two, left a festering 
wound in the social order of the township. The first incident that showed that times had 
changed took place on 11 April 1987, with the burning of the homes of David Thusi in 
Mbokotho Drive and of Elliot Madonda in Ekukhanya Road.132 Although the motives for the 
burning of these homes cannot be verified, people commonly saw the incident as an attack 
on lnkatha members by UDF supporters.133
In July 1987, SOYO requested the 'Qozen', as they were called, to resign. SOYO got 
backing from some residents, who complained about the committee's actions, after the 
Stoneyard Unemployed Relief Project (an employment project), on which most villagers 
depended for their income, was ended. SOYO made the following allegations about the 
committee to the Echo newspaper: 
131 See Chapter 2, under the section: Sobantu, Edendale and 
Vulindlela in the rnid-1980s. 
132 Natal Witness, 11 April 1987. 
133 Author's interview with Gloria Zuma (Linley House, 
Pieterrnaritzburg, 19 July 1995}. 
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'The dozen do not consult the community on issues involving them. They received 
assistance from the Maritzburg City Council without informing the community and 
made a report back afterwards. They also spoke to the Progressive Federal Party 
(PFP) without a mandate. 
The committee was linked to the vigilantes who sjambokked school children into 
classes during a boycott at Sobantu High School (1985). 
Stoneyard workers are not organized and do not have a spokesperson. SOYO 
suggests the formation of a committee made up of one representative per street 
who will safeguard the interests of the workers'. 134 
Amid these political complications, anonymous death threats were levelled against 
members of the Committee of Twelve. As political tensions grew, the role of the committee 
became insignificant and eventually it collapsed. The main problem of the Committee of 
Twelve was that it was neither a civic association nor a township council. When the 
committee opposed SOYO or showed no interest in UDF-affiliated organizations, the youth 
immediately identified it as another vigilante group. Moreover, UDF supporters were very 
unhappy with people who participated in township councils. When people who had been 
elected to a 'people's body' failed to fulfil what the Front supporters anticipated from them, 
UDF supporters immediately identified them as ·collaborators'. 
Fighting between AZ.APO youth and UDF youth in Sobantu further damaged the township's 
social fabric. A fierce battle between the UDF's Amavarara and the AZAPO's 
Amazimuzimu took place on 11 June 1987. 135 One person died, and two UDF supporters, 
Velaphi and Thuli Mkhize, were allegedly shot by police on the same night. They were 
admitted to Northdale Hospital. 136 The fight allegedly began when the Amavarara marched 
to Dark City, which was the base of the Amazimuzimu, to order refugees out of the 134 Echo, 16 July 1987. 
135 Ibid. 
1
� Natal Witness, 12 June 1987. 
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township. The refugees allegedly attacked lmbali residents visiting Sobantu. Many 
Sobantu residents were also assaulted when the feud over refugees started. 137 
Besides ideological differences, the problem between Amazimuzimu and Amavarara was 
allegedly that the former had embarked on a campaign of deciding who was allowed to 
visit Sobantu 'and who was not. Sobantu, as stated in the previous chapter, had not 
expanded since the late 1950s. As a result, usually the elder children of households 
moved, and parents and younger children stayed behind. When the Amazimuzimu 
attacked visitors to the township, SOYO reacted, as the attacks were directed against their 
brothers, sisters and relatives. SOYO accused the Amazimuzimu of being gangsters rather 
than a political grouping. The battles ultimately led to most of the AZ.APO youth members 
leaving the township for Durban. The urgent need for security prompted this exodus, 
according to the former AZ.APO youth president, Nkosinathi Majola. AZAPO's regional 
headquarters were at Durban, and resources such as lawyers could be more easily 
obtained there. 138 
When the Committee of Twelve collapsed in 1987, a new group of ex-political prisoners, 
which included people like Azalea Ndebele, came to the forefront in the community of 
Sobantu. Residents called this group Omathanduxolo (peace-lovers). 139 This name came 
from their approach of seeking compromise. The group existed in the township up to 1990, 
when the Sobantu residents formed the Sobantu Residents Association (SRA). The 
launching of the SRA in 1990 coincided with the restructuring of a youth umbrella body 
South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) in the Natal Midlands region. This gave the SRA 
137 Ibid., 12 June 1987. 
138 Author's interview with Nkosinathi Majola (Community 
Care Centre, Pietermaritzburg, 9 October 1994). 
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the opportunity to be the only representative body of Sobantu residents, as SOYO and 
other youth organizations were absorbed into SAYCO. 
Struggles within: The UDF and its affiliates in the Natal Midlands 
In March 1987 youth activists from Congress movements launched the South African 
Youth Congress (SAYCO) in Cape Town. In April the Release Mandela Committee (RMC) 
was launched in Hammanskraal by anti-apartheid activists who were campaigning for the 
release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC. Nationally, the two 
organizations sought to fill gaps that had emerged when the state suppressed extra­
parliamentary activities and organizations under the state_ of emergency regulations. The 
two organizations joined COSATU in organizing and mobilizing people to protest against 
apartheid rule. 
After its launching the RMC in conjunction with other two organizations as key players, 
orchestrated some organizational challenges to the government. Its first initiative was to 
challenge the emergency regulations in the Pietermaritzburg Supreme Court and to 
embark on an extensive campaign in the media for the unbanning of the ANC and the 
release of Mandela. The government later banned its advertisements. Nationally, the RMC 
campaigns were a success to some extent in that T-shirts, calendars and pamphlets with 
Mandala's photo were continuously.distributed to the public, and that publicized the anti­
apartheid political struggles in the country. 140 
Although the national launching of the RMC took place on 11-13 April 1987, it was nearly 
three years before a Natal Midlands branch was formed. 141 According to Cassius Lubisi 
who was national assistant publicity secretary for the RMC from 1987 to 1990, the reason 
140 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 6 September 
1994) 
141 Ibid. 117 
for this was that UDF leaders in Maritzburg and in Natal accused each other of being 
involved in the cabal. 142 The RMC campaigns in the region between 1987 and 1990 were 
organized jointly with the SAYCO campaigns, or under the banner of SAYCO. Some of the 
campaigns that these two organizations jointly organized in the region included the holding 
of public meetings of the relatives and families of detainees to campaign for their release. 
Some of the individuals from the region whom they had on their list were Harry Gwala, 
Matthews Meyiwa, Zakhele Mdlalose, John Nene, Anthony Xaba and Truman 
Magubane. 143 
Although the SAYCO branch in the region managed to organize a number of campaigns, 
it was continuously in crisis and chaos. In 1988 the SAYCO structures in the region twice 
disbanded. Its first Interim Committee elected by youth from the region came to office on 
10 April 1988, but collapsed within two weeks. 144 In May of that year SAYCO was 
resuscitated, but again soon collapsed. The collapses were mainly caused by · struggles 
within', i.e. friction between supporters because of unequal distribution of resources, and 
denial of independence to members who felt that SAYCO should pursue its own 
campaigns independently of other progressive organizations. 145 According to 
Thembokwakhe Ngubane, some members blocked funds that were supposed to help 
COSATU to organize a campaign. Before it collapsed, a committee of five people was 
elected to convene a meeting on 25 February 1989 in Edendale. The Edendale five failed 
to do this, and explained that they were too few in number. Then the SAYCO restructuring lG See Chapter 3, under the section titled: The emergence 
of clique politics. 
M
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committee, which had been elected in May, increased their number to eight. This served 
to strengthen the Edendale five against the elected restructuring committee, and they now 
attacked the restructuring committee, questioning its legitimacy. The restructuring 
committee then disbanded on 30 July 1989. 146 A new organizing committee representing
various areas in the region was elected by some youth members who claimed to belong 
to SAYCO (although the regional structure was non-existent), but it collapsed within a 
month. 147 
Without functioning affiliates in the townships, how did the Front organize meetings, 
stayaways and boycotts? According to Thembokwakhe Ngubane, people responded to 
calls as individuals, not through organizations. This assertion reaffirms the account given 
by Mduduzi Ndlovu that UDF-affiliated organizations, and indeed the Front itself, during 
the state of emergency years became · omnibus' organizations, mobilizing but not 
organizing people. 148 For instance, there were no fully organized and functioning UDF­
affiliated organizations in African townships in the region but when the UDF called for 
boycotts, protest marches or stayaways a large number of people showed their support. 
Apathy, conflicts and confrontations were common characteristics of UDF-affiliated 
organizations in the region. 
Other factors that weakened the UDF structures in the region were that after the imposition 
of the 1986 state of emergency its activists were either in hiding, detained or restricted, 
and from February 1988 it was a banned organization. It had been incapacitated 
structurally and organizationally by the state. The main strength of the Front was that it 
managed, even though disorganized, to resist lnkatha's recruitment, and to bring together 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Author's interview with Mduduzi Ndlovu (UNP, 8 June 
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people from various diverse background. People from different walks of life (students, 
workers, professionals, clergy) and from different races (Africans, Coloureds, Indians and 
Whites) came to work together under the banner of the UDF, even if they were few in 
numbers. 
Although the state of emergency from 1986 managed to disorganize the Front and its 
affiliates in the region, by the second half of 1989 extra-parliamentary organizations were 
resurfacing; nationally. This resurfacing of extra-parliamentary organizations, was marked 
by protests marches and defiance campaigns carried under the name of Mass Democratic 
Movement. This gave a new turn to political struggles in the region. UDF activists began 
to take initiatives to revive the Front. The following chapter will assesses the mass 
defiance campaign and the political developments thereafter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
AT THE FINISHING LINE: THE NATAL MIDLANDS UDF, 1989-1991 
Introduction 
In the Natal Midlands, the 1989 defiance campaigns were on 21 September, few days later 
than in other regions. The campaigns in the region stimulated UDF leaders into working 
to restructure the organization. Some UDF activists began to advocate the urgent 
transformation of the Front, arguing that the Front should become more democratic, 
transparent, and accountable to its supporters in the region.1 The goal was to strengthen 
the Front through effective functioning of affiliated organizations. Furthermore, they felt 
that there was an urgent need to address the criticisms that had emerged in the late 1980s 
of malpractice, within the Front.. These were the criticisms that focused on 'cabalistic' 
tendencies in the leadership (a few individuals and taking decisions on behalf of the 
Front), and on the lack of coordination of the activities of the Front's affiliates. 2
After UDF supporters had declared the Front 'unbanned' through the programme of 
defiance campaigns, there were different views on what path the local UDF should follow 
and on how the Front should relate to its affiliates. The restructuring process led to 
tensions within the UDF leadership towards the end of 1989. Two camps emerged, with 
those elected to lead the body in 1985 seeing the new restructuring committee (a body 
that was formed by some UDF activists to revive the Front in 1989) as trying to discredit 
them.3
1 Jabulani Sithole, Pieterrnaritzburg, UDF file: Proposals 
to the UDF restructuring committee (January 1990). 
2 Ibid. 
3 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 22 October 
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While debates around the restructuring process were under way, the government 
unbanned all restricted political organizations on 2 February 1990. These organizations 
included the UDF, ·African National Congress, South African Communist party, Pan 
Africanist Congress, and others. The unbanning changed the course of politics in the 
region and in the whole country. The UDF became enmeshed in a struggle to redefine its 
role and establish itself in the new political order. From its inception in 1983 the UDF had 
shown that it was ideologically close to the ANC. The fact that most of the organizations 
that did not agree with the ANC's political approaches did not join the UDF supports this. 
Furthermore, the Front had adopted the Freedom Charter in 1987. The ANC had not 
controlled the UDF and there were no formal structural links between the two 
organizations, but they were strong allies.4 
When the ANC began to operate legaJly in February 1990, the position of the UDF became 
uncertain. The question which its leaders faced was whether to merge with the ANC or to 
remain as a separate organization. This uncertainty affected the leaders of the Front more 
than their supporters. 5 They were concerned to position themselves on platforms where 
they could have a voice in shaping the future of South Africa. Some aimed to do so 
through attempts to maintain the UDF as a separate organization. Others rushed to 
position themselves in ANC structures. Those who were ANC members simply crossed 
over to it as it was unbanned. Moreover, in the townships most people who supported the 
UDF saw themselves as ANC supporters, so when the ANC became legal they joined it.6 
Protagonists of the disbandment of the UDF justified their stance by arguing that most of 
the people whom the UDF accommodated were from charterist organizations, and with the 
4 Author's interview with Yunus Carrim (UNP, 14 October 
1994) 
5 Author's interview with Sobhuza Dlarnini (UNP, 8 June 
1995) 
6 Ibid. 
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unbanning of the ANC such people had gone back to the ANC. This left the UDF without 
a clear role. After the unbannings, most of the people who had previously mobilized and 
organized people for the UDF began to organize for the ANC. Also, to some ANC 
supporters the history of the UDF made it unacceptable, as the Front was seen to be 
dominated by unruly and uncontrollable youth. As a result a number of people swung their 
support to the ANC in the hope that discipline and control would be re-established by 
leaders like Nelson Mandela.7 
After the unbannings in 1990, the UDF and Mass Democratic Movement gradually phased 
themselves out, to be replaced by the Tripartite Alliance of the ANC, SACP and COSATU. 
COSATU's movement into the new alliance had a great impact in reducing the Front's 
political weight. Nationally and locally, the strongest support for the emerging Tripartite 
Alliance came from those areas that were known to be UDF strongholds. This was a clear 
indication that most UDF supporters, particularly from the townships, were ANC 
sympathizers. 
In the Pietermaritzburg region, the history of the UDF from 1989 can be divided into two 
clear phases. The first phase, from September 1989 to February 1990 was marked by 
debates and proposals on how to restructure the UDF in the region. The debates took a 
serious turn after the mass defiance campaign in September 1989. The second phase, 
from February 1990 was marked by attempts to establish a new relationship with the ANC 
and to redefine the Front's political role. The last· phase was marked by few political 
developments on the part of the UDF, in the region. This could have been attributed to the 
fact that the UDF in the region had always experienced problems, and when other political 
organizations were unbanned its activists went back to their original organizations. In 
August 1991, the UDF's eight years in the politics of resistance ended. Although in 1989 
7 Author's interview with Vis Naidoo (UNP, 6 June 1995). 123 
there was a strong desire to restructure the Front in Pietermaritzburg region, its 
disbandment in 1991 passed without notice. 
The boil bursts 
The defiance campaigns of September 1989 led by the Mass Democratic Movement 
marked the beginning of another phase in the politics of anti-apartheid resistance 
organizations in South Africa. During the campaigns, supporters of banned organizations 
declared their organizations ·unbanned'. These were supporters of organizations like the 
UDF, ANC, SANSCO (South African National Students Congress), and COSAS (Congress 
of South African Students). They were called ·people's organizations' by their supporters. 
Why the state allowed the defiance campaign marches in 1989 to continue without 
imposing repressive measures is a difficult question to answer. Initially the state reacted 
harshly against the campaign, · particularly in the Western Cape, resulting in an outcry 
locally and internationally.8 Then later the state allowed the campaigns to go ahead. 
Explanation of the success of the campaigns and of the unbanning of political 
organizations vary. Some academics seek the explanation of change in 1989, from the 
change of leadership of the National Party, from P. W. Botha to F. W. De Klerk. This is 
what Robert Schrire refers to as · careful experiments in the liberation of the country by 
F.W. De Klerk'. Some academics see the unstable economic and political situation within 
the country as having been a catalyst in the acceptance of change by the National Party. 9 
8 Yunus Carrim, 'The defiance campaigns: Protest politics on 
the march', Indicator South Africa, vol. 4, no. 4 (1989), 
pp. 49-52. 
9 Robert Schrire, Adapt or Die: The End of White Politics 
in South Africa (Cape Town, Ford Foundation, 1991), 
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Nationally the campaigns began in August 1989 and gained momentum in September 
1989. On 5-6 September the MOM led a stayaway, in which about 2 to 3 million people 
were involved. 10 The stayaway was called to protest against the election by white voters 
of a segregated parliament. In Pietermaritzburg, students and workers marched went 
through the streets of the city waving banners of banned political organizations, chanting 
and singing freedom songs. 11 Two weeks later, on 21 September, some 7 000 people 
marched through the city declaring their banned organizations 'unbanned'. The march 
demonstrated the growing support of the Mass Democratic Movement in the region. 12 The 
protesters handed a memorandum to the police at Loop Street station with the following 
demands: 
The end to the institutional violence of apartheid. 
The end to the presence of the SADF and the Riot Squad in the townships. 
The end to the reluctance of the police to control violence in the townships. 
The end of the unwillingness of the government to appoint a Commission of inquiry 
into the role of the police in the.Natal violence. 
The end of detention without trial and the suspension of the rule of law. 
The end of the silencing of activists by restrictions and banning orders. 
The end of the continuation of the state of emergency. 13 
What is important about the wave of mass demonstrations in late 1989 is that for the first 
time it took popular protest out of the black townships and into the white city centres. 14 The 
major objectives of ·the defiance campaigns were to force open a legal space for the extra­
parliamentary organizations, and to create a popular mood for a revitalisation of opposition 
10 Natal Witness, 7 September 1989. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Natal Witness, 22 September 1989. 
13 Ibid.
14 Julie Frederikse, The Unbreakable Thread (Johannesburg, 
Ravan, 1991), p. 262. 125 
structures made dormant by the state of emergency. 15 In retrospect the defiance 
campaigns were successful, in that within four months the government had addressed 
most of the demands put forward. Also, in strategic terms the defiance campaign 
succeeded in broadening and consolidating democratic forces. Above all, the campaigns 
finally broke the intransigence of the National Party. However, it was not only the extra­
parliamentary organizations that gained through the defiance campaigns, for by allowing 
the protest marches to go ahead the new government of F. W. De Kl erk won favourable 
publicity at home and abroad. 16 
The mass action programmes and accompanying hunger strikes by detainees led to the 
release of hundreds of detainees. 17 In October 1989 a mass political rally was held in 
Johannesburg to welcome the release of ANC political leaders like Walter Sisulu, Govan 
Mbeki, Oscar Mpetha, Raymond Mhlaba, Harry Gwala, Ahmed Kathrada, Elias Motsoaledi, 
Andrew Mlangeni and Wilton Mkwayi. That rally had the effect of virtually unbanning the 
ANC. 18 On 16 December 1989, the government released the five Delmas treason trialists 
and UDF national leaders, Patrick Lakota, Popo Molefe, Moss Chikane, Tom Manthata and 
Gcinumuzi Malindi. 19 The Delmas treason trial that took place in 1988 marked a second 
event in which UDF activists were charged by the state for treason. The first trial was in 
Pietermaritzburg in 1985. 
15 Yunus Carrim, 'The defiance campaign: Protest politics on 
the march', p. 50. 
16 Ibid. , p. 52. 
17 SANSCO News letter, University of Durban Westville 
(September 1989). 
18 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 22 October 
1995). 
19 Natal Witness, 17 December 1989. 126 
After the march in Pietermaritzburg on 21 September, UDF activists embarked on a 
programme of restructuring as a means of organizing and sustaining mass protest in the 
region. 20 According to Cassius Lubisi and Jabulani Sithole, who were members of the 
restructuring committee, there were various reasons for proposing that the UDF should be 
restructured.21 Firstly, the UDF and most of its affiliates in the region were not functioning, 
particularly in the townships. The aim therefore, was to rebuild the Front and resuscitate 
its affiliates, with activists who could serve in Front structures being drawn from functional 
organizations.22 Furthermore, the process of restructuring aimed at achieving 
accountability, efficiency, non-racialism and transparency. 23 The stress on accountability, 
efficiency and transparency sought mainly to address the legacy of the cabal in the region. 
Non-racialism was a strategy to try to integrate the different racial groups, particularly 
members of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and the white Pietermaritzburg Democratic 
Association (PDA).24 Since its launching the UDF had been criticised by bodies like the 
National Forum for propagating non-racialism and at the same time allowing certain 
affiliates to organize along racial lines. The integration of different political organizations 
was to be a precautionary measure to avoid the repetition of · cabal' or • coterie' control 
that had developed in the 1980s. 
The restructuring process was to be guided by members of a restructuring committee. 
They were Cassius Lubisi, Sipho Gcabashe, Nana Mnandi, Happy Blose, Jabulani Sithole, 
20 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 22 October 
1995) 
21 See footnotes; 2 5 and 2 6. 
22 Author's interviews with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 22 October 
1995) and Jabulani Sithole (Pieterrnaritzburg, 22 March 
1995) 
23 Jabulani Sithole (Pietermaritzburg), UDF file: Proposals 
to the UDF restructuring committee (January 1990). 
24 Ibid. 
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Makhosi Khoza and the two UDF secretaries, S'khumbuzo Ngwenya and Martin 
Wittenberg. The Restructuring Committee was not an elected body. 25 It consisted of 
organizational representatives who, early in 1989 had attended a COSATU-UDF summit 
on violence in Natal.26 Their first meeting was in an open field at the lower end of Church
Street in Pietermaritzburg. 27 Organizations represented on the Restructuring Committee 
were the Natal Midlands Women's Organization (an offspring of the Natal Organization of 
Women), the South African Youth Congress, the Natal Students' Congress, and COSATU 
affiliates.28 The restructuring committee was to serve on an interim basis. Its mandate was
to coordinate the formation of elected UDF structures in the Natal Midlands.29 
The size of the executive committee of the UDF was to be trimmed to reduce bureaucratic 
delays and inefficiency. The position of the Natal Midlands UDF President, which was held 
by the Rev. S. Gqubule, was to be abolished. The reason was that it was only a 
ceremonial position and there was no guarantee of accountability and responsibility. The 
new committee was to consist of a chairman, a vice-chairman, two secretaries (General 
Secretary and Publicity Secretary) and a treasurer.30 
25 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 1 7 October 
1995). 
26 Although the UDF was banned at the beginning of 1988, 
and while there were no functioning UDF structures, 
individuals who were attending meetings called 
themselves UDF members. Author's interviews with 
Jabulani Sithole and with Cassius Lubisi(UNP, 23 October 
1995) . 
27 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 17 October 
1995). 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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The main objective of the activists was to revive the UDF as a functioning body. The Front 
had to organize its affiliates so that the executive committee could be elected in a properly 
convened annual general meeting in the subregion. Each member organization was to 
send three delegates from its executive committees to meetings of the general council.31 
The PDA and NIC delegations were however to be limited to one person each. The 
committee proposed that at the following annual general meeting no racially or ethnically 
organized organizations should be allowed to affiliate. The new approach was that since 
the Front was engaged in a struggle to establish non-racialism, the racial integration of 
organizations should proceed immediately. The UDF aimed to organize Indians and 
Whites into sectoral organizations of youth, women, students, civics and teachers. 32 
Daily decisions were to be made by the chairperson and the two secretaries (general and 
publicity). These three figures would form the .secretariat of the UDF. The executive 
committee was to meet once a fortnight, the secretariat once a week, and the General 
Council once a month. Special General Council meetings were to be convened when major 
political issues needed to be discussed and decided upon. 33 
Of the affiliated organizations of the UDF, SAYCO embarked on its own restructuring 
process. Its objectives were to address the difficulties experienced in 1989 when the 
structure had disbanded and reformed several times. The desire among young supporters 
of MDM to revive youth organizations was still strong. The youth leagues that had been 
strong in 1985 had disintegrated with the imposition of the state of emergency, and with 
the restrictions imposed on UDF leaders by the state. The formation of SAYCO in 1987 
had brought together the scattered UDF youth organizations under one umbrella body, but 
it was not until 1990 that the organization began to consolidate itself. However, from 1990 31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 129 
most of political activists who were members of UDF-affiliated organizations crossed over 
to the ANC and began to participate in building it. 
The UDF and the ANC after February 1990 
The relationship between the UDF and the ANC before 1990 was that of allies, but they 
had no formal structures for working together. The main reason for this absence was that 
the ANC was banned. When the state unbanned both organizations, the UDF had to make 
a decision on its future. Previously it had been an umbrella for organizations that were 
predominantly charterist in sympathy. Now that the ANC was unbanned, some activists 
felt that there was no need for the UDF to continue to exist, while others felt that it should 
continue to exist as a watchdog over the ANC. 34 
At a meeting held in Cape Town on 9 April 1990 to decide the future of the UDF, the 
decision was reached that the UDF would not disband but would be transformed.35 The 
following were the proposed recommendations: 
The UDF will continue to exist, because it has a role to play in terms of coordinating 
its affiliate organizations. 
It should transform itself, by splitting into national sectoral federations that will 
consist of super-federations such as youth and women groups. 
The base of the liberation movements be broadened to include those who had not 
previously participated in the UDF structures.36 
Two weeks after this meeting, with debates surging on about the future of the UDF, its 
National Executive passed a resolution to scale 9own its political activities and allow the 
ANC to work towards becoming the leading liberation movement.37 Nationally and 
34 Author's interviews with Blade Nzimande (UNP, 5 October 
1994) and Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 16 October 1995). 
35 Natal Witness, 10 April 1990. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., 24 April 1990. 
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regionally the resolution had a great impact on the UDF, whose organizational structure 
had been hard hit by years of oppression and which was now trying to make an organized 
comeback. Many affiliates chose to leave the Front and join the ANC, and at regional 
levels the structures of the organization began to break down. 38 
The breakdown.in the Pietermaritzburg region was rapid. Because of its internal problems 
and its conflicts with lnkatha, the UDF in the region was not fully functional. The movement 
to revive the UDF quickly turned into a movement to establish new ANC branches. But 
instead of building on existing UDF structures, ANC supporters began to establish their 
own branches. 39 Where the UDF had · been concerned with strengthening sectoral 
organizations, i.e. youth and workers, the ANC's emphasis was on buil_ding branches 
rather than sectors.40 However, COSATU-affiliated trade unions (although being sectoral) 
played a vital role in building ANC branches in the region.41 The importance of workers' 
organizations in the region was enhanced by the influence of the socialist Harry Gwala, 
who saw workers as a revolutionary force in the liberation struggle. 
The establishment of the ANC in the Natal Midlands region brought in a new leadership. 
People who were ANC members but had not been in prominent positions during the UDF 
era came to _the forefront.42 At times there were tensions between some UDF and ANC 
leaders in the region. Few leaders from the UDF managed to stay afloat politically and 
38 Mac Maharaj, 'At the UDF farewell rally' South African 
Outlook (July to August, 1991), pp. 86-89. 
39 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 22 October 
1995). 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Author's interview with A. S. Chetty (Pietermaritzburg, 4 
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attain top leadership positions in the ANC.43 Those from the UDF who managed to
establish themselves in the ANC's leadership in the midlands were S'khumbuzo Ngwenya, 
A S. Chetty, Yunus Carrim, John Jeffery and Thamsanqa Mseleku.44, 
The ANC in the region was led by Harry Gwala, a student of Marxist-Leninist ideologies. 
He had been released from prison in November 1988, after serving 13 years of a life 
sentence. In the early 1980s he had contracted a rare motor neuron disease that 
subsequently paralysed his arms. 45 After his release, he had re-established contact with
the underground structures of the ANC and SACP, and played a key leading role in the 
activities of these organizations in the Midlands. 46 In June 1989 he travelled to London to 
seek treatment for his disease. During his two-month stay in London he held discussions 
with the exiled leadership of the ANC and SACP.47
Due to his uncompromising war talk, people called him the 'lion of the Natal Midlands'. He 
was nationally known as one of four · radicals' in the ANC leadership, together with Peter 
Mokaba, Winnie Mandela and Tony Yengeni. He served on the internal leadership core 
of the ANC after its unbanning. In December 1990 he was elected as Natal Midlands ANC 
leader in the first ANC conference in the region in 30 years. 48 In July 1991, at the AN C's 
48th National conference in Durban, he was elected to the national executive committee. 
4
3 Ibid.
44 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 26 October 
1995). 
45 Obituary letter, read at funeral service of Thembeyakhe 
Harry Gwala (June 1995). 
46 Ibid. 
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In December of the same year he was elected to the central committee of the SACP at its 
eighth Congress in Johannesburg. 49 
Gwala turned out to be a highly charismatic political leader in the Natal Midlands. Some 
critics argued that his style of leadership was problematic in that he concentrated 
organizational power around himself. He was very critical of the UDF cabal in the region. 
This might explain why the UDF was disbanded sooner in the region than in other parts 
of the country. The unbanning of the ANC in the region brought an opportunity to try to 
change the image of UDF supporters. This was done by abandoning it and crossing over 
to the ANC. After the unbannings, Gwala alienated not only those who were seen as part 
of the cabal group but even some people who were in the restructuring committee. 50 Most
of the activists who became close to Gwala were not former UDF activists. Some activists 
began to criticise him, and accused him of forming another cabal. 51
In his speeches Gwala did not hesitate to show his radicalism or militancy, as the 
following quotation indicates: 
We are not begging for our liberation, we will take it by force. To the warlords, we 
are not going to meet them with bibles and prayers, but we will meet them with AK-
47 s. 
This country is experiencing labour pains and where a normal birth is not possible 
a cesarean section must be performed. The death of apartheid cannot be 
pronounced by the National Party, but by the people who experienced its 
oppression. 52 
49 Obituary letter, read at the funeral service of 
Thembeyakhe Harry Gwala (June 1995). 
50 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 22 October 
1995). 
51 Ibid. 
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Gwala would be remembered for his presence amongst UDF-ANC-SACP supporters 
during what became known as the · Seven Days War' from 25 March to 2 April 1990, and 
of lifting the morale of the UDF-ANC-SACP supporters in the face of ongoing attacks by 
urging them to stand up and defend themselves. 53
The Seven Day's War and its aftermath 
The unbanning of political organizations in 1990 led to further escalation of conflicts 
between the UDF and lnkatha supporters. On 25 March 1990, youths in Edendale who 
allegedly supported the UDF-ANC attacked buses which were returning from an lnkatha 
rally-in Durban, and caused damage of approximately R25 000. 54 This is in keeping with 
the view that sees UDF-ANC activists as taking the offensive in the war. A second view, 
given by John Aitchison from the Centre of Adult Education at the University of Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg, cast lnkatha as the aggressor. According to Aitchison, on the morning 
of Sunday 25 March a number of buses carrying lnkatha supporters travelled down the 
main road through Vulindlela and Edendale to an lnkatha rally at King's Park Stadium in 
Durban.55 On their way, lnkatha supporters shouted and insulted people at Gezubuso and 
said they would come back. At KwaShange they fired shots at people as they passed, at 
Vulisaka more shots were fired, and at KwaMnyandu they chased people and threw stones 
at them.56 In the afternoon, when lnkatha supporters returned from the rally, clashes took 
place in number of areas in Vulindlela and Edendale. There were battles at Dambuza, 
cars were attacked, and Marawa House, where local KwaZulu Government offices were 
53 Obituary letter, read at the funeral service -of 
Thembeyakhe Harry Gwala (June 1995), p. 2. 
� Natal Witness, 27 March 1990. 
55 John Aitchison, The Seven Days War: The Victims' 
Narrative (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal, Centre 
for Adult Education, 1991), p. 1. 
56 Ibid. 
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situated, was attacked and badly damaged. 57 KwaZulu Transport had a bus set alight at 
KwaShange, and on 28 March it suspended all its bus services to the townships. This 
move came when lnkatha crowds hijacked buses to launch a revenge attack on Caluza, 
Mpumuza and Ashdown. 
On 27-28 March, full-scale fighting took place between UDF and lnkatha supporters in 
Vulindlela, Edendale, Ashdown and lmbali. 58 Thousands of non-lnkatha refugees poured 
into Edendale.59 lnkatha supporters who were attacked, mostly from Vulindlela areas, 
escaped to their chiefs' homesteads. By the end of the month, coordinated and organized 
fighting in the Edendale valley had subsided, with at least 50 people dead, about 150 
wounded and more than 6 000 homeless. 60 The war came to be known as the Seven Days 
War (25 March to 31 March), although fighting continued for more than a month, 
particularly in lmbali township and in the Table Mountain areas to the east bf 
Pietermaritzburg. 61 
After the fighting had subsided, there were still some state agencies, particularly the police 
force, which continued trying to destabilize communities in the region. According to 
Aitchison, the South African Police and KwaZulu Police were seen carrying lnkatha 
attackers on their vehicles or not taking action when they saw that the attackers were 
lnkatha supporters. 62 Some prominent lnkatha members were allegedly seen wearing 
57 Ibid. 
58 Mark Butler, et. al, Irnbali, (University of Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg, Centre for Adult Education, 1993), 
p. 139.
59 Ibid. 
00 Natal Witness, 31 March 1990. 
61 John Aitchison, The Seven Days War: 25-31 March 
1990, p. 2. 
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police uniform, and in some instances police allegedly shot UDF comrades. Chief 
Shayabantu Zondi and David Ntombela allegedly played a prominent role in organizing 
lnkatha supporters during this war. Chief Shayabantu allegedly said that he did not want 
any maqabane in his area (Gezubuso, Shange, Mnyandu, Vulisaka), and that they should 
all leave or he would attack them. 63 
Another instance where police involvement in the township violence became known was 
when the commander of the Riot Unit in Pietermaritzburg and his branch were implicated 
in harassing people in the townships.64 However, the story of police involvement was cut 
short in that the constable who made the allegations died without testifying iri court. 65 The 
involvement of the police in destabilization was brought to light by Constable Roy Mandia 
Ngcobo who was accused of murdering Major Deon Terblanche, commander of the city's 
riot unit.66 Ngcobo was believed to be a strong UDF sympathiser; his brother had formerly 
been convicted of 'terrorism'.67 Two days after his arrest, he was shot dead by the 
detectives who were investigating his case. They alleged that Ngcobo tried to get hold of 
a gun that one of them was carrying. The day before Ngcobo was shot dead, he had 
confessed that he had murdered Terblanche. He had also claimed that police officers 
attached to the 'C' Relief section of the unit had murdered civilians, raided people's homes 
and broken into bottle stores.68 This claim emerged during the inquest into Ngcobo's death. 
Though it involved heavy loss of life and widespread destruction, the Seven Days War 
helped to provide the ANC with a platform and the means of mobilizing its supporters in 
63 Ibid., p. 37. 
64 Natal Witness, 15 March 1990. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
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the region. Visits by ANC national leaders like Mandela to the region helped to build the 
organization in the region. Appeals from regional leaders to UDF-ANC-SACP supporters 
who were involved in the conflict helped to consolidate support for the ANC. 
Some people viewed the war as lnkatha's means of reasserting itself after finding that the 
state was no longer fully on its side. If this was lnkatha's aim, one can say that it did 
reassert its authority in the peri-urban areas but failed to win new ground or penetrate the 
townships where UDF support was strong. In terms of territories dominated, the war did 
not lead to any changes as UDF and lnkatha areas remained as they were prior to the war. 
The opening of lmbali police station in October 1990, with Chlef M. G. Buthelezi as guest 
of honour, led to protests from non-lnkatha supporters. 69 Its siting in the lnkatha stronghold 
of Stage 2 meant that the station was immediately identified as an lnkatha police station. 70
To non-lnkatha supporters, the presence of Buthelezi as a leader of lnkatha was an 
indication that the station would be biased in dealing with cases that involved lnkatha and 
non-lnkatha supporters. As a result, many residents ignored the station, and continued to 
use Plessislaer police station. 71
lmbali township had been the focal point of politicalstruggles in the mid-1980s, and it 
became an epicentre of cor1flict again after the unbanning of political organizations in 
1990. With the unbannings and the gradual phasing-out of the UDF, most of the problems 
that emerged in lmbali stemmed from the legacy of the Front's history. These patterns had 
. to do particularly with the emergence of youth gangs in the townships. As one source put 
it: 
69 Natal Witness, 12 October 1990. 
70 Mark Butler, et. al, Imbali, p. 165. 
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The gangs consist of disaffected UDF youth, who found themselves sidelined when 
the ANC was unbanned and ANC exiles began returning, more especially MK 
cadres. (uMkhonto weSizwe). 
The gangs consist of criminals who were once part of defence units created to 
protect UDF leaders under restriction orders. When the influence of this leadership 
declined the criminals sided with some ANC faction against old UDF factions. 
The gangs consist of youth who were infiltrated and coopted by the police with the 
aim of destabilising the township. 
The gangs consist of criminals, who have always been criminals. They were drawn 
into political violence, because their fighting skills were necessary at the time, and 
as this necessity waned, so their importance decreased. Youths who had been 
heroes suddenly became mere criminals again, and in order to reassert their 
influence they began terrorising residents in gangs. 72
The findings of these researchers are convincing in two aspects, firstly in that most of the 
people who were involved in the formation of these gangs were by-products of political 
violence in the area. It is indisputable that most of them had been UDF-ANC supporters. 
Secondly, the gangs grew rapidly after the unbanning of political organizations in 1990. 
Although some exiles (ANC leaders and supporters who were outside the country) and 
Robben Islanders (ANC leaders who were imprisoned in Robben Island) had difficulties 
in realizing their expectations after their return, in terms of gaining leadership positions 
and finding monetary support, there are no indications to show that there was any gang 
that was directly backed by either the ANC or by UDF supporters in lmbali. 73 Nor was any 
conflict ever reported between the supporters of the two organizations. But that UDF 
supporters contributed to the · problem is undisputable. It was through involvement in 
political conflicts that these gangs had acquired guns, shooting skills, popularity and 
recognition in the community. 74 This recognition was based on their fighting abilities, but 
72 Ibid., p. 147. 
73 Author's interview with Sobhuza Dlamini (UNP, 8 June 
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when the conflicts subsided their abilities were no longer important for the UDF supporters 
whom they had previously protected. However, there is a danger of perceiving the 
emergence of these gangs solely as a by-product of the conflict between the UDF and 
lnkatha. Gangs were, and are, found in numbers of townships in the country and were not 
only confined to areas of Natal where there were UDF-lnkatha conflicts. On the other hand 
it is important to note that not all gangsters were people who fought during the violence. 
Some groups consisted of people who did not participate in the fighting between UDF and 
lnkatha. The groups came into existence because of harassment by established gangs. 75
That most of the so-called gangsters had supported the UDF against lnkatha is 
indisputable, but their political aims are questionable. Politically most of the gang members 
were immature and, according to one source bankrupt in leadership qualities. 76 They were 
not leaders in terms of planning or formulating strategy during the conflicts, but rank and 
file members. When the fighting was over they could not define who the enemy was, and 
they continued fighting even when it was unnecessary. 
Two other important factors that led to the rapid growth of gangsterism in lmbali were the 
absence of community discipline in this politically divided township, and the continuation 
of the sharp political division between the UDF-ANC and lnkatha. This could explain why 
they did not emerge in any numbers in other townships, for instance in Sobantu and 
Edendale. Most of those who turned to be gangsters were people who were unemployable, 
or could not go back to school. n Initially, it seem, some gangs got the impression that they 
were supported by office-bearers of the ANC, who believed that fighting with lnkatha 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
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the region had almost totally forgotten about the Front.82 In the Natal Midlands region the 
UDF, 'died' earlier than in other regions.83 The causes for the earlier disbandment of the 
UDF in the region varied from its weakness and inefficiency to the nationwide phenomena 
of the rush by UDF leaders to secure leadership positions in the rising ANC. The fact that 
the UDF in the region had always been embroiled in in-fighting, and in conflicts with 
lnkatha, and state repression also hastened its collapse. 
At its national disbandment conference Mac Maharaj gave the following perspective on the 
dissolution of the UDF: 
We have come to celebrate the dissolution of the UDF, because of its success. But 
if success is the only thing we are celebrating, then we can be filled with sadness, 
with loneliness, because we are leaving something we gave birth to, lived through, 
and we will miss it. I believe that the significance of the UDF is among those 
individual achievements, it resides in a spirit that is marshalled together, a spirit that 
Allan Boesak called 'the spirit of refusal'. It was more than refusal, it was staking 
out the future, the future of unity for our entire people, our country, our nation. 84 
Maharaj referred to the UDF as ·we' to show that the UDF accommodated ANC supporters. 
After the disbandment of the Front, SAN CO branches were launched in some regions, as 
had been proposed on 29 May 1991 at the UDF meeting held in Cape Town. In Natal, 
there were difficulties in changing the image of the UDF to that of a civic organization. 
SANCO was supposed to draw people from across the political spectrum.85 However, it 
was a difficult task to change perceptions of people who had previously viewed the UDF 
82 Author's interview with Cassius Lubisi (UNP, 22 October 
1995). 
83 Ibid. 
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as their enemy. The fact that it is not easy to draw a line between political and civil issues 
in the South African social context complicated the functions and the acceptance of the 
association. The bitter debates about the formation of SANCO in Pietermaritzburg delayed 
its launching until 8 September 1994, more than three years after the first call for it. 
86 
The 
elected chairman of the organization, Dumisani Mthalane, claimed that the delay was due 
to violence that engulfed the townships and the political climate that led to funerals and 
political rallies every weekend, leaving people with very limited opportunity to attend civic 
functions. 
87 
The political affiliation of SANCO was clear, as most of the people in its highest echelons 
were inclined to the 'Tripartite Alliance' politics. Although the organization's constitution 
stated that only those who were · apolitical' could be elected to office, the outlook of the 
organization gives a contrary picture. However, whether SANCO will manage to address 
itself to bread-and-butter issues is a wait-and-see question. 
To conclude, in the period 1989-1991 the UDF in the Pietermaritzburg region was plagued 
by in-fighting and factionalism. The process of restructuring the UDF from 1989 onwards 
was short-lived because of the unbanning of political organizations in 1990. Because the 
UDF was working within the same·part of the political spectrum as the ANC, when the 
latter organization was unbanned UDF activists in the region switched their support to it, 
and left the UDF to die its own natural death. Because the UDF had never been fully 
functional in the region, its effective disbandment took place earlier than in other regions. 
86 
Natal Witness, 8 September 1994. 
87 
Ibid. 
142 
t ·  
1  
CONCLUSION 
'I must say that in the life of a political organization eight years is nothing, and 
yet the achievement of the UDF over that period is such that when the history 
of our struggle for freedom is written, those eight years will need a book' . 1 
Up to the mid-1980s Pietermaritzburg was relatively quiet politically. The Soweto 
uprising of 1976, and the Vaal Triangle protests of 1983-4 failed to stimulate political 
mobilization or organization in the region. Politically, therefore the region lagged behind 
other centres. This was particularly so in African communities where there were neither 
strong civic, students' or church organizations that could mobilize people to lead 
protests against the South African apartheid policies of the South African government. 
Among the black communities in Pietermaritzburg, Indian communities were better off 
in terms of political organization in the early 1980s. Indian activists from Natal Indian 
Congress were actively involved in creating civic and community organizations that 
later played a significant role in extra-parliamentary political activities in the region, 
although when political organizations began to mushroom in African areas the influence 
of Indian organizations subsided. 
Political activities in Pietermaritzburg began to take off after the launching of the UDF. 
in 1983. But it was a gradual process. After the formation of the UQF, civic 
organizations mushroomed in Durban townships, and strongly challenged the policies 
of the South African and KwaZulu government. When the South African state and the 
KwaZulu government, together with lnkatha, moved in to clamp down on this opposition 
from civic organizations, fighting ensued between their supporters and UDF supporters. 
From the time of its national launching at Rocklands Civic Centre, Mitchell's Plain, 
Cape Town in 1983, the UDF aimed to bring people from various races and walks of 
1 Mac Maharaj, 'At the UDF farewell Rally', South African 
Outlook (July-August, 1991), p. 86. 
143 
life (workers, students, religious arid community organization) to work together for the 
creation of a free, democratic and non-racial society. 2 The UDF's initial campaigns were 
to oppose the passing of the South African constitutional reforms of 1983, and the 
related Koornhof Bills. The Front aimed at mobilizing mass opposition inside the 
country for the first time in 23 years. 
At the launching rally, present from Pietermaritzburg were members of the Committee 
of -Concern who took with them declarations of support for the UDF from 42 
organizations from the region. The Committee of Concern was an organization formed 
in May 1983, at a conference organized by the Anti-South African Indian Council, to 
discuss social and political problems affecting the different communities of 
Pietermaritzburg. 
In Pietermaritzburg, the first UDF mass meeting after the national launching of the 
organization in Cape Town was held at the Lay Ecumenical Centre in Edendale on 30 
October 1983. The purpose of the meeting was to mark a 'people's weekend' called by 
the national UDF to show opposition to the proposed South African Constitution. At this 
meeting the second office of the UDF in Natal was opened at the Lay Centre, the first 
having been opened in Durban. Some activists saw this meeting as marking the 
launching of the UDF in the region, but no UDF officials were elected at the meeting, 
nor were UDF structures set up. The Front continued to operate under the auspices of 
the Committee of Concern. 
In 1984 Pietermaritzburg witnessed the formation of youth organizations like the lmbali 
Youth Organization, Edendale Youth Organization, and many others that identified 
themselves with UDF politics. The youths, students and teachers became very 
influential in the politics of the UDF in the region.3 Most of the UDF campaigns were led 
by the youths, and usually the campaigns centred around issues affecting the youths. 
2 See Appendix 1: The Declaration of the UDF (20 August 
1983). 
3 See Appendices 5 and 6. 
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IYO became the most influential UDF youth affiliate in the region. Its first success was 
in August 1984, when it organized students into protesting against the visit of Piet 
Koornhof, the Minister of Cooperation and Development, to Pietermaritzburg. Koornhof 
was visiting the region to come and install township councillors in lmbali. IYO's 
successful campaign led to an increase in support for the UDF from students in the 
region. 
The Koornhof incident affected relationship between numbers of parents and youth in 
lmbali. The behaviour of students in disrupting the meeting prompted some parents to 
think of reviving vigilante groups. In their eyes, UDF activists were responsible for 
causing problems in the townships because of their 'unruly and undisciplined' 
behaviour. The vigilantes were joined by lnkatha supporters who were also beginning 
to see the UDF youth as a threat in the region. The two groups had common purposes. 
lnkatha emphasised the importance of maintaining the patriarchal and hierarchical 
values which it presented as traditional in African culture, and so did the vigilante 
committees. Relations between the UDF and lnkatha and the region were complicated 
by the fact that the Front was dominated by young people whom some parents viewed 
as children who aimed at undermining their authority. 
From August 1983 to March 1985, the UDF in the region functioned under the aegis of 
the Committee of Concern. UDF structures in the region were established in March 
1985. The Natal region was divided into the subregions of Northern Natal, Natal 
Midlands, North Coast and Durban Central. Each subregion had its own independent 
Local Executive Committee (LEC) and a Local General Council (LGC), and there were 
two structures that represented the whole Natal region, the Regional Executive 
Committee (REC) and the Regional General Council (RGC). The process of setting up 
these structures was important in that it gave elected UDF officials experience in 
running the Front, and enabled supporters to identify their leaders. 
During 1984-5, the emphases and nature of UDF campaigns in Pietermaritzburg 
changed in character, from campaigns based in Indian communities to campaigns 
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based in African townships. lmbali became the focal point of the political struggles in 
the region from this period. Organized campaigns centred around the release of 16 
UDF activists on treason charges (1985), consumer boycotts, and students' boycotts. 
The political struggles in the region developed in a pattern, starting in lmbali and 
gradually spreading to other areas like Sobantu, Edendale and Vulindlela. 
At the same time animosity between UDF and lnkatha supporters in the region began 
increasing, as UDF supporters openly criticised the lmbali township council and the 
KwaZulu government, both of which were supported by lnkatha. UDF activists also 
began to mobilize in rural constituencies which formed lnkatha's power-base. lnkatha 
supporters reacted to these UDF campaigns by embarking on their own recruitment 
drives, which intensified after 1986. When the state imposed emergency regulations 
to curtail the activities of extra-parliamentary organizations, lnkatha had the backing of 
the KwaZulu bantustan and of the South African state. UDF struggles were therefore 
to establish and expand an organizational presence in rural communities and in the 
townships in the face of opposition from lnkatha, the KwaZulu administration and the 
South African state. These struggles became more and more violent, and narrowed 
down to struggles for control of specific territories by 1987. 
In the long run, some of the barriers or obstacles which the UDF faced in the region, 
favoured its mobilizing strategies. When .lnkatha and the vigilantes began to harass 
people suspected of supporting the UDF in lmbaH and later, in other parts of the region, 
many people who were politically undecided felt they had no option but to join the UDF. 
The Front in the region consolidated its support in response to attacks by lnkatha 
supporters on members of previously apolitical communities. This was unlike the 
situation in other regions, where political mobilization by extra-parliamentary 
organizations centred around civic issues and apartheid inequalities. In 
Pietermaritzburg only one civic organization was launched in an African township, the 
lmbali Civic Organization in April 1985. It was short-lived because of intimidation from 
opponents of the UDF. 
146 
On 12 June 1986, because of the growing strength of extra-parliamentary 
organizations, the National Party government imposed a national state of emergency. 
Extra-parliamentary organizations, including the UDF, found it increasingly difficult to 
operate in the face of state repression. The Front was confronted by the enormous 
power of the state, in the form of restrictions, bannings and detentions of its activists. 
The handicaps under which the Front operated in the Pietermaritzburg region during 
the state of emergency years (1986-90) were formidable. In retrospect one can see that 
1985 marked the heyday of the Front in the region. In June 1986, UDF offices closed 
down because of state repression. This meant that there was no central place for 
organizing the day-to-day business of the Front. Key UDF activists were detained or 
restricted. This affected the organizational abilities of the Front because people who 
were expected to organize meetings were no longer available. The banning of UDF 
meetings led to a breakdown of communication between the Front and its affiliates. 
The effects of the state of emergency caused tensions among UDF supporters in the 
region. The Front in the region was plagued by severe internal divisions. These 
problems were evident also in some of its affiliated organizations. Some activists in th_e 
region were accused by other activists of forming a cabal that bypassed democratic 
mechanisms laid down for decision-making. This in-fighting, combined with repressive 
measures from the state and physical attacks on the part of lnkatha on UDF supporters, 
weakened the UDF in the region. 
Some of the failures of the UDF stemmed from its nature as a confederation of 
organizations. Each affiliate functioned with its own constitution and it was not bound 
by any code to the Front. In short, the UDF was a loose body that individuals could join 
only through membership of affiliated organizations. Ultimately the strength of the UDF 
lay within the affWates. 
The state of emergency had some indirect benefits for the UDF. For instance, from 
1986, UDF activists in the region were always on the run, moving from place to place. 
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This gave them the opportunity to mobilize in areas that had not been mobilized before. 
Furthermore, the presence of armed troops in schools and in the townships intensified 
black hostility to the South African government. The troops were visible symbols of 
oppression that UDF activists could point to when mobilizing residents. 
From 1987 the conflict between the UDF and lnkatha in the region assumed the 
proportions of a civil war. Violent clashes between the two groups were reported in 
various parts of the region, particularly in Edendale and Vulindlela areas. In Edendale 
the UDF established defence units in the form of street committees. UDF activists later 
transformed these into more coordinated Self-Defence Units (SDUs). UDF activists 
later formed SDUs in other parts of Pietermaritzburg. 
In February 1988 the state finally banned the UDF. But clashes continued unabated, 
spreading even to schools in the peri-urban areas of Vulindlela, with students who 
supported the UDF being harassed by lnkatha supporters and vice-versa. This resulted 
in some areas in the region being declared · no-go' areas by the inhabitants, who were 
either predominantly UDF or lnkatha. 
By 1989 extra-parliamentary opposition in South Africa was resurfacing, led by the 
Mass Democratic Movement (MOM). At the core of the MOM were the UDF and 
COSATU. Nationally, extra-parliamentary organizations embarked oni mass defiance 
campaigns from August 1989, in what they proclaimed their banned organizations 
'unbanned'. The marches in Pietermaritzburg took place on 21 September 1989. 
The success of the defiance campaigns in Pietermaritzburg stimulated UDF activists 
into trying to restructure the Front in the region. But the process of restructuring was 
short-lived. With the unbanning of political organizations in February 1990, most UDF 
activists moved to the ANC, and began to participate in the building of ANC branches. 
New support for the Front was not forthcoming, probably because of its known · radical' 
history in the 1980s. These were some of the issues that hastened the disbandment 
of the UDF in the region. 
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After the unbanning of political organizations in 1990, UDF activists were engaged in 
debates to try and redefine the Front's future role in the country. While debates were 
going on nationally about the future of the UDF, in Pietermaritzburg region the Front 
had in effect ceased to exist. In the eight years of its existence in the region, the Front 
had achieved a number of things. Firstly, it brought together people from different races 
and walks of life into working to achieve a free, democratic and non-racial South Africa. 
Secondly, the Front managed to prevent lnkatha from establishing domination over 
African townships in the region. However, with traditional authorities playing a vital role, 
lnkatha managed to maintained its supremacy in the peri-urban area. One of the 
legacies of the UDF's struggles therefore is a politically community sharply divided 
between town and country. Finally, although the official disbandment of the UDF in 
1991 passed without notice on the part of former activists in the region, its legacy 
passed on to the ANC. Both the UDF's support base, and problems that faced it, were 
inherited by the ANC. 149 
APPENDIX 1 
The Declaration adopted by the United Democratic Front at its inauguration in Cape 
Town at Rocklands, Mitchell's Plain, on 20 August 1983 read as follows:. 
We, th_e freedom loving people of South Africa say with one voice to the world 
that we cherish the vision of a united, democratic South Africa based on the will 
of the people, we strive for the unity of all our people through united· action 
against the evils of apartheid, economic and all other forms of exploitation. 
AND, IN OUR MARCH TO A FREE AND JUST SOUTH AFRICA, WE ARE 
GUIDED BY THESE NOBLE IDEAS. 
The stand for the creation of a true democracy in which-all South Africans will 
participate in the government of our country; We stand for a single non-racial, 
unfragmented South Africa free of bantustans and Group Areas; 
We say, all forms of oppression and exploitation must erid. 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THESE NOBLE IDEAS, AND, ON THIS 20TH DAY OF 
AUGUST 1983, AT ROCKLANDS CIVIC CENTRE, MITCHELL'S PLAIN, WE 
JOIN HANDS AS COMMUNITY, WOMEN'S, STUDENTS', RELIGIOUS, 
SPORTING AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS TO SAY NO 
TO APARTHEID. 
We say NO to the Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill - a bill which will 
create yet another undemocratic constitution in the country of our birth; We say 
No to the Koornhof Bills which will deprive more and more African people of their 
birthright. 
We say Yes to the birth of UDF on this historic day; 
WE KNOW THAT 
this government is determined to break the unity of our people; 
WE KNOW THAT APARTHEID WILL CONTINUE 
that white domination and exploitation will continue; that forced removals, the 
group Areas act and the Bantustans will remain. 
WE KNOW that there will not be. an end to the unequal distribution of the land, 
wealth and resources of the country. That the migratory labour system will live 
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on to destroy family life. 
WE KNOW that the government will always use false leaders to become its 
junior partners and to control us. Our lives will still be filled with fears of 
harassment, bannings, detentions and death. 
Mindful of the fact that the new Constitutional Proposals and Koornhof measures 
will further entrench apartheid and white domination, 
WE COMMIT OURSELVES TO UNITING ALL OUR PEOPLE WHEREVER 
THEY MAY BE IN THE CITIES AND COUNTRYSIDE, THE FACTORIES AND 
MINES, SCHOOLS, COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, HOUSING AND 
SPORTS FIELDS, CHURCHES, MOSQUES AND TEMPLES, TO FIGHT FOR 
OUR FREEDOM. 
we therefore resolve to stand shoulder to shoulder in our common struggle and 
commit ourselves to 
WORK TOGETHER TO 
organize and mobilise all community, worker, student, women, religious, sporting 
and other organizations under the banner of the United Democratic Front; 
consult our people regularly and honestly, and bravely strive to represent their 
views and aspirations; educate all about the coming dangers and the need for 
unity; build and strengthen all organizations of the people; unite in action against 
these Bills and other day to day problems affecting our people. 
WE PLEDGE TO COME TOGETHER IN THIS UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT 
AND FIGHT SIDE BY SIDE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT'S 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROPOSALS AND THE KOORNHOF BILLS. 
Source: Ukusa, 9 September 1983. 151 
APPENDIX 2 
The national leaders of the UDF at its formation in 1983 were: 
PATRONS: Nelson Mandela, Monty Naicker, Helen Joseph, Florence Mkhize,. 
Allan Boesak, Sheik Naseem, Francis Baard, Dorothy Nyembe, Beyers Naude, 
Hassan Howa, Martha Mahlangu, Johnny lssel and Father Smangaliso 
Mkhatshwa PRESIDENTS : Archie Gumede (Natal); Albertina Sisulu 
(Transvaal); Oscar Mpetha (Cape Town). VICE-PRESIDENTS: Christmas Tinto 
and Joe Marks (Western Cape); George Sewpersad and Virgil Bonhomme 
(Natal); George du Plessis and Frank Chikane (Transvaal). SECRETARIES : 
Yunus Mohamed and Joe Phaahle (Natal); Trevor Manuel and Cheryl Carolus 
(Western Cape); Mohamed Vali and Popa Molefe (Transvaal). EXECUTIVE 
MEMBERS : Jerry Coovadia and Mcibisi Xundu (Natal); Ram Saloojee and 
Aubrey Makoena (Transvaal); Andrew Boraine and Mildred Lesia (Western 
Cape). 
Source: PACSA, UDF folders; 'The United Democratic Front'. 
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APPENDIX 3 
The organizations which belonged to the Committee of Concern (a body representing 
various anti-apartheid organizations) formed in 1983 in Pietermaritzburg included the 
following: 
Azanian Student Organization, Sobantu Youth Organization, Matiwane Youth 
League, Teachers Association of South Africa, Pietermaritzburg Child and 
Welfare, Pietermaritzburg Ratepayers Association, Mountain Rise Ratepayers, 
Bombay Heights Ratepayers, Combined Ratepayers, Bombay Heights Youth 
Movement, _ National Union of South Africa Students, Pietermaritzburg 
Association for Christian and Social Awareness, Young Christian Students, 
Anti-South African Indian Council, Black Sash, The University of Natal Joint 
Academic Staff Association, Council of Unions of South Africa, Metal and Allied 
Workers Union, Transport Workers Union, Paper and Allied Workers Union, 
Sweet Food and Allied Workers Union, Trade and General Workers Union, 
Maritzburg Football Association, Northern Suburb Football Association, Natal 
Midlands Table Tennis Association, Aurora Cricket Club, BARWY, Young Men's 
Muslim Association, Nizamia Muslim Society, Vivekananda Divine Life Mission, 
Hindu Young Mens' Association, Doctors' Guild, Northdale Residents 
Association, Mpumalanga Arts Ensemble, University of Natal Pietermaritzburg 
Black Workers Union, Deepavali Cheer Society. 
Source: PACSA, UDF folder: Committee of Concern, Newsletter (October 1983). 153 I 
APPENDIX4 
Some of Natal Midlands UDF members detained during the 5th state of 
emergency, 1988-1989 
Name 
Buthelezi, Sipho Abdool 
Chetty, Kamlasen 
Chanco, Thembezakhe Mishack 
Dladla, Dumisani Kenneth 
Dladla, Linda Lines 
Dlamini, Mxolisi Theobald 
Dlamini, Sobhuza Ernest 
Dlamini, Sytlverius 
Dube, Cosmos Dennis 
Gasa, Muhle Lennie 
Hadebe, Reggie 
Hadebe, VusumuziJohannes 
Hlongwane, Stembiso Benedict 
Khanyile, F. Sibusiso 
Khanyile, Siphiwe Moses 
Khumalo, Sydney Skhumbuzo 
Lukhele, Aubrey Mbusi 
Mabaso, E. Nkosinathi 
Madiba, C. Bonginkosi 
Majola, Bonginkosi Vayi 
Makhathini, E. Sibusiso 
Makhathini, M. Sthembiso 
Masango, Ernest Themba 
Mbambo, John 
Mbongwe, B. Mzwandile 
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Age ( approx) 
17 
28 
21 
35 
21 
17 
22 
27 
27 
32 
23 
27 
20 
19 
28 
22 
23 
21 
22 
19 
39 
18 
20 
Mchunu, M. Bonginkosi 28 
Mdladla, Lucky Joseph 22 
Mdladla, Mdelwa Jerome 19 
Mkhize, Mandia Gidla 20 
Mkhize, Sibusiso Alfred 18 
Mnikathi, Nsizwa Herbert 23 
Mokubung, N. Gregory 18 
Mpulo, F anelo Andries 
Mseleku, Thami 26 
Mthalane, 8. Jeffrey 
Mthembu, Sifako Isaac 28 
Myeza, Daniel Mbongeni 22 
Ndlele, Mazwi Eugene 19 
Ndlovu, Mduduzi 24 
Ngcobo, Qinisela Nicholas 18 
Ngubane, Dominic Sabo 
Ngwane, Brian Mxolisi 17 
Ngwenya, Dick Absolom 34 
Ngwenya, Skhumbuzo 30 
Nkwanyana, Muzi 24 
Nxumalo, Moses Bhekinkosi 20 
Nyimbile, S. Bhekinkosi 32 
Nzimande, Bheki Cyprian 17 
Sikhakhane, Dumisani 20 
Sithole, England Petros 25 
Sithole, Sibusiso Joackum 19 
Sosibi, Israel Thulani 32 
Vilakazi, J. Mandlenkosi 32 
Witternberg, Martin Werner ·2s
Xulu, Bernard Vika 33
Xulu, Thamsanqa Wiseman 30
Zondi, Jericho 24155 
Zuma, Ephraim Bongani 
Zuma, S. Nthabeni 
Zuma, Sipho Bethwell 
19 
30 
18 
Source: Christopher Merrett (University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg): Detainees Aid 
Committee; Research and Report file. 
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17 organizations that were restricted in February 1988 
United Democratic Front, Azanian Youth Organization, Azanian Peoples Organization, 
Detainees' Parents Support Committee, Detainees' Support Committee, Release 
Mandela Committee, National Education Crisis Committee, National Education Union 
of South Africa, South African National Students' Congress, Cape Youth Congress, 
South African Youth Congress, Soweto Civic Association, Cradock Residents' 
Association, Port Elizabeth Black Civic Association, Vaal Civic Association, Western 
Cape Civic Association, Congress of South African Trade Unions. 
Source: Natal Witness, 25 February 1988. 
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Statistical summary of detentions in Pietermaritzburg and the Natal Midlands: An 
overview. 
(a) Detentions under the third state of emergency, 12 June 1986 to 11 June 1987.
Category A B C D 
Students, scholars, teachers 97 
Unionists, workers 6 
Community group members 39 
Clergy, church workers 30 
Others 5 
Unknown 78 
TOTALS 255 
Notes: In the above column A = Original detention 
B = Redetentions 
C = Total detention 
D = Percentage of total. 
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7 104 38.8% 
1 7 2.6% 
3 42 15.7% 
30 11.2% 
5. 1.9%
2 80 29.8%
13 268 100.0%
(b) Detentions under the fourth state of emergency, 11 June 1987 to 1 O June 1988.
Category A B C D 
Students, scholars, teachers 30 4 34 2.7% 
Unionists, workers 41 41 3.1% 
Community Qroup members 63 11 74 5.7% 
Clergy, church workers 2 2 0.2% 
Others 3 3 0.2% 
Unknown 1124 14 1137 88.1% 
TOTALS 1263 29 1292 100.0% 
Notes: In the table above A = Original detention under the fourth state of emergency 
B = Redetentions 
C = Total detention 
D = Percentage of total. 
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(c) Detentions under the fifth state of emergency 11 June 1988 to 9 June 1989.
Category Number of detainees 
Students, scholars, teachers 9 
Unionists, workers 1 
Community group members 10 
Clerov, church members -
Others 
Unknown 74 
TOTAL 104 
Source: Christopher Merrett (University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg): UDF Detainees 
Aid Committee; Research and Report file. -
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